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Abstract
The relationship between religion and foreign policy has 
emerged as a priority for Western governments in recent 
years, yet scholarly analysis of the religion-foreign policy 
relationship, particularly in the UK, remains scarce. 
Seeking to contribute to this - still nascent - conversation, 
in this thesis, I ask the question ‘what are policy makers 
doing in the context of so-called religious resurgence or 
‘post-secularism’? In doing so, I challenge conventional 
wisdom about the secularism of public policy, about the 
emergence of the post-secular, about the impacts of 
globalisation and about rational choice theories of 
religious vitality. Broadly speaking, I argue that policy 
makers are finding new ways to ‘manage’ religion by 
drawing on both domestic policy and domestic 
constitutional settlements. As a result, I argue, there are 
constitutive differences in the way the United States and 
the United Kingdom pursue religion-related foreign policy. 
However, contrary to many sociological accounts which 
emphasise the outlier status of the United States in the 
otherwise overwhelmingly secular West (see e.g Berger et 
al, 2008), I demonstrate the ways in which Britain and 
America - when it comes to religion-related foreign policy  
- are religious and secular respectively.  Furthermore, this 
thesis offers a different account than that presented by, 
increasingly numerous, post-secular narratives. Where 
they emphasise religious change at the international level, 
I demonstrate that religion-related foreign policy, on both 
sides of the Atlantic, is characterised by continuity at the 
national level. 
Finally, I make suggestions about how a more religion-
attentive UK foreign policy could be developed in ways 
which are consistent with this story of continuity in the 
national management of religion.
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Chapter One: Medium, method, message 
1.1 Introduction
The inter-relationship between religion and politics has been the 
subject of increasing conversation in recent years. The appearance of 
religion-related panels at political science conferences and vice versa1, 
the emergence of the ‘political science of religion’ in Serbia and then 
the United States2 and the establishment of two interdisciplinary 
journals in 20073 and 20084 demonstrate the extent to which this 
nexus is now firmly established on the scholarly landscape. A 
8
1 The General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, for 
example, has started to include panels on religion. In 2011. the panel ‘Religious/
Secular Politics: Local, National and Global’ invited contributions on the struggles 
between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ in the context of the public sphere. Though there 
was no substantive panel on religion at the 2013 event, the upcoming 2015 General 
Conference will feature a ‘religion and foreign affairs’ panel for the first time. 
Similarly, the 2015 meeting of the International Society of the Sociology of Religion 
will host panels on ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, on ‘Politics, Religion and the 
Management of Religious Diversity’, on ‘the Role of Religious Organisations in the 
Sustainability of the Welfare State’ and on ‘religion and public institutions: new 
practice and religious-secular dynamics’ to name a few. 
2 The discipline was formerly established in the Faculty of Political Science at the 
University of Belgrade, Serbia in 1993 long before the Berkeley Center at 
Georgetown University appeared in 2006. 
3 The first ‘Politics and Religion’ journal was established in 2007 and focuses on the 
‘politology’ of religion. The journal is centred around a group of scholars at the 
Centre for the Study of Religion and Religious Tolerance in Belgrade, Serbia. For 
more information see http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/index.php?lang=en 
- accessed 14 May 2015.
4 The second journal ‘Politics and Religion’ which is multidisciplinary in approach 
and international in scope first appeared in 2008. It is a journal of the politics and 
religion section of the American Political Science Association.
combination of high profile politicians,5 events,6 and disputes7 have 
brought this relationship not only to public attention in the UK but, 
perhaps more importantly, into the realm of public policy 
development.
A thesis which is firmly located at this intersection, then, is timely. 
Moreover, the specific focus of this research - the relationship 
between religion and foreign policy - has emerged as a priority for 
Western Governments during the course of my research such that one 
major transatlantic research institution has devoted a year to the 
subject8 and one US official identified has identified 2014 as ‘the year 
of religion and foreign policy’ (USG/4 Oct 20139). Indeed, as a direct 
result of my fieldwork interviews, US State Department and UK 
9
5 Former Minister of State Baroness Warsi has been vocal about the extent to which 
the public sector has been gripped by ‘militant secularisation’ (Winnett, 2012) and 
has sought to create a society in which people feel ‘stronger in their religious 
identities’. Similarly former Prime MInister Tony Blair has spoken out about the 
need for the promotion of religious tolerance overseas given contemporary 
insecurities ‘could easily be fought around questions of cultural or religious 
difference’ (Helm, 2014).
6 For example, a series of ‘Westminster Faith Debates’, founded by Charles Clark 
and Linda Woodhead, have attracted the attention of both policy makers and the 
media, helping to fuel the conversation about religion and public life in the UK and 
beyond. http://faithdebates.org.uk/ - accessed 14 May 2015.
7 In February 2012, the High Court judged that it was unlawful for Bideford town 
council to begin meetings with religious prayer. In response to this judgement, then 
Communities Secretary Eric Pickles responded that the announcement was 
‘surprising and disappointing’ and set about giving councils back the ability to pray 
through the Localism Act (www.gov.uk, 2012). Elsewhere, in 2013, British Airway 
worker Nadia Eweida won a 6-year long battle against the airline for the right to 
wear a necklace bearing a cross to work. The Prime Minister responded on Twitter 
saying that he is ‘delighted people shouldn’t suffer discrimination due to religious 
beliefs’ (Doughty and Wilkes, 2013).
8 The Transatlantic Academy, a research institute that seeks to bridge the scholar-
practitioner divide declared their theme for the year 2014-2015 to be ‘religion and 
foreign policy’ and published ‘Faith, Freedom and Foreign Policy’ in April 2015, 
concluding that ‘policymakers in the transatlantic community must factor the
influence of religion into their decision making on numerous issues.’ (Bartnett et al, 
2015).
9 Roundtable contribution 4 October 2013
Foreign Office officials are now working together to better consider 
the role of religion in diplomacy.10 This thesis is emerging, then, at a 
time of some considerable activity both within the US and UK 
Governments and outside them but this has not always been the case. 
In fact, this project was inspired by three related factors - all of which 
reflect the historical absence of reflection on the religion-international 
policy relationship. 
My own experience as a former central Government civil servant was 
the main inspiration for this research. Quite unlike many of my 
colleagues in central government, my degree (in Theology and 
Religious Studies) often seemed irrelevant to the policy areas within 
which I was considered ‘qualified’ to work. While economists were 
often drawn to roles in Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), geographers to 
the Department for International Development, or engineers and 
scientists to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, on 
entering the Civil Service, it was not immediately clear to me that a 
background in religious studies (and a particular interest in the 
sociological study of religion) would be relevant to any general policy 
area. However, after the 2005 London terrorist attacks, greater 
attention was being paid to the significance of religion (particularly 
Islam) as a motivator of threat actors whose actions could seriously 
undermine the UK’s foreign and security objectives. It was in this 
10
10 In May 2013, in conjunction with the State Department, I organized, facilitated 
and presented at an inaugural State Department-Foreign Office roundtable on 
religion and foreign policy. A second roundtable, in October 2013 continued the 
conversation, focussing on the ways in which institutional resistance to ‘doing 
religion’ might be overcome.
context that I was offered a role in developing a new initiative - a 
National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom which would 
respond to the changing global context and integrate domestic and 
‘international’ departments within the government  toward a series of 
shared security goals. Between 2008 and 2010, in fact, three such 
Strategies were produced (two under the premiership of Gordon 
Brown and one under the Coalition Government) and a number of 
related strategic policy projects undertaken. My involvement in this 
work led to a number of realisations: first, that the relationship 
between the research community (both Universities and Think Tanks) 
and the policy community was an essential part of the policy 
development process; second, that the policy community was reliant 
on (and increasingly called upon) subject area experts from outside, to 
identify emerging issues about which the policy community would 
need to respond; and third that the nature of international policy was 
changing at a rapid pace with which the policy community was 
struggling to keep up. Perhaps most importantly, while undertaking a 
project on the significance of ‘soft power’ as a strategic security tool, I 
became increasingly convinced that too little attention was being paid 
to religion by the foreign policy community. In-depth analysis of, and 
engagement with, Muslim communities at home and abroad had long 
been underway as part of the Counter-Terrorism agenda, but this 
tended to be marginalised within key departments and was certainly 
far from mainstreamed (further discussion of this work and its 
implications can be found in Chapter Three  - ‘Getting Religion Right 
11
while Getting Religion Wrong’). The identification of ‘ideologies and 
beliefs’ in the 2009 National Security Strategy (HMG, 2009b) had not 
increased the depth or range of analysis of religion that was dedicated 
to other key ‘threat drivers’, such as poverty, resource shortages, and 
climate change. 
The second factor which influenced the direction of this research was 
the attention which was being paid by parallel academic and policy 
communities in the United States who had started taking religion 
much more seriously. Not only had the overt religiosity of President 
Bush resulted in considerable analysis of the First Amendment and 
relationship between religion and society in the US, the Obama 
administration also showed attentiveness to religion. Indeed, one of 
Obama’s first presidential speeches (in Cairo) focussed on his 
strategic objective to increase engagement and understanding of the 
Muslim World.11 A number of influential political scientists were also 
coalescing around the religion-security-foreign policy nexus as an 
important subject for the future. The Task Force on Religion and the 
Making of US Foreign Policy (Appleby and Cizik, 2010) explored a 
number of related issues and sought to raise the profile of religion as a 
strategic issue across the US foreign policy community. So too were 
US Universities developing curricula dedicated to this subject, little 
12
11 Birdsall (2015:173) suggests that Obama’s Cairo Speech represented a watershed 
moment in American diplomacy given it has been followed up with a series of 
initiatives to increase the bandwidth for religion-related diplomacy in the State 
Department.
wonder, then, that former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair founded his 
‘faith and globalisation’ initiative at a leading US University12. 
Explaining and exploring these markedly different transatlantic 
approaches to religion, then, was one of the core objectives of this 
research project from the outset and remains pertinent even in light of 
recent developments. Necessarily, this raises a number of questions 
about the way the religion-foreign policy relationship has already been 
characterised. The third factor which influenced the direction of this 
thesis was my MA research into the relationship between religion and 
security. As part of that project, I examined work which considered the 
religion-political science nexus and found that the vast majority of 
what is a relatively underexplored field, originates in the American 
epistemic community. Indeed, the contributors to the previously 
mentioned Task Force (Appleby and Cizik, 2010) constitute some of 
the leading voices in this conversation - from Thomas Farr (Berkeley 
Centre, Georgetown University) to Douglas Johnston (International 
Center for Religion and Diplomacy). Although varied in their 
approaches to key foreign policy issues, and indeed in their 
interpretation of the First Amendment, there are common features in 
the approaches taken by advocates of religion/foreign policy nexus in 
the US. The most significant of these, I would argue, is the distinction 
(also present in UK policy and literature, though it is far less 
13
12 The Tony Blair Faith Foundation ‘Faith and Globalisation’ network was started at 
Yale University in 2008, though it now consists of more than 30 research institutions 
around the world.
extensive) of ‘religious actors’ from what we might call ‘mainstream 
foreign policy actors’. My MA research thesis explored one 
manifestation of this distinction, focusing on the way ‘religious’ actors 
are presented in relation to security objectives. In my MA thesis, I 
argued that insufficient attention had been paid to the way religion 
might motivate state as well as non-state actors and, indeed, suggested 
that the security objective itself displayed certain ‘religious’ 
characteristics. 
In this thesis, I investigate a different dimension of the religion-policy 
relationship. I seek to advance what might be called a ‘top down’ 
analysis of the role in religion in foreign policy - that is a thorough 
investigation of how and why religion (and particularly religion-state 
relationships) influences policy and policy makers - as a natural 
complement to the ‘bottom up’ analyses characteristic of development 
theory, terrorism analysis and the like. This is, as the title of this thesis 
suggests, something of a ‘character study’ of the way religion is 
‘managed’ by policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. The title 
‘managing God’ is both a rhetorical evolution from the words of 
Alistair Campbell13 which have been appropriated by scholars and 
14
13 Famously former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Communications Director forbade 
the Prime Minister from answering questions about his religion in an interview (see 
Brown, 2003) with the expression ‘we don’t do God’. This comment has been 
widely quoted as evidence of the supposed marginalisation of religion in the public 
sphere (see e.g. Carey and Carey, 2012).
policy makers since14 and a reflection of the fact that the majority of 
this thesis deals with the nexus of religion and bureaucracy. Where 
‘doing God’ is an unspecific moniker which fails to describe the 
complex interactions of religion and policy making, ‘managing God’, 
I suggest, offers a more constructive and clearer articulation of what 
seems to be going on both in the US and UK context. I contend that 
without unravelling the complex connections between religion and the 
people who make policy, the processes they use and the assumptions 
they draw upon, it is impossible to fully demonstrate when and where 
policies are pursued out of anything other than ‘narrowly drawn 
interests’ (Appleby and Cizik, 2010: 8). Broadly speaking, I argue that 
there are constitutive differences in the way the United States and the 
United Kingdom pursue religion-related foreign policy. However, 
contrary to many sociological accounts that emphasise the outlier 
status of the United States in the otherwise overwhelmingly secular 
West (see e.g Berger et al, 2008), I demonstrate the ways in which 
Britain and America - when it comes to religion-related foreign policy 
- are religious and secular respectively. Furthermore, as the title of this 
thesis suggests, I demonstrate the significant ways in which the 
religion-state relationship in each context influences the foreign policy 
making process thereby subjecting religion to different sorts of 
15
14 For example, an event in March 2014 which brought together scholars and policy 
makers was entitled ‘How do Governments do God?’ - see http://
religiousliteracyhe.org/2014/02/how-do-governments-do-god-with-warwick-
hawkins-head-of-faith-communites-engagement-at-dclg-and-dr-chris-baker-
university-of-chester-12-march-2014/#.VVxlCiesPR0 - accessed 20 May 2015. 
Similarly, at the British Council Workshop ‘Toward Better International Policy 
Making: Understanding the role of religion in the Middle East and North Africa’, the 
Head of Faith Community and Civil Society Engagement at the Department for 
International Development made a presentation entitled ‘Governments Do God: the 
role of faith and religion in development’.  
‘management’. The result, I argue, is something very different than 
contemporary ‘post-secular’ narratives would have us believe. Rather 
than a story of religious change at the international level, this thesis 
exposes the reality that religion-related foreign policy - on both sides 
of the Atlantic - is characterised by continuity at the national level. 
Finally, I make suggestions about how a more religion-attentive UK 
foreign policy could be developed in ways that are consistent with this 
story of continuity in the national management of religion.
The research presented in this thesis, therefore, offers theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the way religion is understood by US and UK 
policy makers in light of both structural and cultural patterns of 
religiosity. It has been structured around three question sets: 
* How does religion influence state and non-state actors? Which 
actors are religious? How does religion orientate actors politically? 
Why does this matter for the UK?
* What are the goals of religiously-attentive foreign policy? How 
far is the American model a product of its context? Is current foreign 
policy ‘secular’? Is the integration of religion into foreign policy a 
good idea? 
* What might a strategy for integrating religion into UK foreign 
policy look like? How significant are differences in the cultural 
16
heritage of the US and the UK? How effective are current modes of 
engagement? How would religion fit in the UK system?
In answering these questions, it interrogates three analytical 
interfaces:
* The relationship between social science and public policy: how 
do policy makers use social scientific knowledge? How can social 
scientists achieve policy impact?
* The relationship between religion and public policy: how do 
policy makers contend with religion? How is religion represented to 
policy makers?
* The relationship between religion and social science: how do 
social scientists account for religious dynamics? How is the 
relationship between religion and society understood?
The rest of Part One is largely focussed on the first of these interfaces 
with the second and third acting as the core foci of Parts Two, Three, 
Four, Five and Six. 
17
1.2 Medium (or expanding the interface between public policy and 
social science)
Over the last ten years, the study of religion has been revitalised as a 
result of global religious revival and diversification and there has been 
increased attention paid to ‘religion’ and ‘the sacred’ across the 
academy, including in sectors such as the social and political sciences 
which have traditionally marginalised it (for a discussion of the 
relationship of the sociology of religion to mainstream social science 
see Beckford, 2000). Beckford (2000: 482) suggests that the ‘return’ 
of the sociology of religion from its formerly marginalised position to 
centrality, is the result of sociologists of religion accepting mainstream 
social scientific premises and of religion having become more 
interesting to other social scientists:  ‘the study of religion has entered 
the new millennium playing at least to some extent together with, 
rather than separately from, anthropologists, psychologists, other 
sociologists, political scientists and economists’. Despite these 
positive developments, however, in the following exploration of the 
relationship between social science in general (and the sociology of 
religion in particular) and public policy, I suggest that while policy 
makers are increasingly comfortable contending with religious 
dynamics, sociologists of religion may not have developed the sort of 
‘policy literacy’ necessary to achieve real impact.
18
1.21 Policy literacy 
In addition to the proliferation of interest in ‘religion’ across academic 
disciplines, renewed attention has been paid to religion and belief in 
the context of public policy. A number of essays in Woodhead and 
Catto’s (2012) collection reflect the prevalence of religion in the 
discourses of law, politics (Ganiel and Jones, Mawhinney et al, 2012) 
and public policy (Dinham and Jackson, 2012; Johnsen, 2012), just as 
policy makers themselves seem increasingly comfortable with ‘doing 
God’. Ministerial rhetoric emphasises not only the continued 
significance of religion in contemporary society but seeks to actively 
engage with religious communities and dynamics in the achievement 
of public policy goals.15 Furthermore, civil servants themselves have 
made public statements about the work being done within 
Government to ‘include religious organisations in public 
life’ (Hawkins, 2013) and to better understand the influences of 
religion on policy.16 Beckford (2012: 15) suggests that the coalescence 
of dramatically increased religious pluralism, equalities legislation and 
the ‘confluence of communitarian and neoliberal currents’, which has 
19
15 For example, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, celebrated the 400th 
anniversary of the King James Bible by calling Britain ‘a Christian country’ and 
describing the role the Bible has played in helping ‘to give Britain a set of values 
and morals’. Launching the ‘near neighbours’ policy, Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles emphasised the ‘vital role’ played 
by faith communities https://www.gov.uk/government/news/launch-of-near-
neighbours-programme - (accessed 12 February 2013).
16 See Sue J Breeze (an official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office working 
on freedom of religion, antisemitism and post-Holocaust issues) Twitter, 4 October 
1012: ‘Thought-provoking meeting this morning with government colleagues on 
influence of religion on policy. Loads of ideas to follow up!’
created a ‘faith sector’ in public service delivery, is responsible for 
boosting the visibility of public religion in Britain. 
In fact, it is possible to trace the attention paid to religion, faith and 
belief by policy makers in three distinct dimensions: religion as a 
policy ‘problem’, religion as a policy ‘solution’, and, most recently, 
the emergence of religion as a contextual or determinative factor in 
societal dynamics. One official has described these three modes in the 
language of political science, suggesting that these modes reflect 
‘primordial’, ‘instrumental’ and finally ‘constructivist’ conceptions of 
religion (HMG/4 October 2013/a ). Given the emergence of 
international Islamist terrorism at the end of the twentieth century, and 
the significance of religious dynamics and actors in military 
engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that religion has been presented as a policy ‘problem’ and, indeed, that 
the resulting ‘securitization’ (Croft, 2012) and ‘stigmatization’ (House 
of Commons, 2010a) of religious communities has been widely 
criticised. The description of ‘ideologies and beliefs’ as national 
security ‘threat drivers’ in the 2009 National Security Strategy (HM 
Government, 2009b), domestic and international counter-
radicalisation policy ‘Prevent’17, and the deployment of Muslim faith 
20
17 The 2009 update to the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy ‘CONTEST’ explains that 
‘The purpose of the Prevent strand of CONTEST is therefore to stop people 
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and violent extremism’ and goes on to 
suggest ‘Prevent must be based upon a collaborative partnership between 
Government, policing and communities. Prevent must enable and support 
communities to continue to actively challenge the small minority who espouse 
violent extremism. But the Prevent strategy must not be the only or the main context 
in which Government and Muslim communities work and talk together’ (HMG, 
2009a p.12).
advisers to central departments and government agencies18 all reflect 
the way policy-makers understood religion as an obstacle to the 
achievement of public policy goals. So too do they demonstrate the 
‘instrumentalisation’ of religious actors and organisations as ‘policy 
solutions’. The contribution of faith-based organisations to civil 
society development both at home and overseas is long established. 
What Beckford describes as the ‘statutory’ role for religion in UK 
public life means that major public institutions - including schools, the 
military and prisons - have long intertwined monarchy, Church and 
state in the delivery of services and achievement of policy goals and in 
ways that have been expanded in light of religious diversity 
(Beckford, 2012: 16). So too has the proliferation of ‘third sector’ and 
‘civil society’ welfare and health providers (see e.g. Dinham and 
Jackson, 2011) created a ‘faith sector‘ (Beckford, 2012: 15) which is 
increasingly called upon to contribute to governance and service 
provision. Whether this represents the ‘cooption’ (Ketell, 2012) or 
‘interpellation‘ (Beckford, 2012) of religion, it is apparent that policy 
makers recognise religious organisations and communities not only as 
‘policy problems’ but also as contributors to domestic policy 
outcomes. 
21
18 One former ‘faith advisor’ to Her Majesty’s Prison Service explained to me that, 
from the advent of the Preventing Violent Extremism Agenda (made public with the 
publication of CONTEST, the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy, in 2006), Muslim 
Advisers and Muslim chaplains were increasingly being used as ‘tools against 
extremism’ and to ‘clarify’ and ‘expose’ extremist Muslim theological positions 
(HMG/4 October 2013/a).
Moreover, religion has been presented as a ‘policy solution’ in the 
international context. The Department for International Development 
has actively partnered religious organisations since its inception in 
1997. Under then Secretary of State Claire Short, a mapping exercise 
was undertaken which revealed the limits of Government’s 
understanding of the contribution of faith-based organisations to 
international development (HMG/4 October 2013/b)19. Furthermore, 
religious organisations complained that they were rarely engaged with 
except as ‘implementers of policy’ (HMG/4 October 2013/b). 
Importantly, Short encouraged wider engagement with FBOs and later 
the Department collaborated with academics on a large-scale 
Religions and Development Research programme, administered by the 
University of Birmingham20 which ran between 2005 and 2011. Not 
only did this research help policy makers to understand the various 
ways in which religious organisations and communities are implicated 
in development processes, it demonstrated the complex inter-
relationship between religion and development contexts (HMG/4 
October 2013/b).
Indeed, in my interviews with policy officials across central 
government departments, it was external engagements with religion, 
particularly in non-Western contexts, which challenged their own 
assumptions about the significance of religion and its social location, 
22
19 Roundtable contribution 4 October 2013.
20 For more information on this programme, see the dedicated website: http://
www.religionsanddevelopment.org/index.php?section=1 
as one official explained ‘we are only just starting to realise that our 
settled view of the world is otherwise’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c) and 
another suggested ‘there is a need for greater understanding of faith 
communities whose boundaries of politics and religion are not the 
ones we’re familiar with’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a). These experiences, 
supported by intellectual frameworks which are increasingly 
sophisticated about the religion-international relations nexus (e.g. 
Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2004; Thomas, 2005) have helped policy 
makers to recognise religion as more than an ‘obstacle’ or ‘barrier’ to 
achieving policy outcomes, and more too than a ‘tool’ or ‘instrument’ 
through which policy goals might be achieved. In fact, the most recent 
policy engagement with religion has uniquely been in encouraging 
religious organisations and communities to work with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to report and challenge religious persecution 
overseas (HMG/ 23 August 2012/a), enabling them to ‘utilise’ the 
extensive Embassy network to promote international religious 
freedom. I discuss this and other religion-related foreign policy 
initiatives in detail in Chapter Four (4.2 ‘On religious freedom’ and 
4.3 ‘Post-secular foreign policy?’).
Whether it is the result of genuine ‘religious resurgence’ (Berger, 
1999, Thomas, 2005) or reflects a less ‘radical’ series of circumstances 
in which religious actors have come to be implicated in public life 
(Beckford, 2012), many of the officials I interviewed recognised 
religious engagement as a policy imperative (e.g. HMG/27 July 2012/
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a; HMG/ 23 August 2012/a; HMG/3 July 2012/a; HMG/28 August 
2012/a). Moreover, this imperative has necessitated close contact 
between policy makers and external ‘experts’. One official expressed 
to me an openness to engagement with academics and think tanks and 
conscious attempts to ‘keep on top of key reports‘ (HMG/27 July 
2012/a), while others pointed to the FCO’s community of ‘research 
analysts’ as a way to ‘access’ external research (HMG/ 24 July 2012/a) 
and as the ‘central focus for academic engagement’ (HMG/28 August 
2012/c). A number of other officials interviewed identified drawing on 
expertise from outside Government as a routine part of the policy 
process (HMG/4 July 2012/a; HMG/ 24 July 2012/a; HMG/5 July 
2012/d), with one official noting that ‘we have to do so (engage with 
academics and think tanks) more and more as resourcing becomes 
ever tighter’ (HMG/ 27 July 2012/a)21.8 October 2013/a). 
1.22 Religious literacy
However, while these relationships augur well for increasingly 
sophisticated understanding of religion in the policy context, they 
have also exposed a number of cultural and institutional barriers to 
engagement with religious dynamics and actors. Later, in Chapter 
Three, I argue that what I call ‘religion blindness’, a combination of 
‘impartiality’ and fear of ‘getting religion wrong’, continues to be 
prevalent among officials in central government departments. Others 
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21 In correspondence 8 October 2013.
have identified a ‘secular’ orientation as influencing policy responses 
to religion (Gutkowski, 2013; Chapman, 2008). Yet perhaps the most 
prevalent observation about the policy community’s attempts to 
‘manage God’ has been that there is an institutional lack of ‘religious 
literacy’ (Prothero, 2008; Dinham and Jones, 2010; Dinham and 
Francis, 2015; Knott et al, 2006; Carr, 2007). In fact, ‘religious 
literacy’ is understood and used by practitioners, scholars and 
religious civil society representatives in three different dimensions: 
first, it is used with reference to ‘knowledge about’ religious traditions 
and communities and, in some cases, ‘knowledge of’ the way religion 
orientates identities, worldviews and behaviours, as Carr (2007: 668 - 
my italics) suggests ‘it would be hard to count anyone as properly 
educated who completely lacked any religious knowledge’. 
Alternatively, ‘religious literacy’ can be described as an ability or skill 
as Prothero (2008:11 - my italics), who popularised the expression in 
the United States, suggests, it is ‘the ability to use religious terms and 
symbols’. Finally, the lack of ‘religious literacy‘ is used as shorthand 
for either ‘secularism’ or the persistent belief in, or commitment to, 
variations of secularisation theory.22 
The achievement of ‘religious literacy’ in the specific contexts of 
public policy and practice has also taken a number of different shapes. 
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22 While it is beyond the scope of this section to describe and problematise the many 
dimensions of secularisation theory, it is pertinent to identify the three main tenets of 
classic accounts of secularisation as described by Casanova, (2006) as: the societal 
decline in religiosity or religious affiliation; the differentiation of religion from other 
social spheres (economics, politics etc.); and the ‘privatisation’ of religion, or 
confinement of religion to the private sphere. It is likely that those interviewed 
conflated two or more of these dimensions in their own references to 
‘secularisation’.
In the policy framework articulated by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (2008a: 33- my italics) religious 
literacy is the condition of demonstrating both ‘the skills and 
knowledge required to engage in an informed and confident way with 
faith communities’ (DCLG, 2008a:33 - my italics), where research 
into community policing emphasises ‘the importance of context-
specific religious literacy and religious awareness...(as a means of) 
enhancing the delivery of an effective and responsive policing 
service’ (McFadyen and Prideaux, 2011:8 - my italics). More recently, 
the potential advantages of increased religious literacy have been 
articulated in an international context where understanding ‘how 
religion motivates and mobilises people’ and ‘how grievances are 
presented’ (HMG/4 October 2013/a) are considered critical in conflict 
resolution and peace-building operations; and where recognising and 
understanding ways in which religion may be significant as a 
‘motivating factor’ and in ‘shaping the regional environment’ (HMG/
28 August 2012/b) make understanding religion necessary to ‘manage 
our relationships with other societies’ (HMG/ 13 December 2012/a). 
The exposure of policy makers both to a highly religious global 
context23 and to the increasing body of scholarship on religion in 
public life across a range of disciplines (for summaries of recent 
developments in the study of religion, see e.g. Beckford (2000) and 
Sherkat and Ellison (1999), then, has revealed a series of institutional 
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23 According to Pew research (2012b) ‘worldwide, more than eight in ten people 
identify with a religious group’. 
shortcomings within the policy community. In doing so, it has 
demonstrated the importance of ‘translation’ between different 
communities of practice to increase mutual intelligibility and enable 
more effective partnership working. The result has been a range of 
initiatives aimed at increasing the ‘religious literacy’ of the policy 
making process including, for example, the appointment of specific 
religious advisers to central Government departments HMG/4 
(October 2013/a, HMG/5 July 2012/b), the publication of ‘principles’ 
for working with faith communities (HMG/14 June 2013/a)24 , the 
inclusion of religious actors in advisory fora (HMG/ 23 August 2012/
a, HMG/23 August 2012/b) and the adaptation of existing ‘religious’ 
state functions (Beckford and Gillat, 2005). However it is understood, 
there is clear evidence that the accusation of religious ‘illiteracy’ has 
been internalised by central government policy makers and that efforts 
are being made to overcome it. Yet, from my own experience, as well 
evidence drawn from interviews I have undertaken in the UK and the 
US, suggests that in the rush to criticise the policy establishment, 
scholars of religion - and indeed religious civil society organisations - 
have often overlooked their own shortcomings and have failed to 
develop ‘policy literacy’. 
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24 Roundtable contribution 14 June 2013.
1.23 Two Communities?
There is a relatively well developed historical literature25 on the ‘gap’ 
between social science research and the policy community which 
emphasises ‘that social scientists and policy makers live in separate 
worlds with different and often conflicting values, different reward 
systems and different languages’ (Caplan, 1979: 459) Indeed, so-
called ‘two communities theory’ reflects on a supposed ‘great 
divide’ (Weiss, 1979) between social scientists and decision makers, 
particularly when it comes to substantive policy issues (Caplan, 1979). 
However, while the better understanding - and use - of academic 
research by policy makers has been recognised as a necessary part of 
successful ‘evidence based’ policy (see HM Government 2012: 14), 
how well do scholars of religion understand the policy environment?
Beckford (2012: 2) describes a range of different ways in which the 
idea of ‘post-secularity’ has gripped the academy and identifies 
‘varieties’ of the post-secular in disciplines such as philosophy, 
literary theory, post-colonial studies, anthropology, political science, 
international relations and geography, noting that ‘the fact that 
commentary on religion is increasingly creeping into social scientific 
28
25 It is significant that, despite the current emphasis on academic impact, I have 
struggled to find more recent literature on the relationship between social science 
research and the policy community, with a couple of notable exceptions. The dates 
of the research quoted here are potentially significant, given they appeared just 
before the Thatcher Government de-emphasised the role of ‘society’ and hence 
undermined the acceptability of the social sciences. It is possible that there has been 
a dearth of literature on the usefulness of social science literature since that time, 
though this is starting to change thanks to the impact agenda (see e.g. Bastow, 
Dunleavy and Tinkler, 2014 and Denicolo, 2013).
theorising about social and cultural change suggests that the study of 
religion is no longer isolated from the rest of the social sciences as it 
used to be’ (Beckford 2000:488). Interest in religion from sectors that 
have traditionally marginalised it (see e.g. Philpott, 2009) has been an 
important contributor to the increased public visibility of religion in 
the UK. The appearance of ‘religion’, ‘the sacred‘ and the ‘non-
rational’ as key tropes in post-structuralist, post-modern and post-
colonial thought, characterised by the social scientific ‘turn to 
culture’ (Robertson, 1988), has returned religion to the mainstream of 
academic enquiry. Yet, this proliferation of interest in ‘religion’ 
suggests something other than the ‘harmony’ of religious studies and 
wider social science (Beckford, 2012). I would suggest that it 
demonstrates important ways in which religious studies has not 
always been ‘up to the task’ of answering the questions posed of it in 
the contemporary era, and argue specifically for increased knowledge 
and understanding of the policy process in order to ensure both the 
medium and the message of religious studies achieves a greater policy 
‘impact’.
While there is an imperative for policy makers to utilise external 
expertise both in policy development and evaluation (Cabinet Office, 
1999a: para 2.6), a number of officials I interviewed expressed 
frustration about the relevance, presentation and timing of, as well as 
access to, research findings, a combination of factors that I 
characterise as ‘policy illiteracy’. Surprisingly, some officials even 
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expressed concern about the extent to which internal analysts (for 
example the FCO’s Research Analysts or the Joint Intelligence 
Organisation Analysts) ‘understand the policy context’ (HMG/ 24 July 
2012/a), given the analysis ‘profession’ is separated from the policy 
‘profession’ within Government (HMG/28 August 2012/b). And this 
distance is also manifest in engagement with external experts as one 
official explained there is a sense that ‘academic stuff happens in a 
different sphere...’ (HMG/4 July 2012/a).  As a result of this distance 
between the ‘two communities’, it seems, the challenge of 
‘translating’ research findings into policy-relevant information is one 
which falls disproportionately on the policy community as social 
scientists ‘know the literature but there is a skill gap when it comes to 
getting things done’ (HMG/7 December 2012/b), hence ‘policy 
makers puzzle how do we use this, how to take the idea and do 
something with it?’ (HMG/4 July 2012/a). In fact, it is more common 
for policy makers to commission research in specific contexts (HMG/ 
24 July 2012/a) or to draw on internal research capacity (HMG/7 
December 2012/a, HMG/28 August 2012/a) than to routinely consult 
external academic expertise. Caplan (1979:467) calls this micro-level 
utilisation of information as ‘parochial’ given it rarely applies to 
macro-level issues or ‘conceptual utilisation’ and given the amount of 
data it is possible to gather and store in-house is limited. Further, he 
suggests, this approach is high risk and ‘purely adventitious’. The 
same concerns were expressed by those I interviewed with one official 
suggesting that ‘seeking out academic research is dependent on 
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person’ and is ‘often done via Google which is hit and miss’ (HMG/4 
July 2012/a). Caplan (1979: 467) argues for better institutional 
arrangements ‘deliberately designed to supplement agency-provided 
information with other kinds of knowledge vital to national policy 
decisions’, but also lays down a challenge for the academic 
community to make ‘realistic appraisals of the relative merit of 
diversified social science information, linking persons with relevant 
expertise...to the policy setting; recognising and distinguishing 
between scientific and extra-scientific knowledge needs; and 
redefining issues in terms that may make them more amenable to 
solution or which allow them to be viewed from a different 
perspective’ (Caplan 1979: 467). In an era where academics are being 
encouraged to demonstrate research impact in a number of spheres,26 
there is a clear role for them in assisting policy makers to access, 
understand and utilise knowledge effectively.
In addition, there are a number of specific challenges for sociologists 
of religion if we are to better inform and influence the policy making 
process. During my interviews with policy officials in the UK, it 
became apparent that there remains concern about ‘how’ to engage 
with religion given ‘government and religion are speaking two 
different languages...as they should be....the government doesn’t have 
anything useful to say about the existence or not of God’ (HMG/4 July 
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26 A Joint Statement by HEFCE, RCUK and UUK, http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/kei/
maximising/Pages/Impactstatement.aspx - (accessed 8 October 2013) explains that 
there is a need for Higher Education Institutions to ‘consistently engage with 
business, the public sector and civil society organisations, and are committed to 
carrying new ideas through to beneficial outcomes.’ 
2012/c). As a result, the same official explained, when it comes to 
research on religion ‘I’m not convinced we’re intelligent 
customers’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c). Furthermore, there are a number of 
ways in which these ‘different languages’ manifest themselves. Some 
policy makers explained that the data made available by scholars of 
religion was inadequate given ‘too much is based on views and 
assertions’ rather than the factual certainty of double-blind testing in 
the natural sciences (HMG/10 May 2012/b) and given the lack of 
available statistics and large-scale data sets on religion (HMG/5 July 
2012/b). It is important to recognise that, though policy makers 
recognise their own shortcomings when it comes to the evidence-base 
of many policy decisions (HMG/7 December 2012/b), the type of data 
and the style in which it is presented by sociologists of religion are not 
always compatible with the policy making process. Indeed, the need to 
publish research outcomes in ways that are accessible to the policy 
community is another challenge for sociologists of religion. Nor do 
sociologists of religion have the sort of deep, long-term relationships 
with the policy community that their competitors in other social and 
political sciences benefit from: initiatives like the recent Westminster 
Faith Debates27 were described as ‘useful’ but ‘unusual’ (HMG/3 July 
2012/a). In fact, it seems, policy makers are more likely to consult 
religious ‘representatives’ than scholars of religion. 
32
27 The Westminster Faith Debates is an initiative founded by Linda Woodhead and 
former Home Secretary Charles Clarke now both at Lancaster University. The Faith 
Debates bring together academics and public figures to debate the latest research on 
religion and values. For more information see http://faithdebates.org.uk/about/ - 
accessed 18 May 2015.
Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the appointment of 
Muslim ‘faith advisers’ to a number of central government 
departments. These were able to increase understanding of different 
traditions and to challenge the way policy makers understood some 
issues as one official described: ‘I would argue it was a class thing. He 
would say it was about being Muslim....’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b), 
drawing on different migration patterns and religious trends to show 
‘differences between religious groups in their tendency to achieve 
particular measures of ‘success’(HMG/5 July 2012/b). Another 
suggested that Muslim advisors to the Prison Service were able to 
‘clarify’ and ‘expose’ extremist theological positions and contribute to 
countering extremism (HMG/4 October 2013/a). In other 
circumstances, policy makers describe the inclusion of ‘religious 
voices’ into advisory groups on a number of policy issues (HMG/ 23 
August 2012/a, HMG/23 August 2012/b, HMG/28 August 2012/a, 
HMG/27 July 2012/a, HMG/4 October 2013/a), and mechanisms for 
the consultation of religious communities at home and overseas 
through organisations identified with the nine historic faith 
communities.28 While officials are aware of some of the inherent 
dangers in this approach such as the tendency to ‘look for 
representatives and institutions like us’ (HMG/7 December 2012/a), 
which can create a relationship of instrumentalisation and can also 
lead to intra and inter-religious conflicts over ‘patronage and 
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28 Central Government routinely consults the Christian Churches (individually for 
larger denominations and collectively), the Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish, Buddhist, 
Jain, Zoroastrian and Baha’i communities.
influence’ (HMG/27 July 2012/a), nevertheless in the scope of the 
Government’s engagement of religious issues and dynamics across a 
range of policy areas, consultation of ‘representatives’ rather than 
consultation of ‘experts’ seems to be the default approach. Not only, 
then, are sociologists of religion competing with other academic 
experts for impact in public policy, they also - uniquely - face 
competition from religious voices. 
1.24 Toward ‘policy literacy’
It is apparent, then, that sociologists of religion face a threefold 
challenge: to better inform and impact upon the policy making process 
despite what is at best the ad hoc consultation of social scientific 
research in general by policy makers; to do so despite strong 
competition from other social and political scientists who often have a 
stronger track record of engagement with policy makers; and to 
compete against the dominance of ‘confessional’ religious voices in 
existing arrangements. To overcome this challenge, I suggest, will 
require us to find better and different ways to share our research 
findings - finding policy-relevant media - and to better understand the 
policy development process and the requirements of policy makers - 
developing policy-relevant messages. 
In the United States, where the policy process is considerably more 
‘open’ (Steiner, 1987), there are a number of useful precedents for 
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enabling sociologists of religion to achieve research impact. Not only 
have the Luce Foundation29 and Pew Forum30 committed considerable 
time and resource to the study of public religion, their research outputs 
are presented in terms that policy makers can understand and use, 
emphasising ‘the quantitative side of religious scholarship...(which) 
people aren’t used to discussing’ (USCS/30 April 2013/a). Not only 
did policy makers (USG/7 May 2013/a; USG/15 May 2013a; USG/4 
October 2013/a) frequently refer to this data, scholars themselves 
acknowledged that ‘there is certainly an appetite for the sociological 
study of religion and people are seeing its value’ but that it is 
important to ‘use different language to get policy peoples’ interest...if 
they only speak a certain language they won’t be heard’ (USCS/30 
April 2013/a). Specifically, the presentation of research ‘not stuck in 
academia’ (USCS/30 April 2013/a) and in terms that ordinary people, 
including policy makers can understand, is important. Further, 
research should be non-partisan but pragmatic - for example, 
describing phenomena as ‘religion-related’ is a useful way to avoid 
protracted and inward-looking debates about the ‘nature’ or 
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29 According to the Luce Foundation Website, ‘The Henry R. Luce Initiative on 
Religion in International Affairs, launched in June 2005, aims to provide intellectual 
leadership, develop new paradigms for research and teaching, create new resources 
and networks, and enhance public understanding of and discussion about religion in 
the international sphere.’ Of particular note is the grant that the Luce Foundation 
awarded to the British Council to support the ‘Bridging Voices’ series of 
transatlantic scholarly and policy dialogues through which I was able to design and 
facilitate two transatlantic workshops ‘Toward Better International Policy Making’. 
For more information on this and other Luce initiatives, see http://www.hluce.org/
hrlucerelintaff.aspx - accessed 18 May 2015.
30 The Pew Research Center is a non-partisan ‘fact tank’ that seeks to inform the 
public about ‘the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world’. 
Religion and Public Life is one of seven research projects undertaken by the Center 
which conducts polling of public opinion, demographic research and other empirical 
social science research. More information on Pew Center projects can be found here: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/ - accessed 18 May 2015.
‘definition’ of religion (USCS/30 April 2013/a, USG/4 October 2013/
a31) and makes the measurement and study of religion possible, 
opening up new avenues for scholars of religion. Civil society 
representatives in the US, too, are conscious of the need to ‘translate’ 
between communities which puts a premium on ‘knowledge and 
experience of the way politics works’ (USCS/24 April 2013/a*), often 
drawn from direct experience of the policy environment, (USCS/26 
March 2013/a*, USCS/26 March 2013/b*, USCS/24 April 2013/a*) as 
well as the  ‘ability of actors to be ‘bilingual’ or ‘multilingual’...able to 
speak to lots of different communities’ (USCS/26 March 2013/a*).
Indeed, HMG officials too were concerned to dispel the ‘mystique of 
policy development: all policy really is a plan to do 
something’ (HMG/4 July 2012/a), thus research outputs need to be 
delivered in an appropriate way which means ‘knowing your audience 
and writing to the level that is required based on their 
understanding....’ (HMG/28 August 2012/b). Specifically, it is 
important not to ‘assume a massive level of specialisation’ (HMG/28 
August 2012/b) and to recognise that officials may ‘lack the time or 
ability to think in detail’ (HMG/4 July 2012/a). At the same time, 
scholars must recognise that ‘officials are never starting from a zero 
base of a problem’ (HMG/4 July 2012/a) given Ministers and political 
parties determine strategic direction, meaning that the achievement of 
research impact must consider the multiple layers of ‘policy making’ 
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31 Roundtable contribution 4 October 2013.
machinery. It may be for this reason that the ‘conceptual 
utilisation’ (Caplan, 1979) of knowledge is less common in the policy 
environment than its ‘instrumental utilization’ on day-to-day issues. 
This has implications for the type of research that is undertaken by 
sociologists of religion and for the way research findings are 
disseminated.
In seeking specifically to influence and inform policy makers, it is 
hoped that this research might act as a prototype for sociologists of 
religion. Alongside this thesis, I have published in a policy-facing 
journal (The Review of Faith and International Affairs: Lindsay, 2014) 
as well as other media (Birdsall, Lindsay and Tomalin, 2015a) that 
have a wider policy and public audience. I also successfully bid to the 
British Council for a ‘Bridging Voices’ grant to organise, design and 
facilitate two transatlantic workshops entitled ‘Toward Better 
International Policy Making: Understanding the role of religion’. 
These workshops involved scholars and practitioners from both the 
US and the UK and represented an opportunity for me to expose my 
own research to a policy audience. (More detail about these 
workshops and their findings can be found in Chapter Six (6.4 ‘The 
contemporary picture’.) Indeed, a crucial part of this project has been 
findings ways to present my research findings to policy makers and I 
have actively sought to build consensus around my findings and to 
help policy makers explore their implications. One Government 
official has already commented that ‘You are already contributing, 
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which is great’ (HMG/13 December 2013/a)32 and I intend to monitor 
the on-going ‘impact’ on the policy community of this range of media 
in the hope of producing findings about the best ways to measure and 
demonstrate ‘impact’ on the policy community.33
  
1.3 Method
My own research, which consciously seeks to inform and influence 
the policy community, bridges the gap between these ‘two 
communities’. It seeks to increase policy literacy within the sociology 
of religion community by taking a loosely ‘ethnographic’ approach to 
interpreting the policy process and community and, at the same time, 
to increase the understanding of religion by policy makers through the 
adoption of an ‘interpretative research’ (Bhattacherjee (2012) 
methodology. Interpretative research, according to Bhattacherjee 
(2012:103) is the opposite of positivist methodology given ‘the 
research starts with data and tries to derive a theory about the 
phenomenon of interest from the observed data’. Seeking to 
understand the way policy makers engage with religion to fill what I 
have perceived as a gap in the literature - the religion-bureaucracy 
38
32 In correspondence 6 May 2015.
33 Alongside this PhD, I have undertaken to develop an ‘impact survey’ as a means 
of testing and measuring research impact using qualitative methods. This survey 
takes the form of a semi-structured interview and has been piloted on Leeds City 
Council with whom myself and colleagues partnered on a project with the output 
‘Taking Religion and Belief Seriously: The challenge for Leeds City 
Council’ (Lindsay, Starkey and Kirby, 2014). Using the impact survey to measure 
the impact of this report on Leeds City Council both helped me to refine the survey 
and to demonstrate the ways in which our academic research had changed the way 
Leeds City Council institutionally approached religion and religious communities. 
A second pilot, with English Heritage, will take place before the refined survey is 
used to measure the impact of the British Council Workshops.
nexus - I set out to understand the relationship between religion and 
state from the perspective of those experiencing it (Woodgate, 2001). 
Simply put, my research process involved the continued interplay of 
empirical data and theoretical reflections and this is reflected in the 
contents of this thesis. I began and ended the research process with 
extended engagement with the work of Margaret Archer and the 
critical realists and with Charles Taylor’s seminal work ‘A Secular 
Age’. These pieces of work represent the ‘bookends’ which support 
the analysis contained in this thesis - I begin in Chapter Two with 
some reflections on Taylor and end - unusually for a PhD thesis - in 
my final chapter by introducing new material to consider the extent to 
which Archer’s model of cultural morphogenesis helps us to explain 
what is going on when policy makers ‘manage God’. These theoretical 
reflections were therefore at the forefront of my mind when I 
undertook my empirical fieldwork. My fieldwork took place over a 
two year period during which time I sought - and was mostly given -  
access to policy makers in the UK and US systems whose work 
required them to engage with religious issues, actors and dynamics. I 
used these interviews to better understand the bureaucratic response to 
so-called ‘religious resurgence’ and used the insights gained from 
these interviews to reflect on dominant social and political narratives.
As such, this thesis has been developed through the triangulation of 
three research methods. First, it is informed by working experience of 
UK foreign and security policy and has involved close analysis of 
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primary material in the UK and the US including published foreign 
policy documentation, official communications and internal 
documents from the National Archives and US Library of Congress. 
This has been combined with a series of semi-structured interviews 
with experts and policy makers in order to explore the various 
dimensions in which the religion-foreign policy relationship are 
currently understood. Finally, I draw on a range of theoretical 
approaches. A conceptual analysis of the relationship between 
religion, culture and political action, and a sociological evaluation of 
the impact of the national understanding of religion on public life, 
have shaped a number of theoretical findings through which I reflect 
on the relationship between religion and society. 
1.31 Policy and the non-rational 
Weiss (1979:439) suggests that the ‘contribution of social science to 
public policy cannot be understood independently of the processes for 
making public policy’ given these processes determine where and 
when external expertise is sought. As the Institute for Government’s 
‘Policy Making in the Real World’ points out, most theoretical models 
about policy development present the process as a series of logical 
steps - most commonly as a cycle which ‘has the advantage of 
recognising that few policies are built on green field sites – most 
modify existing positions, which may have grown up piecemeal over 
time.’ (Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, 2011). Indeed, most 
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professional policy training will utilise some form of ‘cycle’ to 
demonstrate the various stages of the policy development process as in 
the oft-quoted ‘ROAMEF’ cycle identified in HM Treasury’s ‘Green 
Book.’34
Figure 1: ‘ROAMEF’ evaluation and appraisal cycle, HM Treasury, 
Green Book (HMT, 2003/2011:3)
Despite its continued use, the cyclical account of the policy process is 
widely recognised as flawed. In fact, in 1999, a Cabinet Office 
publication explicitly rejected it: ‘we started to try to represent the 
‘modernised’ policy process in the traditional way, using a model... 
showing sequential activities organised in a cycle. But we found that 
experienced policy makers reacted against such a presentation because 
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34 The ‘Green Book’ is a resource, published by HM Treasury, which offers binding 
guidance for Government departments and agencies on the evaluation and appraisal 
of policies, programmes and services. See the 2011 update here https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220541/
green_book_complete.pdf - accessed 15 October 2013
they felt it did not accurately reflect the realities of policy 
making...’ (Cabinet Office, 1999b: 2.9). In the absence of a theoretical 
model which better fits their experience, Hallsworth et al (2011: 31) 
suggest ‘policy makers often have to fall back on their native wits. 
This is why many interviewees voiced concerns about the ad hoc 
nature of policy making: there is not so much a lack of recommended 
processes, just a lack of realistic ones.’ The same report goes on to 
identify some of the characteristics which are often not accounted for 
in rational policy-process models including understanding 
organisational and bureaucratic pressures, understanding existing 
arrangements, or working toward unclear goals. It quotes one policy 
official who describes the challenge: ‘You don’t start from scratch, 
surveying the evidence and so on and building up from there and 
arrive at some policies. Someone comes in with an idea and our job so 
often is to sort of retro fit the evidence and rationale to support the 
policy that ministers have already decided they want to 
pursue.’ (Hallsworth et al, 2011:41). Acknowledging the perennial 
struggle to improve the circumstances in which policy is made,35 it is 
nevertheless critical for academics in general, and sociologists of 
religion in particular, to understand that policy making often involves 
what one special adviser describes as ‘ad-hocery’ (Hallsworth et al, 
2001: 31) and has elsewhere been labelled ‘muddling 
through’ (Lindblom, 1959). Indeed, as Caplan (1979:454) suggests 
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35 This report and others like it (e.g Hallsworth and Rutter ‘Making Policy 
Better’ (2011)recommend a combination of increased rationalisation and increased 
controlling for/recognition of/accounting for the non-rational processes involved in 
policy making. 
‘Rather than relying upon any single piece of information, the final 
policy decision was likely to depend upon an appraisal of scientific 
(hard) and extra-scientific (soft) knowledge from a variety of 
sources’ (Caplan, 1979:454). 
1.32 An ethnographic approach to public policy
Given this coalescence of the scientific and the extra-scientific - or the 
rational and the non-rational - I have purposely utilised ethnographic 
methods in my analysis of the policy community to better understand 
the cultural forces that influence the policy process. While this 
research project is far from an ethnography strictly speaking, I did 
adopt some ethnographic methods including field research in 
‘naturally occurring settings’ which enabled me to capture the ‘social 
meanings and ordinary activities’ (Brewer, 2000: 10) of my subjects. 
By interviewing policy makers in their immediate context, utilising 
‘insider’ language and analysing the data generated in light of political 
and social theory, I was able to generate broadly ‘ethnographic’ 
insights. In fact, this thesis is underpinned by new evidence and data 
drawn from two sets of original fieldwork. The first set of fieldwork, 
undertaken over a period of 3 years36 in the UK, took the form of a 
series of semi-structured qualitative interviews with 30 policy officials 
currently serving in Her Majesty’s Government. Broadly speaking, I 
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36 The majority of my interview data was gathered over a period of one year but a 
few follow-up interviews and other events took place at a later stage.
asked questions pertaining to the interview subject’s own experience 
which fell into three categories37: conceptualisation (‘what is the 
relationship between religion and foreign policy’, ‘is religion a 
(foreign) policy issue?’), capacity (‘how often do you utilise external 
research’, ‘are there any religion specialists in your department?’) and 
culture (do you consider there to be a department or organisational 
culture’, ‘what is the cultural make-up of your department?’). 
Appendix A outlines the full set of interview questions. Interviewees 
were all asked questions from the same set though interviews varied in 
the number and type of questions asked. Appendix B outlines the dates 
of these interviews though subjects will remain anonymous. The 
officials interviewed, all of whom participated voluntarily, have posts 
in a range of central government departments (though not all 
departments were represented) and most have policy experience in 
two or more Ministries. Though the level of seniority of those 
interviewed varied, the minimum grades represented were middle 
management (i.e. the minimum level at which civil servants are 
considered professional specialists) and the vast majority of those 
involved were either senior middle management or senior civil 
servants with considerable experience and expertise. 
Participants were selected based on a combination of ‘cherry-picking’ 
and ‘snowball sampling’ (see Morgan, 2008: 816-7). While the 
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37 I have taken these three categories from Danan et al’s (2007:39) report ‘Mixed 
Blessings’ into US Government engagement with Religion in Conflict-prone settings 
which identified these three issues as ‘obstacles’ to effective working.
process of identifying suitable elite interviewees, particularly in 
‘closed’ contexts like central government, often requires making 
contact with senior institutional gatekeepers (Harvey, undated), as a 
result of my own background, it was possible to more directly target 
key officials whose current and/or former roles had involved 
engagement with either religion and/or foreign policy. While this kind 
of ‘cherry picking’ can result in an unrepresentative data sample, 
given it is necessarily driven by existing contacts and relationships, in 
fact, it reflected the most appropriate, if not only, way for me to access 
a small, and nascent Whitehall sub-community. I will comment further 
later on the benefits and challenges of my ‘insider’ status within this 
sub-community, but at this stage it is worth pointing out that, due to 
both the constant fluctuation of posts and people within central 
government positions, and specifically, due to the specific period 
within which this fieldwork was undertaken (in the first years of a new 
government after 13 years of New Labour continuity), being able to 
identify individuals based on prior experience rather than purely 
current job title was a distinct advantage particularly given new teams 
and posts of relevance to my research emerged during the course of 
my fieldwork.  
Semi-structured interviews enabled me to ensure a degree of structure 
and consistency in the interview process, while also guaranteeing the 
necessary  flexibility. As Bryman (2008: 475) has explained ‘the 
emphasis must be on how the interviewee frames and understands 
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issues and events’. This methodological approach ensured that, as well 
as ‘official’ information about policy structures and processes, my 
subjects were able to express their own perspectives about the subject 
matter and, in doing so, revealed some of the most  interesting and 
challenging ideas in this thesis. Thus, while DiCicco-Bloom and 
Crabtree (2006) identify the use of semi-structured interviews as an 
alternative to traditional ethnographic approaches (when not combined 
with participant observation), in this instance, a combination of 
personal experience and semi-structured interviews generated some 
significant ethnographic insights (see, for example, Chapter Three on 
the cultural causes of ‘religion blindness’ in HMG).
The same semi-structured interview approach was adopted to 
undertake the second set of fieldwork in the United States. This data 
collection took place over a three-month period in Washington, DC. In 
total, 15 subjects were interviewed including current and former 
federal government employees, civil society  representatives, public 
intellectuals and lobbyists. The same questions as used in the UK were 
asked. There are significant differences between the governance 
arrangements of the two countries - perhaps the most apparent being 
the comparatively small number of permanent administrators and 
officials in the United States and comparatively large number of 
political appointees in senior positions. The implications of this for the 
policy-making process and, in turn, for the relationship between 
religion and foreign policy are explored in Part Five but there are two 
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methodological points worth noting here. First, there were access 
challenges in the US that I had not experienced in the UK which were 
due to the so-called ‘revolving door’ which enables the continual 
movement of people in and out of federal government as a result of 
changing administrations. Thus, while in the UK, it was possible to 
interview central government officials who had played a significant 
role in shaping policy over the last decade (and, in some cases, beyond 
that), in the US this was not always the case. Second, and perhaps 
more obvious, was the challenge of my ‘outsider’ status in relation to 
the US policy machine. This meant that it  was considerably easier to 
access government officials of former administrations - many of 
whom now operate within the sort of ‘epistemic community’ around 
religion and policy that  is still absent in the UK as scholars, teachers, 
advisors and lobbyists. 
Of course, both of these have implications for my research findings. It 
was not, for example, possible to perfectly replicate the UK approach 
in the US as was my initial intention. As a result, the roles and 
experience of those who contributed to the US fieldwork data vary 
considerably  and include current  policy officials, civil society 
representatives, academics and lobbyists (Appendix B outlines 
interviews though anonymity of all subjects is preserved in 
accordance with ethics governing this research project). All of the 
American subjects interviewed continue to have an active interest - 
and contribution - to the religion-foreign policy relationship in the 
47
United States, but not all of the subjects are still, or indeed ever have 
been, policy  practitioners. However, while this makes direct 
comparison between data on institutional cultures more challenging, 
in many ways this experience reflects some of the key cultural 
differences of which foreign policy on religion is an outworking 
including the relative ‘openness’ of the foreign policy process in the 
US compared to the UK and the attendant relationships between those 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’.
Given the purpose of the US interview data was to act as a foil for the 
UK situation and to provide context in light of which my initial 
hypothesis about the closeness of UK and US foreign policy and 
therefore the possibility  of adopting US foreign policy on religion, the 
challenges I experienced in accessing interview subjects in the United 
States, and the non-replicative sample of subjects I was able to 
interview, did not undermine or significantly change my  thesis. It did, 
however, require me to reflect on my relationship to the research. 
In his useful paper on elite interviews, Harvey (undated: 1, 13) 
identifies ‘persevering with difficult stages of the research such as 
interview rejections and difficult meetings ‘as a critical aspect of the 
experience of junior researchers. This certainly proved to be the case 
in my study. While my background in UK government meant that I 
did not face the ‘outsider’ challenge, it  was likely that a lack of 
professional contacts and social capital in the United States made it 
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more difficult to obtain responses from those contacted. In order to 
gain access to many of those interviewed, it nevertheless again proved 
beneficial to refer to my background and UK government contacts 
(one subject required full biographical details) and once my credibility 
was proven to key gatekeepers, a circle of relevant interview subjects 
was opened up to me and proved to be both well-formed and well-
networked.38 
My status as an ‘insider’ to the policy community, then, proved 
beneficial in permitting me access to UK, and even US, interview 
subjects. However, there is much evidence of the impact of ‘insider’ 
status on research outputs (see e.g. Brannick and Coghlan (2007). As 
Kanuha (2000) explains, there are both potential benefits and 
drawbacks of this position, ‘For each of the ways that being an insider 
researcher enhances the depth and breadth of understanding a 
population that may not be accessible to a non-native scientist, 
questions about objectivity, reflexivity, and authenticity of a research 
project are raised because perhaps one knows too much or is too close 
to the project and may be too similar to those being studied.’ (Kanuha, 
2000: 444). Asselin (2003:100) suggests that the distinction between 
cultures and subcultures may be a way to overcome the ‘tendency to 
believe one knows the culture’ in that it offers the ‘insider’ researcher 
an opportunity to at the same time act as an ‘outsider’.
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38 I use the word ‘networked’ here not only to describe the virtual and social 
interconnections between this group of people but to illustrate that it is a 
‘community of interest’ which meets regularly and irregularly in both formalised and 
informal contexts.
Hence the importance of ‘reflexivity’ in relation to research is now 
widely  acknowledged (see e.g. Angrosino, 2005) and, just as this 
thesis identifies greater cultural reflexivity on the part of policy 
makers as an urgent priority, so do I recognise that my own identity 
from within the British policy-making establishment has played a 
significant role both in the research process and its findings.
Perhaps most obviously, it likely helped me to obtain both an AHRC 
studentship  and Research Travel Support Grant to fund my research in 
that there was a degree of assurance about my research subjects and 
access ‘built-in’ to the project. Indeed, not only was I able to access 
‘elite’ interview subjects but shared language, identity  and experience 
helped me to sidestep some of the challenges commonly faced by 
junior researchers (see Harvey, undated). Simply  put, I was able to 
explain and justify my  research and to persuade subjects of its utility 
precisely because I was ‘one of them’. One policy  official interviewed 
explicitly stated at the outset that he was participating because we had 
a former colleague in common which added legitimacy to my enquiry 
(HMG/5 July 2012/c). Further, I was able to maximise whatever time 
was available for interviews (in some cases as little as 30 minutes) by 
virtue of the fact that I was able to make certain assumptions based on 
common experiential background: familiarity with the language of 
governance for example was key, as was knowledge of departmental 
and institutional mechanisms, policy processes and key players. My 
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interview with one official (HMG/28 August 2012/a), for example, 
began with a discussion of shared experiences in relation to colleagues 
we had in common. This both helped to establish rapport but also, 
more importantly, acted as a ‘shortcut’ into discussion of the issues I 
wanted to focus on without the requirement for preamble or extensive 
explanation of policy or institutional background. I suspect, as Dwyer 
and Buckle (2009) surmise, that my insider status enabled both more 
rapid and more complete acceptance and that the data gathered was of 
greater depth than had I been an ‘outsider’ getting to grips with 
systems, processes and language. Particularly significant were the 
number of interviewees who expressed a degree of ‘trust’ in my 
research endeavours - both that I would not ‘expose’ them individually 
or collectively and that my research would be useful (HMG/7 
December 2012/b, HMG/ 21 September 2012/a, HMG/4 July  2012/c, 
HMG/7 December 2012/a). That said, in inhabiting what Adler and 
Adler  (1987:73) call the ‘ultimate existential dual role’, it has been 
necessary  to consistently be aware of assumptions, connections or 
comments entirely  reliant  on shared experience and to establish at  the 
outset of the fieldwork process a protocol for interviews which 
included a clear explication of my role in relation to the research.
This ‘dual role’ has also been important in undertaking analysis of my 
interview data. I began by writing up full notes - including brief 
sections of transcription - which I then sent for clearance to my 
interview subjects. This was a critical component in maintaining their 
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trust and enabled them to reflect on what had been said. In my ‘dual 
role’ I was keenly aware of both the need to preserve interview 
subjects’ anonymity and for them to be able to have some control over 
the output of each interview. Though very few made comments or 
corrections, those who did often slightly ‘watered down’ their 
language or edited out particularly direct comments. While this was 
slightly frustrating, I found that it rarely affected the overall message 
of the interview nor did it compromise my research in any  way. Once I 
had a full set of approved interview notes, I set about extracting every 
pertinent comment and then used a simplified coding based on the 
interview questions. Out of this coding emerged a range of key 
themes, including concrete policy initiatives such as international 
religious freedom (see Chapter Four and Chapter Five) and ‘Prevent’ 
policy  (See Chapter Three); sociological insights about the 
relationship  of religion to the state (see Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five); and cultural observations and the shaping of institutional 
responses to religion (see Chapter Three and Chapter Five).  
That said, my inhabiting this ‘dual role’ is important in more than 
methodological terms, it also serves as a metaphor for both the 
medium and the message of this research in ‘bridging the gap’ 
between religion and public (foreign) policy.
1.33 A ‘secular’ approach to religion
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While it draws on a cultural analysis of the policy community, then, 
this thesis extends a ‘secular’ theory of religion in that it ‘chooses to 
interpret, understand and explain religion in non-religious 
terms’ (Geertz, 2000) rather than offering a phenomenological or 
theological account. Furthermore, given it is primarily concerned with 
developing appropriate policy responses to religion, this thesis might 
be called secularising given its focus on the temporal dimension by 
which religious actors and dynamics are implicated in ‘proximate’ 
rather than ‘ultimate’ concerns (Somerville, 1998). As one policy 
maker explained to me: ‘government and religion are speaking two 
different languages...as they should be....the government doesn’t have 
anything useful to say about the existence or not of God but..... we 
have to recognise that religious groups advance what have to be 
temporal positions (HMG/4 July 2012/c). 
This methodological ‘pincer movement’ reflects the broader 
intellectual and empirical context within which this thesis is located 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter One). On one hand, it is inspired 
by, and draws from, a post-positivist moment in the social and 
political sciences; an era in which the policy process is being opened 
up to include both religion and the non-rational. Yet, on the other, it 
recognises that the result-orientation of the policy process is 
necessarily rationalising. 
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On one hand, it argues that the proliferation of religious issues and 
actors in public policy is better described as ‘secularisation’ than 
‘religionisation’ (see Chapter Five). Yet, on the other,  it challenges the 
idea that UK public policy is ‘secular’ (see Chapters Three and Four). 
And, as a result of both, it inverts the conventional wisdom - that 
when it comes to religion in public life, it is a case of ‘religious 
America, secular Europe’ (Berger et al, 2008).
1.4 Message  
This thesis is firmly located at the intersection between religion and 
politics, drawing on and testing theories about the transnationalism of 
religion and the relationship of religion to cultural and political 
formations. However, what this thesis seeks to offer is an account of 
an oft-neglected dimension: the nexus between religion and 
bureaucracy. I ask the question: what are policy makers doing in the 
context of so-called religious resurgence or ‘post-secularism’? As a 
result, while this account challenges conventional wisdom about the 
secularism of public policy (Chapter Three), about the emergence of 
the post-secular (Chapter Four), about the impacts of globalisation 
(Chapter Four) and about rational choice theories of religious vitality 
(Chapter Five), I have given each of my substantive chapters a 
subheading. Hence, in Chapter Three, I ask the question ‘How are UK 
policy makers ‘managing God?’, Chapter Four answers the question 
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‘How are UK foreign policy makers ‘managing God?’ and Chapter 
Five focuses on ‘How are US foreign policy makers ‘managing God?’ 
Broadly speaking, I argue that policy makers are finding new ways to 
‘manage’ religion by drawing on both domestic policy and domestic 
constitutional settlements.
In Chapter One, I describe the historical absence of reflection on the 
religion-international policy relationship in the UK, first drawing on 
my own experience as a government official and secondly, with 
reference to the relatively well developed conversation going on in the 
United States on the subject. Explaining and examining these 
markedly different transatlantic approaches to religion has been a 
focus of my research from the outset and is at the analytical core of 
this thesis. However, in this Chapter, I introduce some other 
conversations to which I also hope to contribute by writing this thesis. 
Perhaps most significantly, I suggest that the social sciences in general 
and the sociology of religion in particular, need to increase ‘policy 
literacy’ in order to better achieve impact on public policy. 
Specifically, I speak of the need to publish research outcomes in ways 
which are accessible to the policy community. 
In Chapter Two, I provide an overview of the relevant literary context. 
I explore the emergence of the label ‘post-secular’ in recent years, 
which has been used to describe a range of apparent shifts in the 
religion-state-society relationship, and suggest that post-secular 
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discourses traverse two distinct, but relevant, scholarly conversations - 
one from the political sciences which emphasises cultural factors as 
most significant in accounting for religion-state relations in the current 
era; and the second from the sociology of religion which has evolved 
to emphasise structures as most important in understanding the 
relationship of religion and society. Exploring these two bodies of 
literature in detail, I suggest the ‘post-secular’ discourse has drawn 
from each to create a narrative of Western homogeneity and global 
religious change. Yet, I go on to explain, the material contained in this 
thesis inverts this narrative. Exploring the religion-public (foreign) 
policy nexus in the US and the UK, this thesis points to the 
heterogeneity of the Western experience and the significance of 
continuity in the national management of religion.
In Chapter Three, I explore the usefulness of the label ‘secular’  - 
drawing both from both the social and political sciences and from 
policy makers themselves - to describe the British policy context. 
First, I assess the extent to which the British polity is structurally 
secular and argue that, far from ignoring or marginalising religion, 
there is evidence of the repeated relocation of religion as a policy 
issue by successive governments. Next, I take an ethnographic 
approach to the UK policy establishment, to explore the cultural and 
institutional values that influence policy responses to religion. Here, I 
describe a culture of ‘religion blindness’ in which attention to religion 
has been avoided and feared. These two analyses suggest that the 
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relationship between religion and state in the UK context is more 
complex than a narrative of ‘secularisation’ can account for. Finally, I 
turn to consider the way the UK Government ‘does’ religion drawing 
on evidence from one signature religion-related policy: the Preventing 
Violent Extremism strategy. I suggest that - despite manifest problems 
- Prevent has played a significant role in forcing the Government to 
engage with religion and in extending the religion-policy relationship 
into the international context. The Prevent Strategy, I suggest, 
exemplifies both the way the UK Government ‘manages God’ given it 
at once represents religious engagement and, at the same time, has 
contributed to religion blindness. 
In Chapter Four, I consider the extent to which narratives of 
globalisation and the post-secular, drawn from the political sciences, 
are helpful in describing religion-related UK foreign policy. I begin by 
describing the contribution religion has made to the marginalisation of 
foreign policy - with religious actors often being located at the ‘non-
state’ level. The inclusion of religion into international relations 
analyses has often seemed to compound the diminishing agency of the 
nation-state presented in neo-realist international relations models. 
However, I go on to describe the way evidence from my own research 
presents a different picture. Starting with international religious 
freedom policy, I suggest, while it responds to the global 
circumstances, it is significantly shaped by the domestic constitutional 
context. I then go on to describe a number of recent religion-related 
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foreign policy initiatives, demonstrating the way they too are shaped 
by the domestic context in a way that challenges ‘post-secular’ 
narratives. Advocating the sort of foreign policy analysis described by 
Hill (2003), I argue that it is necessary to recognise the domestic 
sources of foreign policy as evidence of the way the Government 
manages religion and to understand the way both structural and 
cultural patterns shape the agency of the nation-state. 
In Chapter Five, I turn to the American context, to consider how far 
the label ‘religious America, secular Europe’ could be applied to the 
foreign policy context. I begin by evaluating a number of recent 
developments in the US State Department - culminating in the 
establishment of an ‘Office for Religion and Global Affairs’. I suggest, 
contrary to the assumption that America is ‘more religious’ than 
Europe, that a trajectory of increased engagement with religion in the 
State Department could be characterised as ‘secularising’ in that it 
remains firmly rooted in the First Amendment separation of Church 
and State. The way the US Government ‘manages’ religion is thus 
equal and opposite to that in the United Kingdom. Going on to explore 
the foundation of the US polity on the principle of religious freedom, I 
suggest that this principle underwrites its policy culture and deeply 
interconnects its domestic and international policy, reflecting the sort 
of macro-level secularisation that Casanova (1994) describes. Yet, I 
also suggest that religious freedom has an important cultural 
dimension. Drawing on Herberg’s (1956), Parsons’s (1978) and 
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Bellah’s (1967) theoretical perspectives, I re-make the case for 
American exceptionalism - suggesting that the principle of religious 
freedom constitutes a ‘civil religious’ position and arguing that at the 
macro-level America is at once both structurally secular and at the 
same time deeply culturally religious.
In Chapter Six, I bring together the evidence gathered both from my 
UK and US interviews, with analysis from each of the three 
substantive chapters of this thesis to demonstrate the way religion-
related foreign policy challenges some common assumptions drawn 
from both bodies of literature I introduced in Chapter Two. First, I 
consider the way the Treaty of Westphalia - the settlement of the Wars 
of Religion in the seventeenth century -  has been treated in 
International Relations scholarship and argue that, contrary to 
common assumptions, the legacy of the Treaty of Westphalia is very 
relevant in describing religion-related foreign policy today, given it 
subjected religion to national authority or what I have called 
‘management’. Next, I return to the literature analysed in Chapter 
Two. Here, I draw on my original research evidence to demonstrate 
the limitations of either purely cultural or purely structural models as 
able to independently explain what is going on in either the UK or the 
US context. Drawing on Archer’s (1988, 2012) model of 
‘morphogenesis’, I offer a new way to understand the relationship of 
religion to foreign policy which is more complicated than accounts of 
the ‘post-secular’, ‘religious resurgence’ or ‘secularisation theory’ are 
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able to offer, given it at once describes Western heterogeneity and at 
the same time provides analytical space for religious continuity. 
Finally, I turn from the theoretical to the practical to describe the ways 
in which I have sought to make my work not only policy-relevant but 
also impactful. I offer a ‘typology’ of religious engagement as it 
appears in the UK policy context and advocate - in line with the report 
of the British Council workshops I designed and facilitated - the 
creation of greater bureaucratic space within the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office for strategic engagement with religion. This 
would in fact be a natural successor to current UK Government 
initiatives for managing God and would represent continuity rather 
than change.Furthermore, though such an initiative might appear to 
echo American arrangements, it would inevitably be shaped by 
domestic constitutional arrangements and would exemplify the way 
the UK and the US ‘manage God’ differently.
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Chapter Two: Religion and the Post-Secular: Structures, Cultures 
and Actors
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter One, I described the current era as one in which the 
relationship between religion, politics and society is under increasing 
scrutiny. I explained that this dynamic context, combined with my 
own experience of policy making, had inspired me to write a thesis 
which at once explored the religion-foreign policy nexus and at the 
same time explained markedly different transatlantic approaches to 
religion. It falls to this Chapter to outline the ways in which the 
contemporary era has been explained in the literature. In it, I 
demonstrate that the label ‘post-secular’ has been used to describe a 
range of apparent shifts in the religion-state-society relationship in 
both Western countries and the global context. I suggest that post-
secular discourse traverses two distinct scholarly conversations - one 
from the political sciences that emphasises cultural factors as most 
significant in accounting for religion-state relations in the current era; 
and the second from the sociology of religion which has evolved to 
emphasise structures as most important in understanding the 
relationship of religion and society. Exploring these two bodies of 
literature in detail, I suggest that ‘post-secular’ discourse has drawn 
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from each to create a narrative of Western homogeneity and global 
religious change. 
Yet, I argue, this story of religious change is being articulated without 
an important component - these narratives neglect to tell the story of 
the religion-bureaucracy nexus i.e. what policy makers are doing in 
the context of what is being described as a ‘resurgence of religion’. 
This thesis seeks to redress that neglect and suggests, broadly 
speaking, that policy makers are finding new ways of ‘managing 
religion’ by drawing on domestic policy precedents and on domestic 
constitutional settlements. I shall suggest that this means there are 
constitutive differences between the UK and US contexts, and that the 
ways policy makers ‘manage religion’ is influenced both by structural 
and cultural factors, necessitating a new way of engaging with both to 
understand the relationship of religion to foreign policy today. 
2.2 The post-secular
In light of what Berger (1999) and others (e.g. Thomas, 2005) describe 
as the global ‘resurgence’ of religion, the notion of ‘post-secularity’ 
has emerged as a major inter-disciplinary trope. Analyses of the post-
secular are increasingly widespread, as Beckford (2012) notes, such 
that it has become something of a shorthand to describe the ‘return’ of 
religion to public significance in the last 20 to 30 years. While it is 
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true that there are a range of other uses of the expression ‘post-
secular’, explored in detail by Beckford (2012), in this chapter I am 
primarily concerned with the ‘cluster’ of meanings relating to the 
‘resurgence of religion’ or the re-entry of religion into the public 
sphere as this discourse speaks most profoundly to the subject matter 
of this thesis. Some scholars define the post-secular with specific 
reference to what Beckford describes as ‘fresh opportunities for 
religion to re-enter the pubic sphere’ (2012:8). Crocket (2010), for 
example, describes the dissolution of the public/private boundary 
while others (e.g Dinham, Furbey and Lowndes, 2009) focus on the 
particular circumstances of neo-liberalism having created 
opportunities for religious groups in welfare states. Arguably the most 
famous proponent of the ‘post-secular’, Jurgen Habermas (2003), 
argues that a post-secular age is one in which liberal democracies take 
religion more seriously than before. For Habermas (2008), the post-
secular is a later phase of development in secular societies and is 
characterised by a number of changes: belief in the disappearance of 
religion has weakened, religious organisations function in the public 
sphere; and the integration of religious minorities is perceived as a 
problem. In this context, rather than presenting a challenge to 
secularisation, the ‘post-secular’ initiates a reworking of secularisation 
theory in which the public sphere might include religion but that 
‘religious utterances must be translated into generally accessible 
language before they can find their way onto the agendas of 
parliaments, courts or administrative bodies’ (Habermas, 2011: 25-26). 
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Calhoun (2012) suggests that post-secularity is essentially about how 
the secular public sphere should integrate religious voices. Similarly, 
Carlson (2009) describes the post-secular as an era in which ‘secular 
institutions are making adjustments to new realities’ (p.51), blurring 
the public/private distinction. Elsewhere, Casanova (2012:44) has 
drawn on Taylor (2007) to describe the ‘post-secular’ as the 
destabilising of the secular immanent frame and being open to 
‘manifold forms of being religiously human’. While Wickstrom and 
Illman (2012) focus specifically on the movements of globalisation, 
neo-liberalism and the resulting challenges to the binary codes of 
modern thought. Importantly, then, post-secular discourse is 
concerned with the relationships between religion and state and the 
conditions for the ‘return’ of religion to the public sphere in the 
modern West. As a result, it traverses two distinct scholarly 
conversations, one drawn from the social and political sciences and 
the other from the sociology of religion. 
Before I turn to these two bodies of literature, it is instructive to reflect  
one thinker who himself traverses these two bodies of scholarship. In 
his landmark monograph, Taylor (2007) offers a deeply cultural 
reading of secularisation, arguing that secularisation consists neither at 
the micro (religious decline) or the macro (differentiation or 
privatisation) level but in a third movement that he calls the 
‘conditions of belief’ (2007:3). This is a movement ‘from a society 
where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one 
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in which it is understood to be one opinion amongst others...’ (p.3) and 
this, he argues, is the condition in which the modern West now finds 
itself. It is a condition in which the characteristics of religious life - 
good beyond human flourishing, power beyond the immanent and life 
beyond its natural scope - are now perceived as ‘options’ in an era 
where self-sufficient humanism has emerged. For Taylor (2007:437), 
then, the ‘secularisation’ process is a positive rather than a negative 
one, characterised by the emergence of alternatives, ‘marked by an 
unheard pluralism of outlooks, religious and non-and anti-religious, in 
which the number of possible positions seems to be increasing without 
end’. 
While Taylor himself categorises his work as describing a process of 
‘secularisation’, others (e.g Casanova, 2012; Wickstrom and Illman, 
2012) have interpreted Taylor’s thesis as distinctly ‘post-secular’. In 
doing so, they emphasise the cultural dimensions of his thesis, 
including the role of the individual in post-secular society (Wikstrom 
and Illman, 2012: 219) and the cultural shift in the conditions of belief 
which Casanova (2012:31) calls the abandonment of the ‘secularist 
stadial consciousness’. Yet closer reading of Taylor’s text reveals his 
key concern with social structures: not only do processes of 
immigration need to be understood with reference to structural factors 
hence ‘the crucial factor is a structural feature of the host society, the 
way it integrates through religious identity’ (Taylor, 2007: 524 - my 
italics), while his three-fold Durkheimian model of religious change is 
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better understood not as representing merely cultural forms but as 
describing the links between cultural phenomena and social structures. 
It is for this reason that Taylor, following the earlier work of David 
Martin (1978), is able to explain the differences between European 
and American experiences of secularisation. While all North Atlantic 
countries are living in a ‘secular age’ - characterised as an era in which 
belief in God is ‘understood to be one opinion amongst 
others’ (Taylor, 2007: 3), the experience of the secularisation process 
differs considerably. He acknowledges that mobilisation happened by 
various different paths in a way which challenges the dominant linear 
secularisation theory which presents secularisation and modernization 
in steady progress: ‘my aim is to suggest, in place of the supposed 
uniform and unilinear effect of modernity on religious belief and 
practice, another model, in which these changes do, indeed, frequently 
destabilize older forms, but where what follows depends heavily on 
what alternatives are available or can be invented out of the repertory 
of the populations concerned.’ (Taylor, 2007:461). In the US, Taylor 
suggests, a ‘neo-Durkheimian’ form of religion-society relationship 
exists in which connection to the sacred comes via choice within a 
broader church. On the other hand, European settlements reflect 
sediments of both paleo-Durkheimian (in which connection to the 
sacred came via the church) and neo-Durkheimian forms. The 
emergence of the ‘immanent frame’ - in which belief in God is one 
choice among many - interacts differently with the settlements in the 
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two contexts. The result, he argues, is that there has been less 
opportunity for belief to decline in the American context, especially 
given there has been strong resistance to the break up of the neo-
Durkheimian form (characterised by those who resist this break-up as 
a ‘culture war’). Taylor’s work offers us a paradigm through which to 
understand the material presented in this chapter. Through this reading 
of Taylor we see that the secular and post-secular might not be 
mutually exclusive positions; that it is necessary to understand the 
interplay of culture and structure and that doing so helps us to explain 
the heterogeneity among Western experiences of secularisation.39 All 
three factors emerge as significant in the following discussion. 
2.2 The legacy of secularisation
Classical sociology, according to Bryan Wilson (1985:9), ‘documented 
a secularising process‘, as a result of which ‘neither institutions nor 
individuals operate primarily to attain supernatural ends’ (1985:19). 
Indeed, proponents of ‘strong’ secularisation theory predicate an 
inverse relationship between modernisation and religiosity on multiple 
levels: ‘religion - seen as a way of thinking, as the performance of 
particular practices, and as the institutionalisation and organisation of 
these patterns of thought and action - has lost influence’ (Wilson, 
1969: 11). Not only this, structural differentiation results in the rise of 
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39 It is important to note that Taylorʼs work draws heavily on the earlier 
contributions of David Martin (1978, 2005) who was an early and significant 
critic of the presentation of Western secularization as a singular process.  
technical and legal procedures and the rise in scientific knowledge 
replaces religion which previously ‘interpreted the cosmos, giving 
sense to the physical and social world’ (Wilson, 1976:267). So too has 
Bruce repeatedly (2002, 2003) pointed to the significance of the 
Enlightenment and Reformation in creating the twin processes of 
individualism and rationalism which have both eroded the communal 
base for traditional forms of religion and the purpose of religion in 
helping individuals to understand the world. Both of these classic 
statements of secularisation, then, describe a process that operates at 
multiple levels. Yet, as we shall see, the legacy of classical 
secularisation theory has impacted quite differently on the two bodies 
of literature with which this thesis is concerned.
Beckford (2000) has suggested that, after nearly a century of 
divergence, the end of the twentieth century saw the sociology of 
religion ‘playing together’ with the mainstream social and political 
sciences for a number of reasons. They are, he suggests, both 
interested in the apparent return of religion such that ‘scholars who 
have rarely commented on religion in the past now seem to find it 
indispensible to their accounts of current change, especially the 
kaleidoscopic multiplicity of competing religious 
worldviews’ (2000:457). However, in this Chapter, I suggest that - far 
from ‘playing together’ - in their analyses and accounts of religion in 
the contemporary era, the sociology of religion and the social and 
political sciences have followed dramatically different trajectories. 
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First, social and political scientists tend to identify the current era as 
somehow ‘different’ than earlier eras, offering accounts of religious 
change. Second, in so doing, they identify their own intellectual 
frameworks, often described as ‘secular’, as inadequate to account for 
these changing dynamics. Finally, these accounts tend to describe the 
‘West’ as a homogenous entity and to describe processes of 
modernisation and state formation as resulting in its ‘secularism’, 
which is seen to be at odds with the rest of the world where religion 
seems to be thriving. Seeking to ‘bring religion in’ to these disciplines, 
scholars have undertaken a ‘turn to culture’. Dispensing with 
traditional political models, political scientists have embraced 
constructivism as a way to account for the non-rational actor. 
However, as we shall see, in doing so, they firmly locate the religious 
actor at the non-state (or micro) level. By contrast, I argue, the 
sociology of religion has evolved in the opposite direction: where 
political scientists have emphasised the secularism of the ‘West’ in 
comparison to the religiousness of the ‘rest’, secularisation theorists 
continue to point to the differences between Western states and their 
experience of secularisation. Where the social and political sciences 
have turned to culture and classified the drivers of religious change as 
non-state actors, sociologists of religion point to the significance of 
structural macro-level rather than micro-level religious change. 
2.4 Bringing Religion In
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God is back. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s (2009) book so 
entitled attests: globally, religion is on the rise. From the explosion of 
evangelical Christianity in China and Latin America to the worldwide 
spread of Islam, the numerical evidence of religion’s ‘resurgence’ is 
clear. As a result, there has been a parallel ‘resurgence’ of religion in 
the academy where political and social scientists, having for 
generations ignored or marginalised religion, now pay increasing 
attention to it. This section seeks to explore the ways in which 
scholars from a variety of different political science communities have 
sought to bring religion into their disciplines. 
Drawing on evidence from international relations theory, terrorism and 
security studies and development studies, I will identify the 
‘secularism’ of intellectual frameworks to be a common ‘experience’ 
and will consider the similarities and differences in the way different 
scholars have sought to overcome this dominant secularism, focussing 
particularly on the presentation of the ‘religious actor’ throughout the 
literature. Exploring literature from a range of disciplines, I will argue 
that political scientists have tended to construe the ‘religious actor’ in 
a particular way: as a non or sub-state individual or group which is 
either a barrier to the achievement of particular national objectives or, 
more often, which can be utilised as a ‘proxy’ in helping to deliver 
them. This, I suggest, reveals the significant influence of social 
scientific assumptions about the location of religion in society and the 
relationship between religion and the state. Next, I consider the post-
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positivist movement in the political sciences, which has drawn on 
social constructivism as a way to overcome the dominance of these 
secularist assumptions and frameworks. Acknowledging the 
significant progress that has been made as a result of this ‘turn to 
culture’, I suggest that religious agency is increasingly well 
understood as something symbolic and non-rational which orientates 
political actors in the world. However, given the distinction between 
culture and structure, religion as a cultural phenomenon is conceived 
as existing alongside political structures, rather than within them. 
Finally, then, I expose what I consider to be a critical gap in the 
literature and its implications for the way we understand political and 
social agency: a better understanding of the relationship between 
culture and (national and international) political structures will enable 
us to identify ways in which religious agency is manifest in the 
motivations and actions of states and governments.
The so-called ‘resurgence’ of religion is now the subject matter of a 
significant niche in political scientific scholarship. The forces and 
consequences of globalisation have been experienced in profound 
ways by the countries in which this discipline was founded and 
developed (see a more thorough dicussion of globalisation in Chapter 
Four). The combination of a more open global context, and key events 
which this type of globalisation has enabled, including the opening up 
of new economic markets, incidents of international terrorism and 
massive migration flows, has resulted in both the diversification of 
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political scientific study, its integration with other disciplines and, 
critically for the purposes of this research, a new focus for a range of 
scholars on the concept and nature of agency in political systems. 
Across a number of disciplines, religion has emerged as a particularly 
significant source of political agency. This has resulted in a 
reinvigorated interest in religion across the board over the last 25 
years, prior to which, as Philpott (2002) describes, the study of global 
politics largely ignored religion. Indeed, academic analysis of three 
important Western political objectives: security, international relations 
and international development or domestic welfare provision, now 
consciously includes a religious dimension. However, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, scholars lament their secular intellectual inheritance, 
finding themselves without the tools to appropriately ‘bring religion 
in’ (Fox and Sandler, 2004). 
In part this is a conceptual problem: multifarious versions of 
‘religion’ appear throughout the literature. It is a category which is 
used simultaneously to describe a wide range of different historical 
expressions including the ideology of Al Qaeda, post Reformation 
Christianity in Europe, and evangelicalism in the United States to 
name a few. Without an adequate conceptual basis that enables users 
to understand what it is these different ‘types’ of religion have in 
common, it necessarily becomes impossible to identify what makes 
them different. Thus, when Philpott (2000) writes illuminatingly of the 
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‘religious roots of international relations’, what he really means is the 
reliance of international relations on an intellectual framework and 
political system which is contextually dependent on specific aspects of 
the way Christianity developed in Western Europe in the 17th century. 
However, when Juergensmeyer (2003) writes about ‘religious 
terrorism’ and ‘cosmic war’, he covers ground extending from right-
wing Christian anti-abortionists in late 20th century USA, through to 
Hindus in India from the 18th century and Shi’a Muslims in the 20th 
century Middle East. There is, then, no substantive consensus about 
how religion should be accommodated into political scientific 
frameworks.
That said, a number of common - and interconnected - themes emerge 
in this vast array of literature, the first and arguably most significant 
being a degree of unanimity about the reasons both for the historical 
marginalisation of religion and its current popularity. Analyses of 
development studies (e.g. Deneulin and Rakodi, 2011), of 
international relations theory (e.g. Thomas, 2005), of security studies 
(e.g. Seiple and Hoover, 2004), of terrorism studies (e.g. 
Juergensmeyer, 2003) all reveal the disciplinary absence of religion 
from their intellectual frameworks which is problematic in the current 
context. Not only this, explanations of the development of each 
tradition have common features. According to Deneulin and Rakodi 
(2011:49) ‘development studies was founded on the belief that 
religion is not important to development processes, for, as societies 
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develop and modernise, it was assumed that they would also undergo 
a process of secularisation’. The same explanation is offered across 
the board by those now seeking to integrate religion into their 
disciplines: Petito and Hatzopoulos (2004:1) describe secularism as 
part of international relations theory’s ‘genetic code’. 
So too is secularisation - as a process - given as an explanation for the 
historical absence of religion from these fields of enquiry: Thomas 
(2005), for example, suggests that ‘the invention of religion, as a set 
of privately held beliefs or doctrines, was the product of state-building 
– necessary for the rise of the modern state, modern nationalism, and 
the rise of modern international society’, and elsewhere attention is 
paid to ‘two fundamental assumptions: that the significance of religion 
will decline as societies modernize, and that the political space can 
and should be strictly separated from the religious space’ (Deneulin 
and Rakodi, 2011: 46). It seems, then, that these disciplines have all 
inherited certain elements of classic secularisation theory, specifically 
they seem to reiterate a connection between structural differentiation 
and religious decline (inversely related to modernisation).  In doing 
so, it is worth noting, that there is a tendency to conflate the 
experience of Western nations as though there were a singular process 
of Western ‘secularisation’ originating in the Treaty of Westphalia (see 
e.g. Thomas, 2005: 25 and Philpott, 2000).  As we shall see, this is in 
striking contrast to accounts of the differences between European and 
American experiences of secularisation as described by sociologists of 
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religion. It is apparent, then, that the legacy of secularisation has 
impacted upon the frameworks through which political scientists seek 
to explain the world, but how has it impacted upon the way religious 
actors are presented in political science literature? And what does this 
tell us about how they understand the relationship of religion to state 
and society? 
2.41 The ‘non-state’ actor
Given one of the primary reasons for the renewed political interest in 
religion has been the emergence of a major ‘religious ideology’ - Al 
Qaida’s conception of political Islam - and of a network of global 
actors which today constitute the most significant security threat to the 
major Western powers (at least according to the US, UK and EU 
Security Strategies), the most obvious starting point for a review of 
the political science literature is that which analyses the relationship 
between religion and international security.
Perhaps the most widely known reflection on the role of religion in 
international affairs, Huntington’s (1993) ‘The Clash of 
Civilisations?’ article and subsequent book (2002) sought to challenge 
the idea of Western universalism, in particular, responding to 
Fukayama (1992:xi), who had presented the West’s victory in the Cold 
War as symbolic of ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution 
and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
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of government’. Instead, Huntington argued that the global context 
would continue to be marked by conflict in the post-Cold War era. 
However, he suggested that this conflict would not be ideological or 
economic, but civilisational and religious: ‘the principal conflicts of 
global politics will occur between nations and groups of different 
civilisations.... The fault lines between civilisations will be the battle 
lines of the future’ (Huntington, 1993:22). Here, Huntington 
introduced a radical new variable to the study of international 
relations, following the unexpected introduction of religion into 
politics after the Iranian Revolution, suggesting that ideational as well 
as material forces could drive actors on the world stage. It is worth 
noting that he also presented the ‘West’ as a single civilisational 
identity. 
Huntington’s thesis, though widely contested, set a precedent for the 
integration of religion into political science and enabled scholars to 
focus on the role of religion as a source of conflict and insecurity 
which undermines Western policy objectives (Baruma, 2010; 
Juergensmeyer, 2003; Kepel, 1994). This focus has been shared by the 
vast majority of popular literature on the subject as well, in which 
religious belief is portrayed not only as irrational but dangerous (e.g. 
Harris, 2004: 72, 26-27). An alternative ‘positive nexus’ between 
religion and Western objectives is described by others. Here, religion 
plays a more ambivalent role, with some offering solutions to conflict, 
models for successful diplomacy and stabilisation (Appleby, 1999; 
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Johnson, 2003) while others advocate that its value should be better 
recognised and harnessed (Johnson & Sampson, 1994; Seiple & 
Hoover, 2004).
The inclusion of religion in development studies has tended to follow 
the same model as there has been increasing recognition that ‘many 
individuals and organisations have engaged in development work in 
line with specific commitments from different religious 
traditions’ (Alkire, 2006: 502-510) Acknowledgement of the religious 
origins of development (specifically the welfare activities of the 
Christian mission during the colonial period), the persistence of 
religion in developing countries, its relocation to new contexts  and 
the contribution that religious or ‘faith based’ organisations make 
(Clarke and Jennings, 2008) have all contributed to increased attention 
being paid to religion both by theorists of development and, critically, 
those involved in development policy. Recognising not only the 
potential for religious organisations to deliver social services, but also 
their potential strengths in state-building,40 Western policy makers 
increasingly support and fund FBOs as ‘proxies’, though this has led 
to accusations of the instrumentalisation of religion (Clarke and 
Jennings 2008).
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40 For example see De Gruchy (1995) on the role of religion in overcoming 
apartheid in South Africa and Moreno (2008) on religion’s contribution to the 
transition to democracy in the Philippines. 
Importantly, the same accusations dominate debate about the role of 
religion in the context of domestic policy. As evidenced in 
contemporary social policy, the religious individual or organisation’s 
place in public life is usually identified as being within ‘civil 
society’ (e.g. Dinham, 2009). Yet, as Herbert (2003) recognises, ‘civil 
society’ is ambivalent, at once associated with integration but also 
recognised as a space for the expression of identities of difference. 
Though associated with a particular democratic political settlement, 
the ‘civil society’ motif reflects the relationship of religion to public 
life across a range of political realities via what we might call the 
‘service delivery’ model.  In this, religious organisations take on social 
roles that the state is not able or chooses not to fulfil, such as health 
and education. Many of the faith-based organisations which are 
involved in international development should be considered under this 
umbrella, as would religious individuals or groups contributing to 
peace and nation-building overseas. Closer to home, both in the UK 
and, more significantly in the US, religious organisations deliver 
important health, welfare and education services to domestic 
populations. So too does religion take on what we might consider a 
‘civil society’ role in contexts where there is government repression of 
particular institutions or practices. This could also be called ‘service 
delivery’ but in this model religious organisations and individuals tend 
to operate counter to legitimate authority rather than in contributing to 
its objectives.  
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It seems that religion has been accounted for by political scientists in 
all three contexts in a similar way. The religious actor is conceived as 
an individual or group which either contributes towards or undermines 
specific government objectives. In fact, we might suggest that the 
relationship between religious agency and the state is presented as one 
of ambivalent externality. Not only does the description of public 
religion as a ‘non-state actor’ reflect a particular conception of politics 
as secular, it also reflects a related culturally contingent definition of 
religion as something private and voluntary. It seems that even ways 
to integrate religion into political science are dominated by secular 
political assumptions according to which religion and politics are not 
able to occupy the same social space. Because religion’s role in public 
life is defined as being outside the state, a new public realm called 
‘civil society’ or ‘the third sector’ emerges as the location of the full 
range of ‘faith based organisations’ which Clarke (2006) describes. 
The cultural contingency of the ‘civil society’ model, then, is both 
significant and problematic, informed as it is by sociological accounts 
of the religion-society relationship based on the experience of the 
(secular) liberal democratic polity. Herbert (2003) provides a long and 
detailed history of the concept of civil society, demonstrating the 
extent to which it has helped to define debates about the role of 
religion in the public realm in the context of liberal democracies. 
Though Habermas (1962) and Mayhew (1997) provide different 
accounts of the foundations of the concept - the former tracing the 
79
idea of the ‘public sphere’ to the salons and coffee houses of 18th 
century Europe and the latter to 17th century radical Protestant 
Ministers, both recognise the significance of the ‘public realm’ or 
‘civil society’ concept in shaping Western conceptions of religion as 
something outside of, and even subject to, secular authority.
Thus, even though the ‘civil society’ idea helps us to overcome the 
sort of polarised ‘public/private’ dichotomy between religion and the 
state which is characteristic of some traditional sociological accounts 
and which is practically manifest in, for example, the US and French 
Constitutions, it nevertheless still reveals the pervasive influence of 
secularisation theories on the political sciences. The secularism of 
political science - and sociological theories from which it emerged - is 
thus increasingly considered to be constitutive. Hence, in their 2008 
article, Gorski and Altinordu (2008:60) describe a new phase in the 
study of religion and society marked by the cleavage between 
secularisation as a theory and secularism as an ideology. Tracing the 
etymological history of the term ‘secularism’, they describe a number 
of meaning-shifts over the course of Western history, concluding with 
‘the church-state struggles of the fin de siecle’ which gave new 
meaning to the concept of ‘secularisation’ as a political programme. 
Contemporary discussions of secularisation, they suggest, point to a 
fruitful new dimension for analysis - of the sort undertaken by 
Ozyurek (2006) in Turkey and Gutkowski (2012, 2013) in relation to 
British security actors - in which secularism is recognised as a cultural 
formation that ‘is carried by social actors with specific interests who 
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associate it with concrete lifestyles, emotionally identify with it, 
sacrilise it in the image of the state and of the founding fathers, 
performatively display their adherence to it, and mobilize against 
religious movements through complex strategies’ (2012: 73-74). I 
discuss the elevation of one model of ‘secularism’ to a sacred value 
further in Chapter Five.
Accounting for religion, then, requires more than the integration of 
religion into existing frameworks. Instead, as part of a broader critique 
of modernity as a culturally contingent ideology (Alexander, 
2003:193), a range of scholars (Thomas, 2005; Wuthnow, 1989; 
Xintian, 2004) seek to overcome the ‘positivist assumption’ implicit in 
the social and political sciences by advocating an ‘interpretative 
approach’ (Wuthnow, 1989) to religion or what we might call a ‘turn 
to culture’. 
2.42 The turn to culture
Consistent with what Robertson (1988) describes as the 
‘reawakening’ of cultural analysis in sociology, the need to overcome 
political science’s marginalisation of culture is now being 
acknowledged. A new range of approaches, broadly labelled 
‘constructivist’ has emerged which come to terms with religion’s role 
by challenging and redefining the intellectual frameworks of the 
political sciences that are inextricably tied to the modern distinction 
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between church and state (Wendt, 1999; Fox & Sandler, 2005; 
Thomas, 2005; Snyder, 2011; Hurd 2011). These analyses introduce 
what Lapid (1989: 236) calls ‘meaning related content’ to the political 
context and, in line with ‘anti-positivist philosophical and sociological 
trends’, emphasise non-rational methodology, including the analysis of 
meaning, ‘thick’ description and interpretation as the best way to 
explain religious motivation. The result of this sort of post-positivist 
analysis has been a better understanding of religious agency, which is 
now able to be interpreted in light of the histories, narratives and 
symbols of different cultural contexts, rather than according to the 
universal myth of secular modern culture. Allied to this is increasing 
recognition from political scientists that interests are constructed in 
relation to these histories, narratives and symbols and not independent 
of them. Thus, the ‘religious actor’ can be recognised as a product of 
his/her/its own context rather than being artificially subjected to the 
requirements of the Western secular norm. Indeed, this trend has also 
opened up the category of secularism itself to political analysis (Hurd, 
2011, Asad, 2003). Rather than the neutral or objective universal 
future predicated by modern narratives, the ‘secular’ has emerged as 
constituted by and constitutive of, a particular civilisation and cultural 
context: a ‘series of political settlements that define, regulate, and 
manage religion in modern politics, including international 
politics’ (Hurd, 2011: 60).
The post-positivist orientation has undeniably moved the conversation 
about religious agency forward, introducing non-rational, symbolic 
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and ideational motivation to a discussion that had previously been 
almost exclusively rationalist-utilitarian. In accounts of ‘religious 
actors’, scholars are increasingly cognisant of the need to consider 
social relationships and motivations other than those based on self-
interest. Similarly, in arguing against rational-choice models of 
religion, Spickard (1998) and Mellor (2000) have both identified the 
potency of non-utilitarian modes of social action. Kubalkova (2003) 
has argued for the introduction of ‘international political theology’ in 
order to ensure that international relations is able to recognise the 
significance of ‘assertive rules’41 as a source of agency. Indeed, if the 
phenomenon of Islamist terrorism has taught us anything, it is that 
actors on the world stage continue to be motivated by non-contractual 
rules and not by rationality or self-interest. What has not yet been 
considered is just how powerful these ideational forces might be in 
our own system.   That is to say, for all constructivism has so far 
contributed to the conversation about the religious actor, it is limited 
in two critical ways.
First, while the introduction of social constructivism to the analysis of 
international relations  presents a promising alternative to a purely 
positivist account of political agency, nevertheless some such accounts 
have tended to define religion in terms of ‘narratives’ and ‘meanings’ 
which help individuals construct identities and navigate their 
environment (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2003: 113-115). Alexander 
83
41 ‘Assertive rules’ involve an immediate demand which must be followed and are 
distinguished from ‘contractual rules’ which involve the application of reason and 
judgement by the individual. 
would call this a ‘weak’ cultural concept, something which assumes 
that meanings, narratives and ideas are both deeply personal and 
voluntary.  Religious motivation, in this light, is essentially the result 
of an intellectual or rational construction and is infinitely multiple, 
making it theoretically unappealing to those who continue to 
recognise the benefit of positivism when ‘being driven by the need to 
find the best explanation’ (Dunne et al, 1998:ix).
Secondly, while the recognition that religion is a cultural social form 
has derived benefits for our understanding of political agency - 
introducing to it greater attentiveness to the non-rational and non-
material, such accounts have not yet overcome what Robertson 
describes as the ‘highly circumscribed definition of culture’ (1998, p.
5) which is the modern legacy and which excludes cultural categories 
from structural significance. The intellectual distinction between 
culture and structure, I would suggest, lies at the very heart of what 
international relations theorists call the ‘third debate’. With Robertson, 
I therefore advocate a ‘metacultural’ approach that considers culture 
explicitly in its relation to structure as well as agency. We might call 
this not ‘post-positivism’, but ‘positivism-plus’, something which 
acknowledges religion as a cultural phenomenon and therefore 
religious agency as something expressed and manifest in symbolic and 
non-rational ways, but at the same time which acknowledges the ways 
in which the symbolic and non-rational might all be manifest in social 
structures. 
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The way forward for the analysis of religious agency in public life, I 
suggest, is with reference to the sort of middle ground cleared for us 
by the critical realists (e.g. Archer et al,1998; Archer 1988) who argue 
that though positivists are misdirected in seeking to identify the sort of 
laws in the social realm which are observable in natural science, so 
too are hermeneutists wrong in abandoning this goal altogether. The 
task before us, instead, is to identify a via media - to recognise that 
religious agency is not merely a private nor a cultural phenomenon 
because ‘cultural actors are also structural agents.’ (Archer, 1988: 298) 
The disciplines of political science have come a long way in a short 
time, but the final part of the journey, as yet, has not been negotiated. 
The attention paid to religious actors has been fruitful: it has resulted 
in recognition of non-rational agency as a significant factor in 
international affairs and it has given us a direction of future travel. To 
fully integrate religion into political scientific analysis will require us 
to develop a better understanding the relationship of culture to 
structure through which we are able to identify whether religious 
agency might be a factor in the behaviour of states and governments. 
Indeed, we should not be surprised to find that this is the case in a 
range of complex ways given ‘subjective and internal feelings that so 
often seem to rule the world... [they] form[s] the will of collectivities; 
shapes the rules of organisations; defines the moral substance of law; 
and provides the meaning and motivation for technologies, economies, 
and military machines’ (Alexander, 2003: 5). 
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In this thesis, I explore this interplay between structural and cultural 
levels, suggesting that it is significant in understanding both the UK 
and the US foreign-policy relationship to religion. In the UK, I argue, 
the ‘mutual embrace’ (Beckford, 2012:16) between religion and state 
is such that the state should be considered a religious rather than 
secular actor. In the US, I suggest, while the state is formally secular, 
the cultural patterns of the market orientate religion-related policy in 
critical ways. In both cases, then, it is necessary to traverse the 
distinction between structures and cultures as ways of understanding 
the relationship of religion to state. 
In seeking to understand the way policy makers in the UK and the US 
understand and negotiate their interactions with religion, then, there is 
some useful material that can be drawn from the political sciences. 
Indeed, post-secular discourse has drawn heavily from this body of 
work. Here there is a story about Western secularism being confronted 
by global religiosity; the religious non-state actor functioning in ‘civil 
society’; and a need to be attentive to cultural dynamics. But there is 
another body of literature which speaks to questions about religion, 
public life and public policy: the sociology of religion. 
2.5 Secularisation challenged 
Like their counterparts in the political sciences, sociologists of 
religion have sought to explain the contemporary era of religious 
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resurgence by challenging the legacy of secularisation theory. Though 
it had been questioned long before - notably by David Martin (1965, 
1978) who sought to explain religious change with reference to the 
diversity within religious traditions rather than the external effects of 
‘modernity’ - toward the end of the twentieth century, secularisation 
theory has come under sustained attack from two different directions.
The first set of challenges question the empirical validity of a theory 
of ‘religious decline’ with reference to global religious revivals. 
Yamane (1997) points out that the proliferation of new religious 
movements, the growth of conservative Protestantism in the US and 
the persistence of religion in various forms have been given as 
evidence that secularisation is flawed. One of secularisation theory’s 
early advocates, Peter Berger, in a dramatic about-face, is now 
convinced that secularisation theory cannot be sustained in light of 
empirical evidence: ‘In my own thinking....the major change of mind 
has been, precisely, the abandonment of the old secularisation theory - 
not, I would like to emphasise because of some philosophical or 
theological change, but because the theory seemed less and less 
capable of making sense of the empirical evidence from different parts 
of the world....’ (Berger, 2003: 337). In fact, Berger’s (1999) edited 
collection brings together a range of scholars who claim the current 
global context is one of ‘desecularisation’ in which a range of 
developments - from Pentecostalism in Latin America to religious 
resurgence in post-communist China - undermine the assumptions he 
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and others made about the causal connection between modernity and 
religious decline.  
However, this empirical challenge is not the only one with which 
secularisation theorists have been forced to contend. While Rodney 
Stark (1999) has made a scathing attack on secularisation theory for 
its lack of empirical base and reliance upon a ‘byone Age of Faith’ 
which never existed, he has also launched a major theoretical 
alternative to secularisation theory. The US experience of high 
modernity and high personal and public religiosity has long been a 
thorn in the side of European secularisation theorists who had often 
made ‘the expedient appeal to ‘American exceptionalism’ (Casanova, 
2003: 19) in order to continue with their ‘universal’ model which 
predicated the correlated developments of modernity and 
secularisation. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, unsatisfied 
by this non-explanation of the American religion-society relationship, 
an alternative paradigm was under construction. Warner (1993) 
observes the emergence of an explanation for the simultaneous co-
existence of high secularity and high religiosity in the US: the rational 
choice paradigm. Counter to the assumptions of secularisation theory, 
rational choice approaches argue not that the existence of religion in 
secular sites is evidence of its decrease but in fact is a recipe for its 
success (Stark, 1999). Based on the assumption that America’s 
tradition of religious liberty has created a competitive market 
environment in which religion thrives, the economic theory of the free 
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market is “the analytic key to the new paradigm” (Warner, 1993), 
which envisages religious activity as the result of rational self-interest 
forcing religions themselves to diversify and compete in order to 
ensure their existence. 
First appearing in the 1980s, ‘rational choice’ or ‘supply side’ models 
have arguably been secularisation theory’s most significant opponents. 
These models explain religious vitality - rather than decline - by 
describing religion as a human need and pointing to a causal 
connection between the availability of religious ‘choices’ and levels of 
religious vitality. In 1987, Stark and Bainbridge’s ‘Theory of 
Religion’ offered a deductive, axiomatic approach to understanding 
the relationship between religion and society based around the 
assumption of human beings’ tendency to utility maximisation. In 
their account, macro-level secularisation, vis societal differentiation is 
accepted as given and the cultural ‘market’ model is applied to micro-
level religiosity. Though some critics (e.g Gorski, 2012) consider 
rational choice models to be primarily concerned with micro-level 
religious ‘demand’, in fact it was Iannacone (1992) who developed the 
idea of the ‘religious economy’ as a way of describing ‘all the 
religious activity going on in any society (Stark and Finke, 2000: 
193). The rational choice paradigm, we might suggest, offers us the 
inverse opposite to the political sciences ‘turn to culture’. Where 
political science is increasingly embracing the non-rational elements 
of human agency, here sociologists of religion turn to the rational 
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principle of utility maximisation as the basis for religious choice. 
Indeed, while there are manifest challenges to rational choice models, 
not least in their failure to account for social or other non-rational 
influences on religious behaviour (see e.g. Sherkat, 1997; Neitz and 
Mueser, 1997), they have ironically enough made a significant 
contribution to the development of so-called ‘neo-secularisation’ 
models both by decentring the European model of secularisation in 
sociological thought and in helping to elevate the ‘core’ subject matter 
of the sociology of religion from the micro-level to the macro-level. 
(For more on rational choice theory and the US context, see Chapter 
Five). 
2.6 Secularisation re-stated
While some proponents of secularisation (e.g. Bruce, 2006) persist 
with the traditional model and continue to posit a causal connection 
between increased egalitarianism, individualism and diversity and the 
decline of organised religion, it has become increasingly common for 
secularisation to be described as a process of religious change. Davie 
(2000), for example, draws on evidence from the European Values 
Survey to identify a pattern of ‘believing without belonging’ across 
Europe and suggests that religious memory is ‘mutating’ rather than 
declining. Furthermore, even Bruce himself limits the applicability of 
his position to the ‘undeniable’ decline of religion in Europe. So too, 
in 1998, Wilson felt it necessary to explain that ‘secularisation does 
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not occur in the same way in different countries or even in different 
regions: the specificity of cultural conditions and historical 
circumstances ensures that the process by which religion loses social 
influence follows a distinctive, perhaps even a unique course in each 
separate social setting’ (Wilson, 1998: 48). Elsewhere (Davie, 2000, 
Berger, Davie and Fokas, 2008), evidence is used to support the 
presentation of Europe as an outlier - or a ‘curious case of deviance 
that requires explanation’ (Berger, 2003: 340) in relation to both the 
United States and the rest of the world. Unlike in the political science 
literature, which as we have seen tends to conflate Western 
experiences of secularisation, it has become increasingly important for 
sociologists of religion (see e.g. Martin 1978, 2005b) to point to 
cleavages between Western nations in their experience of 
secularisation.  
But it is not only by narrowing the geographical scope of seculariation 
theory that it has been re-stated. European sociologists - notably 
Dobbelaere (1981) and Casanova (1994) sought to bring greater 
analytical clarity to secularisation which had previously ‘been used in 
sociology in different ways. It may refer to decline in church 
involvement, to laicisation of social institutions or to religious 
changes’ (Dobbelaere, 1981:8). Describing the process by which 
‘secularisation’ emerged into the social sciences in the early twentieth 
century, Dobbealere suggests that it was originally used in reference to 
the separation of social sectors - or what Parsons called 
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‘differentiation’ - before later being applied to the individual level. As 
a result, he identifies three levels: ‘laicisation’ or the process of 
institutional differentiation where religion loses its overarching claim 
which often involves ‘disenchantment’ or rationalisation; ‘religious 
involvement’ or the decline in indvidiual religious beliefs and 
practices; and finally ‘religious change’ or the adaptation of the church 
and religious organisations to the world. Through these analytical 
distinctions, Dobbelaere proposes, ‘we are in a better position to study 
the empirical relationships between laicisation and religious change; 
between laicisation and religious involvement; and between religious 
involvement and religious change’ (1981:12). 
In his ‘neo-secularisation’ paradigm, Yamane (1997) has rejected 
claims that global data provides an empirical challenge to 
secularisation theory given it is either ‘irrelevant or interpretable 
within the terms of the theory’ (1997:110) In the face of empirical 
challenges facing secularisation theory - from the proliferation of new 
religious movements to the growth of conservative Protestantism in 
the US - as well as the theoretical challenge provided by the religious 
economies model, Yamane argues that ‘the insights provided by the 
new paradigm do not force us to abandon the idea of secularisation 
that has provided sustained insights for cautious sociologists for the 
past century (1997:111). While challenges to secularisation require 
theorists to ‘self-consciously reevaluate the paradigm which for so 
long was part of the taken-for-granted background of sociological 
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thinking’ (1997:112), nevertheless, it is possible to hold onto the two 
core ideas at the heart of the secularisation thesis: the effect of 
modernisation processes in transforming religion and the macro-social 
significance of religion. For Yamane (1997:115), ‘the 
neosecularisation paradigm emphasises the centrality of institutional 
differentiation at the societal level’ meaning that it is possible to 
dispense with ‘peripheral’ elements of the theory including the 
reliance on individual or organisational level data and the over-
simplification of secularisation processes as ‘decline’ or ‘death’ of 
religion.
Casanova’s (1994:11) landmark text ‘Public Religions in the Modern 
World’ too unravels the ‘wide range of meanings it (secularisation) has 
accumulated through its history’. Putting ‘secularisation’ into the 
historical context, he describes the ‘double dualist system of 
classification’ according to which pre-modern Europe was structured 
in which, in addition to the distinction between ‘this world’ and ‘the 
other world’, a dualism also operated within ‘this world’ such that it 
was structured into ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’. In light of this, 
‘secularisation’ describes the process by which this dualism in ‘this 
world’ broke down such that ‘now the secular sphere will be the all-
encompassing reality, to which the religious sphere will have to 
adapt’ (1994:15). Hence he offers a ‘spatial-structural’ understanding 
of secularisation, less about the religious practices of individuals and 
more about the process by which the differentiation of spheres has 
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taken place in different contexts. In doing so, he suggests that 
diffferentiation is the analytical core of the secularisation thesis, to 
which two sub-theses - the decline and privatisation of religion - have 
been attached leading to a ‘confusion of historical processes....with 
alleged and anticipated consequences which those processes were 
supposed to have upon religion’ (1994:19). 
He describes four developments which contributed to the breakdown 
of the medieval system of religious classification: the Protestant 
Reformation - which undermined the unity of the church and 
legitimised the development of secular ethics; the emergence of the 
modern nation state - in which religious conformity eventually gave 
way to tolerance of pluralism; the emergence of capitalism which the 
church could not regulate and which eventually subjected the church 
‘to the logic of commodification’ (1994:23); and the rise of modern 
science which brought faith and reason into conflict. Each of these 
processes, Casanova suggests, contributed to secularisation in that 
they were ‘carriers of differentiation’ (1994:25), though the processes 
happened in different places and at different times and make it 
necessary to understand secularisation less as a ‘universal teleological 
process’ and more as a variable process that is related to patterns of 
state formation. 
The ‘decline of religion’ thesis and ‘privatisation of religion thesis’, 
Casanova argues, have variously been added to the process of 
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differentiation, though with little analytical clarity. The global picture 
reveals that religion has maintained or increased in vitality in most 
parts of the world beyond Western Europe, such that it must be 
considered a global exception. This means that a better understanding 
of the way in which religion has persisted alongside the processes of 
modernity is essential. The privatisation of religion thesis, Casanova 
suggests, has developed out of the observation that religious 
institutions are increasingly marginalised, and/or that the quest for 
meaning is increasingly an individual one. However, Casanova 
suggests, there is resistance to depoliticisation in a range of contexts 
which means there must be room within secularisation theory for 
‘public religion’. In doing so, he makes an important theoretical 
movement by suggesting that meso-level religious mobilisation or 
‘public religion’ is still possible even in the context of macro-level 
secularisation. This analysis achieves two important gains for 
secularisation theory: first, it elevates the narrative of secularisation 
from the micro to the macro level and second, it demonstrates that 
different dynamics are possible between the levels, contrary to 
classical secularisation theory which posited causal connections 
between structures and cultures. 
Casanova (2006:9,11) has emphasised the need to ‘historicise and 
contextualise’ accounts and to recognise that ‘there are multiple 
diverse secularisations in the West and multiple and diverse Western 
modernities’.He goes onto articulate differences between the Latin-
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Catholic cultural area - in which reason and freedom had 
emancipatory power (e.g. during French revolution) hence religion is 
marginalised and privatised and the Anglo-Protestant area (particularly 
the US) where tensions between religion and ‘freedom’ were never 
present hence the US is ‘more religious’ but not necessarily ‘less 
secular’ (Casanova, 2006:12). Casanova (2006:13 - my italics) 
suggests that the ‘civilisation of modernity’ is underpinned by ‘the 
continuous transformation of the pre-modern historical civilisations 
under modern conditions, which help to shape multiple modernities’. 
For this reason, Casanova suggests that secularisation should not be 
associated with processes of modernisation but patterns of fusion and 
dissolution of religious, political and social communities.
It seems, then, that at the beginning of the 21st century, secularisation 
theory is far from being abandoned as a way of understanding the 
relationship of religion to state and society. Rather than a theory of 
religious decline, it is now described as a process of religious change. 
Furthermore, it has been significantly remodelled so that the emphasis 
is now placed on macro-level structural differentiation and on the 
differences between Western experiences of the secularisation process. 
Both of these are important developments for this thesis.  Moreover, it 
seems that accounts of the post-secular bring this body of literature 
into conversation with the political sciences in important ways. 
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2.7 In conversation
Narratives of the post-secular draw from the sociology of religion and 
from accounts of secularisation, taking from them an emphasis on 
religious change: the post-secular is about the transformation of 
beliefs and values (Wikstrom and Illman, 2012: 217), and is a way to 
conceptualise the contemporary resurgence of religion in the public 
sphere (Moberg, Granholm and Nynas, 2012: 3). Yet at the same time, 
they draw from the political sciences to tell a story of Western 
secularism being confronted by global religiosity or the ‘growing 
public visibility of religion throughout much of the Western 
world’ (Moberg, Granholm and Nynas, 2012: 6) as a result of which 
‘we are entering a new phase of state-religion relations, which are 
historically anchored in modernity but affected by neoliberalisation 
and the globalisation of society and social life’ (Martikainen, 2012: 
71). As Wikstrom and Illman explain ‘to sum up this introduction of 
the post-secular discourse, it rests on the observation that religious 
perspectives have renewed their public prominence in contemporary 
Western societies...’ (Wikstrom and Illman, 2012: p.220). What 
emerges from this conversation, then, is a narrative of homogenous 
Western secularism in the face of global (and national) religious 
change. Yet, this narrative does not tell the whole story. In bringing 
accounts of the post-secular from the sociology of religion into 
conversation with those drawn from the political sciences, a number 
of key questions emerge:
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* does the turn to culture give us the best tools to explain the way 
UK and US government’s engage religion in foreign policy?
* does macro-level secularisation (differentiation) describe 
conditions in the UK and/or the US?
* how should we account for differences between the UK and US 
context?
First, I contend that these literatures independently only offer a limited 
insight into the relationship between religion and foreign policy in the 
UK and US. More importantly, I suggest, bringing these two 
literatures into conversation with one another exposes critical flaws in 
both, which are not always cited in post-secular narratives. Where one 
(the turn to culture) set of accounts overplays religion’s significance in 
micro-level agency, it underplays its role in structure. The other 
(mainstream secularisation theory) overplays the significance of 
structures at the expense of culture. 
This very impasse is the central concern of critical realists such as 
Archer (Archer, 1988) who argues that - just as culture and agency can 
be analytically, if not empirically separated - so culture and society are 
analytically separable, hence cultural and structural change can 
happen independently. It is this central tenet that, I suggest, is played 
out by the material contained within this thesis. The analytical 
separability of cultural and structural change means that there is a 
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wider range of options to describe what is going on in UK and US 
foreign policy than these two bodies of literature account for. Hence, 
the religion-policy relationship need not be characterised by a single 
dimension of ‘secularisation’ or ‘religious resurgence’ as the literature 
presents to us. It is possible, for example, that micro-level religious 
resurgence can be occurring at the same time as macro-level 
secularisation or the opposite could also be the case, i.e. that micro-
level secularism can be occurring at the same time as macro-level 
religiosity. In this thesis, I will argue that the religion-state 
relationship influences the religion-foreign policy relationship in two 
ways: the first is structural (the status of differentiation); and the 
second is cultural (institutional patterns and behaviours). In doing so, I 
bring the sociology of religion to bear on the political sciences and 
vice versa. Emerging from this conversation is a narrative quite 
different than that offered by ‘post-secularists’. Where there is an 
emphasis on cultures of secularism and therefore Western 
homogeneity, I (with e.g Casanova, 2012) offer a cultural as well as 
structural analysis of the macro-level, drawing on structural factors to 
emphasise the heterogeneity present within the religion-state 
relationships of the UK and the US. Furthermore, where there is an 
emphasis on structural religious change, shifting global dynamics and 
transformations of both religion and state, I point to religious 
continuity, the stability of church-state settlements and their influence 
over the management of religion.
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Chapter Three: ‘Getting’ religion and getting religion wrong 
(or ‘how are UK policy makers ‘managing God?’)
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter Two, I described and analysed two broad areas of 
scholarship which concern themselves with the relationship of religion 
to the state and society. The first, I suggested, was located in the 
mainstream social and political sciences which have undertaken a 
‘turn to culture’ in a bid to rescue themselves from the positivism 
which had robbed their intellectual frameworks of the ability to take 
religion seriously. The second area of scholarship - the sociology of 
religion - had, I suggested, undergone a 360 degree turnaround from 
secularisation theory, through the abandonment of secularisation 
theory to its restatement with a number of conditions. What both of 
these schools of thought increasingly utilise, I observed, were 
narratives of ‘post-secularity’ given they neatly describe the sort of 
scholarly journey both disciplines had experienced. Yet, in describing 
the current global context as ‘post-secular’, there is a fashion for 
scholars - and increasingly practitioners - to label persistent outliers as 
‘secular’ for refusing to conform to the new ‘post-secular’ landscape. 
In what follows, I evaluate the accusation that British public policy is 
secular. In order to do so, I begin with an exploration of the religion-
policy relationship in recent years, demonstrating that, far from being 
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ignored, religion has been repeatedly relocated as a public policy issue 
by the last two Governments. Yet, I suggest, while successive 
governments have characterised the relationship between religion and 
public policy differently, there remain implicitly Christian 
assumptions in the way the state engages religious forms. 
Next, taking an ‘ethnographic’ approach to the UK policy 
establishment, I go on to explore the dimensions of ‘secularism’ as 
they have been applied to the UK policy context, distinguishing 
between two different narratives which are often conflated. First, I 
suggest it is necessary to distinguish between ‘structural’ and 
‘cultural’ dimensions of UK Government - that is, between 
institutional encounters with religion and the religious complexion of 
the governing elite and its influence over public policy. I argue that the 
last 15 years has been characterised by the repeated ‘relocation’ of 
religion rather than its marginalisation or by secularism, noting that 
despite these relocations there remain some common elements. Next, I 
seek to evaluate the extent to which the accusation of ‘cultural 
secularism’ is appropriate. Here, I distinguish between the political 
and administrative levels of government, suggesting that it is within 
the permanent administrative cadre that aversion to religious 
engagement is strongest but that this is less as a result of cultural 
secularism and more of an attempt at ideological impartiality which I 
call ‘religion blindness’. These two analyses suggest that the 
relationship between religion and state in the UK is more complex 
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than the narrative of secularisation can account for. Finally, I move to 
consider the way Her Majesty’s Government ‘does’ religion in those 
circumstances where religious engagement is non-discretionary. Re-
examining the legacy of HMG’s encounters with religion under the 
auspices of ‘Prevent’, I suggest that despite its manifest problems, 
Prevent played a significant role in forcing the UK Government to 
engage seriously with religion and in extending the religion-policy 
relationship into the international context. As a result, the Prevent 
strategy exemplifies the challenge I earlier levelled at accounts of 
public policy’s ‘secularism’: it has both contributed to the culture of 
‘religion blindness’, by eliciting fear among policy makers, and at the 
same time draws from strongly felt cultural values including implicit 
Christianity. 
3.2 Religion Blind? 
During its time in office, the Coalition Government took a variety of 
steps to respond to criticism about the way religious engagement was 
undertaken by its predecessors. In June 2011, counter-radicalisation 
policy ‘Prevent’ was refocused around known targets and removed 
from association with integration work42. Indeed, though the Coalition 
Government faced accusations of ‘co-opting’ (Ketell, 2012) and 
‘marginalising’ (Christians in Parliament, 2012) religion, its attempts 
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42 For more information, see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-
strategy-2011 
at religious engagement have tended to emphasise the positive 
contribution of religion to public policy goals. While considerable 
attention has been paid to the role of religious civil society 
organisations in the so-called ‘Big Society’ agenda43 (see e.g. Ketell, 
2012), in fact a range of central government policy actively engages 
religious communities and organisations. The ‘Near Neighbours’ 
programme, launched by Communities Secretary Eric Pickles in 
November 2011, aimed to increase interfaith and intercultural 
cooperation in improving local neighbourhoods. Administered through 
the Church Urban Fund, this programme explicitly places a strong 
emphasis on the ‘vital role’ played by faith groups in local 
communities (Pickles, 2011). The conviction that religion plays an 
important role in society was further underlined by the publication of 
‘Faith Partnership Principles’ by the Department for International 
Development in February 2012 which ‘marks a new era of 
understanding between government and faith groups on global 
development’ (Mitchell, 2012).
Indeed, Ministerial rhetoric suggests that these initiatives are part of a 
conscious shift toward ‘doing God‘ (Pickles, 2012).  On a number of 
occasions the UK’s Christian foundations have been reasserted44 and 
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43  ʻBig Society’ policy is focused on ‘making it as easy as possible for civil society 
organisations to help shape and deliver our public services’ (Big Society - 
Frequently Asked Questions https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/85850/Big_Society_FAQs.pdf accessed September 16 
2013).
44 On 16 December 2011, the Prime Minister called Britain ‘a Christian country.’ 
The following February, Baroness Warsi emphasised ‘the importance of the 
Established Church and our Christian heritage’ (see https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/baroness-warsi-speech-in-the-holy-see - accessed 22 June 2013). 
historic policies of multiculturalism criticised.45 On the other hand, 
Ministers have also accused previous Governments of ‘secularism.’46 
My own interviews with officials reveal the extent to which these 
criticisms have been internalised. All of the officials I interviewed 
were conscious of various ways in which Government had made 
mistakes in the past. As a result, officials explained, there were 
perennial concerns about ‘getting religion wrong’, ‘causing offence’ or 
engaging with ‘inappropriate organisations’ (HMG/4 July 2012/b, 
HMG/4 July 2012/c, HMG/7 December 2012/a, HMG/5 July 2012/b). 
A number suggested to me that high profile errors in the past meant 
that ‘religion is not a comfortable space’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c) for 
policy makers, that Government ‘culture is to be embarrassed about 
religion’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a) and that religion is considered as a 
policy issue only by exception (HMG/10 May 2012/b). As one official 
explained to me ‘There are areas where engagement with religion is 
discretionary and areas where it is non-discretionary. The majority of 
my work has been where religion really has affected us and we have 
been forced to deal with it.... but we have not been particularly 
successful in dealing with it because we don’t have much 
practice’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c). That said, a number of officials did 
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45 In February 2011, the Prime Minister declared that the doctrine of ‘state 
multiculturalism’ which has ‘encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, 
apart from each other and apart from the mainstream’ had failed to prevent 
extremism. See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference - accessed 25 October 2013
46 The Communities and Local Government Secretary criticised the ‘intolerant 
secularism’ of the public sector, (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-17082136 - accessed 1 September 2013). Prior to this, Baroness Warsi 
described the ‘militant secularism’ - see http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-
analysis/2012/02/14/warsi-s-speech-on-militant-secularism-in-full, accessed 22 June 
2013)
acknowledge that lessons had been learned from the past and were 
able to utilise major narratives drawn from the social and political 
sciences to explain contemporary practice. For example, a number of 
those interviewed described increasing recognition of the 
exceptionalism of the British and/or European church-state settlement 
(Berger, Davie and Fokas, 2008), suggesting that ‘The desire to 
separate (religion from politics) is European and particularly 
British’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a) and ‘we are only just starting to realise 
that our settled view of the world is otherwise’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c). 
This expression is characteristically ‘post-secular’ (Habermas, 2008) 
in that it recognises the cultural contingency of the Western model 
which separates religion from politics. In addition, officials described 
the changing ‘mood music’ (HMG/27 July 2012/a) within 
Government departments in which there were increasing signs that 
‘it’s OK to be open about religious motivation’ (HMG/27 July 2012/
a). As one explained to me, ‘the key question is whether the public 
space can only be secular or because we have a pluralistic system do 
you allow all voices to shout all the time. We now allow all the 
voices’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b). Government policy, rhetoric and 
practice then, seem to be responding to critiques of the ‘secularism’ of 
the public sphere by actively providing space for religion within it. 
But what if the extent of this ‘secularism’ has been overstated?
3.21 Marginalisation or relocation? 
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Communities Secretary Eric Pickles (2012) has claimed that ‘long-
standing British liberties of freedom of religion have been undermined 
in recent years by aggressive secularism, especially in the more 
politically correct parts of the public sector’. Critical of high profile 
legal disputes over the right to religious expression, including over the 
right to wear or display religious symbols in a working environment, 
Pickles explicitly criticizes the National Secular Society’s campaign 
against council prayers as ‘intolerant’. What is more, he advocates the 
right of religious groups (and Christians in particular) to ‘be heard by 
policy makers’.  
The notion that public policy is inappropriately secular has been 
expressed by another senior politician, Baroness Warsi (Winnett, 
2012), who claimed that religion has been ‘sidelined, marginalised and 
downgraded in the public sphere’. She describes this tendency as 
‘militant secularism’, such urgent language reflects her fear that this 
‘rising tide’ is ‘taking hold of our societies’. Like Pickles, Warsi 
highlights what she considers to be visible signs of encroaching 
secularism including the prohibition of the display of religious 
symbols and considers the ethos of secularism to be intolerant ‘when 
it requires the complete removal of faith from the public sphere’. 
What Warsi and Pickles both highlight (and condemn), then, is what 
they perceive to be the deep secularism of the public sector and its 
implications for the limiting of free religious expression. Sociological 
accounts of secularism might describe this removal of religion from 
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public life as the ‘privatisation’ of religion - a structural form of 
secularisation characterised by the differentiation and the 
‘emancipation of the secular spheres—primarily the state, the 
economy, and science—from the religious sphere and the concomitant 
differentiation and specialisation of religion within its own newly 
found religious sphere’ (Casanova, 1994: 19). However, I would 
suggest that a variety of historical public policy actually reflects the 
conscious engagement of religious communities and organisations, the 
‘management’ of religion rather than its differentiation from the state. 
The so-called ‘Rushdie affair’ is often identified as a watershed 
moment in the relationship between religion and British society. The 
reaction of Muslim communities in parts of the UK to the publication 
of a novel labelled blasphemous, according to Herbert (2003) had the 
effect of politicising urban Muslim youth in the UK and creating a 
nascent South Asian-facing Islamic civil society in Britain. While the 
most significant policy outcome of the Rushdie affair was the eventual 
inclusion of ‘religion’ in anti-discrimination legislation, making 
religion a defining category of difference according to British law, I 
would suggest that it also set a precedent for the subsequent 
development of the religion-public policy relationship in the UK: 
policies of multiculturalism, community cohesion, what I label 
‘heritage Christianity’ and, controversially, security, are all attempts 
by the policy community to galvanise the socially cohesive potential 
of religion in the face of problematic intercultural relations. In other 
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words, by repeatedly ‘relocating’ religion as a policy issue, the policy 
community has sought to ape exactly the effect the Rushdie affair 
created: the political mobilisation of religious communities in a 
thriving ‘civil society’, with mixed results.
In the midst of debate and policy making about the ‘race problem’, 
brought to a head by the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the 
development of a Home Office ‘faith unit’ was Jack Straw’s response 
to what he recognised were religious tensions within his own 
Blackburn constituency (HMG/ 8 June/2011). When Blunkett 
succeeded him as Home Secretary, after the 2001 election, civil unrest 
in ‘multicultural’ northern cities resulted in an increased focus on 
citizenship and integration - the government was increasingly engaged 
in the ‘management of diversity’. Back et al (2002) have argued that 
New Labour’s policy was necessarily Janus-faced, struggling at once 
with the promotion of tolerance and diversity and the challenge of 
coherent national politics. The Christocentric47 label ‘faith’, I would 
suggest, was a critical part of their early attempt to overcome this 
tension, at least as far as dealing with religious communities was 
concerned. While citizenship - by 2005, a status to be achieved via 
examination - continued to be an individual, legal matter, a rational 
contractual relationship between the individual and the state, ‘faith’ 
was increasingly recognised, even encouraged, as a source of local 
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47 My evidence suggests that Beaman’s (2003) research into the United States and 
Canada where there exists an implicit model of what constitutes a legitimate 
religion, could be extended to the UK where mainline Protestantism also has 
constitutional privilege.
and communal identity.  As a flagship education policy, the Blair 
government sought to encourage the establishment of ‘faith schools’ 
within the state sector. Though the idea of the ‘faith school’ was not 
new, its application beyond the Judaeo-Christian norm, a reflection of 
the reality of cultural diversity, certainly was. The accommodation of 
other faiths into a Judaeo-Christian model is evidence of what 
Beckford and Gillat (2005) describe as the New Labour Government 
having a concept of ‘religion’ but not ‘religions’. In their analysis of 
the role of prison chaplains, they suggest that the Christian clergy 
acted as ‘religious brokers’ performing spiritual and pastoral 
responsibilities to a number of faith communities in the prison 
population and, in some cases, being utilised to carry out government 
monitoring of them. 
Todd (2013) has made the same observation about military chaplains 
who represent not only the Christian Church but also the UK armed 
forces and are increasingly called on as interlocutors in negotiations 
with communities in theatre. Not only does this challenge accusations 
of secularism, given the embeddedness of chaplains in both contexts, 
it suggests that there is an implicitly Judaeo-Christian or Christian 
‘model’ according to which the government approaches faith 
communities. Hence the ‘faith schools’ initiative encouraged the 
expression of religious identity in ways which were compatible both 
with existing structures and with national education priorities. 
Through this and the new attention being paid to ‘community 
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cohesion,’48 then, the Blair government’s domestic policy narrative - 
far from ‘ignoring’ or ‘marginalising’ religion, located it in a localised 
context. As a result, the Government of the time presided over a 
paradox in its policy on religion: diverse ‘faith’ identities were 
supported, encouraged and welcomed into public life in communities, 
but the resulting diversity, and potential conflicts arising from it, 
required management at national level via citizenship tests and anti-
discrimination legislation. 
While 9/11 brought religion, terrorism and security to the forefront of 
both the policy and academic agendas, the events of July 7 2005 
challenged the relationship between religion and public policy in the 
UK more profoundly. The sort of distinctions between ‘private’ 
religious and ‘public’ national identity could no longer be sustained, 
nor could the inconsistent local, national and international policy on 
religion. The possibility of ‘home grown’ terrorists, gave rise to an 
overt ‘counter-radicalisation’ agenda in counter-terrorist work: the 
publication of CONTEST in March 2006 turned what had been 
internal counter-terrorism planning into an official cross-government 
strategy, while the establishment of the Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in 2007 made counter-terrorism a strategic 
priority across government, eroding not only internal boundaries 
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48 For example, In response to social disturbances in the city of Bradford in 2001, 
the Home Secretary established an inter-departmental Ministerial Group on Public 
Order and Community Cohesion to consider ‘how national policies might be used to 
promote better community cohesion, based upon shared values and a celebration of 
diversity.’ see the report of this group here: http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/
Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=94 
between departments but also symbolically those between local, 
national and international policy. This emphasis on counter-terrorism 
was only underlined further by the new Brown administration which, 
distancing itself from the failures of ‘ethical foreign policy’, embraced 
the idea of national security as ‘the first duty of government’. The 
publication of two national security strategies in quick succession 
(HMG 2008a, HMG 2009b), the establishment of a National Security 
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and the application of national 
security policies across a range of departments, to some extent 
brought greater coherence to local, national and international policy 
on religion49. Counter-terrorism and national security strategies 
increasingly recognised the interconnectedness of ‘home and away’: 
UK foreign policy was recognised as a potential source of 
radicalisation at home, just as local disputes in British communities 
mirrored major international conflicts and tensions. Thus, the 
distinction between local, national and international which was so 
apparent in the early years of New Labour was gradually 
disappearing, but greater coherence between these levels was the 
result of another critical shift: the emphasis on religion as a potential 
threat to UK security. The 2009 UK National Security Strategy 
(HMG, 2009b) explicitly acknowledged ‘ideologies and beliefs’ as 
potential drivers of insecurity around the world. Similarly, Preventing 
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49 The most obvious example of this was Prevent - the deradicalisation plank of the 
Counter-terrorism strategy - which engaged the departments of Communities and 
Local Government, Children, Schools and Families, Business, Innovation and Skills, 
and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Home Office, Ministry of Defence and 
Foreign Office in the counter-terrorism initiative. The connection between religious 
communities at home and overseas was underlined by Prevent initiatives, and both 
were now subject to the same government intervention and targets.
Violent Extremism policy drew on institutional memory from 
challenging Northern Irish terrorism by engaging in theological 
debate. Once more drawing from an implicitly Christian template, 
Prevent policy led to increasing engagement with Muslim 
communities through policing and local government, leading to 
accusations of ‘spying’ and the perception that Prevent work was both 
counter-productive and stigmatizing (House Of Commons, 2010a). 
Prevent policy and its legacy is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
While counter-terrorism dominated the policy agenda, the Brown 
government also placed a renewed emphasis on localism - establishing 
a department for Communities and Local Government and devolving 
to local authorities a number of key delivery responsibilities, including 
Prevent and community cohesion. As Chapman (2008: 38) explains, 
‘local communities would become agents of certain socially desirable 
goals’. Brown and successive communities secretaries Ruth Kelly and 
Hazel Blears presented a strong case for the role that thriving, diverse 
communities could play in the life of the nation. Religious voluntary 
organisations, of course, played their part in this - just as they were 
increasingly recognised as useful proxies for overseas development - 
but in both cases, the relationship between policy and religion was an 
instrumental one. Thus local authorities were measured by 
nationalised targets, the Prime Minister continued to emphasise 
national values as integrative (including intensified prioritisation of 
national security). It seems, then, that the Brown administration 
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increased the coherence of its policy position vis a vis religion at 
local, national and international levels via the national security 
narrative - thus while religion was celebrated and utilised locally, it 
was construed primarily as one of the problematic side-effects of 
globalisation. Far from an absence of religion-related policy, then, the 
New Labour years were characterised by the repeated relocation of 
religion as a public policy issue and, I would suggest, this pattern 
continues. Not only were many Coalition policies descendants of their 
New Labour predecessors (HMG/27 July 2012/a)50 , it seems that 
religion again was relocated as a public policy issue. 
Perhaps the first indication that the Coalition Government intended to 
adopt a new approach to religion came with the publication of a new 
Prevent strategy in June 2011. Refocusing deradicalisation policy 
around known targets and removing its overtly theological elements, 
Prevent 2.0 made an explicit distinction: ‘the ideology of extremism 
and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious belief emphatically 
is not’ (HMG, 2011a:1). Not only this, the emphasis that had been 
placed on ‘community cohesion’ by New Labour since 2001 was 
rebranded ‘integration’ and removed from association with counter-
terrorism. The ‘Near Neighbours’ programme, launched by 
Communities Secretary Eric Pickles in November 2011, aims to 
increase interfaith and intercultural cooperation in improving local 
neighbourhoods. The Coalition Government, it seems, once again 
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50 For discussions on the continuities between New Labour and Coalition 
communities policy, see e.g. Bulley and Sohki-Bulley (2012), McAnulla (2010).
relocated policy on religion within government, and in so doing, 
reinterpreted the role of religion in society, emphasising the common 
interests and shared experiences which cement cooperation rather than 
division.  
By emphasising Christianity’s cultural contribution to the UK, senior 
politicians in the Coalition Government portrayed religion as 
something that is identifiable with ‘being British’. Whereas under 
Gordon Brown, Britishness and national values were emphasised as a 
means of superseding religious diversity, here we see specific 
historical religious values enlisted in service of national identity. 
Religion, then, exists in a different - relocated - position in relation to 
policy: the cultural role of religion embraced by the likes of Pickles 
and Cameron was almost entirely absent from New Labour policy 
which instead recognised religious diversity, complexity and 
multiculturalism. Yet beneath this repeated ‘relocation’ of religion is 
an important continuity. Rather than the structural secularism or 
‘privatisation’ of religion in the UK public policy environment, 
suggested both by scholars and politicians, provision has been made 
by central government departments for the engagement of faith 
communities since the millennium (HMG/27 July 2012/a). In many 
cases this provision has included the direct funding of faith-based 
organisations and/or their utilisation in the provision of public 
services. Furthermore, it seems that the constitutional privilege 
afforded to the Church of England has repeatedly played the sort of 
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role Beaman (2003) describes in shaping an implicitly Christian 
approach to religious engagement from faith schools and chaplaincy 
to counter-terrorism. As a result, it is necessary to shift the focus of 
our enquiry into public sector secularism away from the structural 
level toward the cultural. To what extent is there a secular orientation 
among policy makers?
3.22 A secular orientation?
Gutkowski (2012: 88) has undertaken research into the UK defence 
and security community and argues that a ‘secular habitus’ has 
emerged since the 1960s which has ‘influenced the way senior British 
policy-makers, officers, and security professionals imagined and 
conducted the wars on terror, particularly up to 2008’. She argues that 
the boundaries of secularism in Britain have developed in relation to 
key political concepts like multiculturalism, democracy, tolerance, 
national identity, extremism, terrorism and insurgency and that ‘these 
habits are not confined to this group (policy-makers) but are 
embedded within the embodied practices, assumptions, and aesthetics 
of the metropolitan middle classes’ (Gutkowski, 2012: 89). Chapman 
(2008: 3) too has examined what he calls the ‘secular activity of the 
formulation of public policy’. He draws similar conclusions - notably 
that a secular orientation has shaped public policy in determinative 
ways but that this orientation is not limited to the policy community, 
but extends particularly to the media who made it clear that Tony 
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Blair’s public religiosity was ‘a high-risk strategy: as portrayed in the 
media, religion evidently seriously clouded judgement’ (Chapman, 
2008:12). Analyses of public policy’s secularism are not limited to the 
immediate past, however, nor to the New Labour government. 
Long before the events of 9/11 and 7/7 brought religion to the 
forefront of public policy attention, Gavin D’Costa (1990: 418) 
examined the Satanic Verses controversy, suggesting that ‘Britain’s 
prized tolerant and pluralist society began to exhibit the power of its 
master code from the beginning of 1989’. D’Costa (1990: 419) labels 
this master code ‘secular fundamentalism’, describing it as ‘a secular 
metaphysics with its attendant political and social baggage’ and claims 
that the inability of author Salman Rushdie, the press and policy 
makers to understand the backlash against this ‘blasphemous text’ is 
characteristic of European secular modernism and the ‘latent 
plausibility structure’ of our conduct drawn from the Enlightenment 
which fails to recognise religious identity as first-order (D’Costa, 
1990: 423-424).
Analysis of the sort undertaken by Gutkowski, Chapman and D’Costa 
highlights a different dimension of secularism than that expressed in 
the critiques of Warsi and Pickles. While the latter emphasise the 
impact of the secular ethos on the expression of personal religious 
identity, the former suggest the ways in which this ethos has 
influenced and shaped policy makers’ conception of events and hence 
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policy responses to these events. In this, they have much in common 
with the work of Asad (2003) and Hurd (2011), both of whom 
articulate a vision of ‘secularism’ as a Western political doctrine: it is, 
says Hurd (2011:60) ‘a series of political settlements that define, 
regulate, and manage religion in modern politics, including 
international politics’. 
This argument is given weight by the nature of the two-tier system of 
UK Government51 in which attention paid to religion by elected 
politicians can be ‘neutralised’ by the bureaucratic system. Since 
leaving office, former Prime Minister Tony Blair described the 
internal reaction to his suggestion that he finish an address announcing 
the beginning of military intervention in Iraq by saying ‘God Bless 
Britain’. It ‘caused consternation in the whole system. A committee 
was convened, and we had to discuss it. I remember we had this 
debate on and off but finally one of the civil servants said in a very po-
faced way ‘I must remind you Prime Minister, this is not America’ in 
this disapproving tone, so I gave up the idea’ (Ross, 2012). This 
anecdote suggests an institutional intolerance of religion within the 
administrative tier of the UK Government. It seems sensible, then, to 
make a distinction between politicians and the ‘Government’ as a 
bureaucratic whole when it comes to the culture of ‘secularism’.  
Indeed, in interviews, a number of officials made a similar distinction. 
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51 Her Majesty’s Government is led by the Prime Minister and his team of Ministers 
who are all either democratically elected members of the House of Commons or 
appointed to the House of Lords. Government Ministers are supported by a 
permanent bureaucracy of civil servants and other Government employees.
One explained to me that ‘officials are very different to Ministerial 
level where ideological views are necessarily part of work and may 
form the basis of decisions’ (HMG/10 May 2012/b). Although 
Chapman, Gutkowski and D’Costa all point to a unifying ‘secularism’ 
which characterises the policy-making process, it seems to be the 
permanent administrative system which meets this description. Yet, 
evidence from my own interviews suggests that, while there are strong 
cultural values shaping engagement with religious issues, dynamics 
and communities, these values are less an expression of ‘secularism’ 
and more a commitment to impartiality. 
While there is insufficient data to measure the religious complexion of 
the civil service, evidence I gathered from interviews would seem to 
suggest that the overall population is more diverse than we might 
expect. A number of officials discussed their own personal religious 
commitments and/or backgrounds, though many suggested that these 
were likely unknown by colleagues. The principle, I would suggest, is 
less ‘secularist’ and more ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’52 and even this is 
changing, as one official explained ‘in the last 10 years, there is a 
more noticeable number of religious people....you might say more 
people are ‘out’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b). In fact, many officials shared 
similar anecdotal evidence of the religious commitments of 
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52 Don’t Ask Don’t Tell was the Clinton administration’s official US policy on 
military service for gay and lesbians. The policy prohibited openly gay, lesbian or 
bisexual people from military service but at the same time prohibited harassment of 
closeted homosexuals. This policy was ended by the Obama administration in 
September 2011. See the Department of Defense directive http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/
blaw/dodd/corres/html2/d130426x.htm - accessed 31 May 2015. 
colleagues, acknowledging ‘strong black Christian, white Christian 
and noticeable Muslim (communities)’ in one domestic department 
(HMG/5 July 2012/b) as well as the fact that ‘most major religions 
have a network’ (HMG/5 July 2012/c). In fact, one official suggested 
‘the civil service shouldn’t be considered secular. There are lots of 
very religious people.... even powerful senior civil servants... [but 
they] don’t wear it on their sleeves’(HMG/5 July 2012/a). Indeed, 
most officials (whether they identified as ‘religious’ or not) made the 
distinction between professional and religious identities. While it is 
possible to ‘be’ both religious and a policy adviser or analyst, and 
while officials are permitted to perform religious rituals in a ‘modern 
workplace....’ (HMG/5 July 2012/c), leaving religion at the office door 
was considered an entirely appropriate modus operandi by both 
religious and non-religious individuals. One official explained this as 
‘an internal cultural norm of assuming it’s private....it’s parked in the 
same box as sexuality’(HMG/4 July 2012/c).
On the one hand, it seems, the civil service is a reasonably pluralistic 
environment in which individuals with a variety of religious 
affiliations and commitments (and none) are employed. And yet, on 
the other, officials were at pains to emphasise that distance between 
these affiliations and professional responsibilities was maintained. 
This was equally true for one official who regularly attends church as 
another who was described by colleagues as a ‘secularist’.  In this 
way, I would suggest, policy officials act neither out of an explicitly 
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‘religious’ nor an explicitly ‘secular’ worldview but according to a set 
of internal cultural values which are strongly felt. These values almost 
certainly include a combination of pragmatism and utilitarianism - the 
characteristics of technocratic governance - as one official pointed out: 
‘civil servants are very good at only focusing their efforts where 
required’ (HMG/10 May 2012/b) and another suggested that ‘the civil 
service is a self-selecting elite which thinks utilitarian’ (HMG/4 July 
2012/c). There is a sense, then, that policy officials operate within 
certain cultural constraints that may impact upon their ability to 
recognise or engage with ‘religion’. However, it should not be 
assumed that this is a ‘secularist’ culture. Instead, I suggest, there are 
determinative values that orientate policy officials into producing 
policy which appears ‘secular’. 
3.23 Secularism or impartiality?
Since the mid-19th century, there has been in the UK a permanent 
cadre of officials, independent of the governing party who are 
appointed and promoted on merit which advises and assists the 
politically elected government of the day. This official cadre operates 
in accordance with the civil service code53 which requires it to act 
with integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.  I suggest that 
these core values - and particularly the required commitment to 
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53 For information on the Civil Service Code, see https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-service-code - accessed 31 May 2015.
impartiality - are pertinent to a discussion of public sector 
‘secularism’. 
According to the code, two types of impartiality are required of civil 
servants. The first - political impartiality - requires civil servants to 
serve an elected government of any persuasion to the best of their 
ability and includes restrictions on personal involvement in political 
activities. There is, though, a second and more general requirement for 
‘impartiality’ which requires civil servants to act ‘in a way that is fair 
and just and equitable and reflects the Civil Service commitment to 
equality and diversity’. Specifically, civil servants must not 
‘unjustifiably favour or discriminate against particular individuals or 
interests’. It is possible that the conflation of these two types of 
impartiality has created a conviction among officials to avoid 
identifying with or engaging with any set of value convictions, 
including those considered ‘religious’. The association of required 
‘impartiality’ with the avoidance of religion, I would suggest, better 
explains the cultural resistance to engagement with ‘religion’ than 
does the accusation of secularism.
Indeed, if colour blindness is the philosophical position that ignores 
racial and ethnic differences between people, thereby being ‘blind‘ to 
their colour, then ‘religion blindness‘ is a conscious or unconscious 
attempt to ignore religious differences, which I would argue is the 
result of an extended commitment to ideological impartiality. Being 
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‘religion blind‘ is less a description of ignorance about the ‘content’ or 
‘nature’ of religion(s) - what has often been called a lack of ‘religious 
literacy’ (Dinham, Furbey and Lowndes, 2009) - and more an inability 
to recognise when and where religion influences actors, orientates 
societies and informs worldviews. Just as critics of ‘colour blindness’ 
as a policy position note (Loury, 2004), blindness to difference at the 
same time denies it significance - and this is the very position in 
which Her Majesty’s Government frequently finds itself. This 
blindness manifests itself in cultural resistance to engagement with 
religious actors and dynamics and is compounded by a lack of 
strategic capacity or coordination of religion-related policy across 
Whitehall,5455 but should not be conflated with ‘secularism’ of the sort 
described by political scientists which tends to be influenced by the 
full constitutional separation between religion and state in the United 
States.
In the current era, amidst the clamour to identify and describe cultures 
of ‘secularism’56, particularly in relation to public policy, there is a 
need to interrogate and challenge these accounts and to problematise - 
as well as utilise - the category ‘the secular’. In particular, this 
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54 There was briefly a Minister of State for Faith and Communities whose role was 
‘to promote faith, religious tolerance and stronger communities within the UK’ but, 
no cross-government policy or structure was established to support her, nor has this 
role been maintained after her resignation. For more information, see https://
www.gov.uk/government/ministers/senior-minister-of-state-and-minister-for-faith-
and-communities - accessed October 25 2013.
55 During the process of writing this PhD, a non-compulsory module on religion has 
been developed for the new so-called ‘Diplomatic Academy’ though whether it will 
tackle this sort of ‘religion blindness’ remains to be seen.  
56 For example, a new journal for ‘Secularism and Nonreligion’ was launched in 
2012 reflecting widespread interest in ‘the secular’ across a range of disciplines.
research suggests that there may be value in broadly ethnographic 
approaches to secular cultures, particularly institutional cultures. More 
urgent is the challenge facing policy makers to develop appropriate 
policy responses in an era of global religious resurgence (Berger, 
1999). 
We have seen, then, that UK public policy is neither structurally nor 
culturally ‘secular’ but that religious engagement happens at multiple 
levels while policy makers seem to follow a pattern of avoidance of 
religious issues and dynamics. In what follows, I provide an example 
of the way religion is engaged in those ‘non-discretionary’ (HMG/4 
July 2012/c) circumstances where it cannot be avoided. Evaluating the 
legacy of the first Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy (2006-2011)
57, I demonstrate once more that the UK public policy machine is far 
from ‘secular’ given its extensive engagements with Muslim 
communities under the auspices of Prevent 1.0. Challenging the 
commonly held perception that Prevent 1.0 is evidence only of the 
British Government ‘getting religion wrong’, I identify a number of 
positive contributions that Prevent has made to the way British policy 
makers approach religious engagement. This evaluation of Prevent 
acts as an exemplar of the arguments made earlier in this chapter: it 
reveals that the relationship between religion and state in the UK is 
more complex than the narrative of secularisation can account for; 
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57 Given the current Government chose to keep the name ‘Prevent’ to describe their 
counter-radicalisation work, in what follows, I refer to historical Prevent policy (that 
between 2006-2011) as ‘Prevent 1.0’ and the later re-focussed Coalition Government 
policy as ‘Prevent 2.0’.
demonstrates the way ‘getting religion wrong’ can contribute to 
existing ‘religion blindness’; and illustrates the way policy makers 
attempt religious engagement according to strongly-held cultural 
values derived from institutional memory and implicitly Christian 
assumptions. 
3.3 Getting religion right while getting religion wrong
In 2011, the UK’s counter-radicalisation strategy ‘Prevent’ was 
reviewed and refocused by the new Coalition Government. This 
review responded to the myriad criticisms levelled at different version 
of Preventing Violent Extremism policy since the late 1990s including 
its ‘securitisation’ (Croft, 2012) and stigmatisation (House of 
Commons, 2010a) of the Muslim community, its ‘instrumentalisation’ 
of ‘friendly’ Muslim commentators (House of Commons, 2010a), its 
encouragement of ‘spying’ within communities (House of Commons, 
2010a), its lack of measurable effect (HMG, 2011a) and its 
undermining of inter-community relationships (Birt, 2009). However, 
this section is not about these flaws. Nor does it seek to defend 
Prevent 1.0 against these very real criticisms. Instead, this section 
suggests that, while it was manifestly problematic in a number of 
ways, Prevent 1.0’s legacy is not entirely negative. 
Drawing on interviews with serving policy officials, I suggest that 
Prevent 1.0 is often given as evidence of how Government ‘got 
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religion wrong’ and has contributed to the widespread fear and 
suspicion of religion as a policy issue. Yet little attention is paid to the 
ways HMG ‘got religion right’ under the auspices of the Prevent 1.0 
agenda. Seeking to rectify this imbalance, first, I point to the 
contribution of Prevent 1.0 - and broader counter-terrorism work - in 
dramatically increasing awareness and understanding of religions’ 
persistence in the contemporary world and of the Islamic tradition in 
particular. Second, I demonstrate that as a result of Prevent 1.0, the 
connections between religious groups at home and overseas were 
recognised and that officials learned the importance of both legitimacy 
and consistency in religious engagement. Third, I suggest that Prevent 
1.0 was almost solely responsible for creating the bureaucratic space 
within government for understanding and engaging with religious 
issues and communities, something which risks being squeezed out in 
the Prevent 2.0 era. Fourth, though not often acknowledged in the 
literature, I suggest that Prevent 1.0 actually evolved to recognise the 
multidimensional relationship of religion to policy issues. Preventing 
Violent Extremism (PVE) was not just about religion as a ‘threat 
actor’ or motivator of insecurity, but actively engaged religious 
communities in resisting and rejecting extremism, helped to mobilise 
Muslim civil society and created the space for discussion and thought 
about the relationship of religion to public policy. As a result, I argue, 
Prevent 1.0 is an example of the sort of religious engagement I earlier 
identified. Not only does the so-called ‘securitisation’ of religion 
challenge the myth of public sector ‘secularity’, Prevent 1.0 both 
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contributed to and demonstrates the existence of the strongly held 
cultural values which have an orientating effect on civil servants that I 
have called ‘religion blindness’. I therefore suggest that while the 
‘desecuritisation’ of religion and integration policy, through the 
publication of Prevent 2.0. has been welcomed, it may also have 
resulted in the relegation of religion from a priority issue of national 
security consequence to a marginal local or human rights concern. 
This trajectory is in stark contrast to the global context in which the 
role of religion in global dynamics threatens to outpace the 
government’s ability and capacity. 
3.31 A new Prevent Strategy 
In June 2011, the Coalition Government published a new ‘Prevent 
Strategy’58 which reflected the outcomes of a detailed review 
undertaken by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism in the 
Home Office with independent oversight. As explained in the Prevent 
Strategy (2.0) document, this review was commissioned to consider 
the effectiveness of Prevent 1.0 by examining the proportionality and 
focus of Prevent 1.0 policy, the scope and delivery of Prevent 1.0 , the 
role of institutions and delivery partners, the coordination and 
evaluation of Prevent 1.0. Significantly, in response to this review, the 
new strategy, Prevent 2.0 (HMG, 2011a: 2) ‘contains a plan to prevent 
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58 For the full document, see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf - accessed 6 
November 2013.
radicalisation and stop would-be terrorists from committing mass 
murder’ by emphasising three strands of activity: challenging the 
ideology of terrorism; preventing people from being drawn into 
terrorism; and working with sectors and institutions where there are 
risks of radicalisation. 
In identifying these three priorities, the document makes clear that its 
evaluation of previous Prevent 1.0 strategy revealed it to be 
‘flawed’ (HMG, 2011a:2), ‘unfocused’ (HMG, 2011a: 3) and 
‘controversial’ (HMG, 2011a:3). Indeed, the Home Secretary’s 
foreward explains (HMG, 2011a:1) : ‘It confused the delivery of 
Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to 
prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the 
heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of 
radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist 
organisations that Prevent should have been confronting’. However, 
the Coalition Government is not alone in criticising New Labour’s 
delivery of Prevent 1.0. In fact, PVE policy has been under near 
continuous scrutiny since it was first made public in 2006 with wide-
ranging critique broadly falling into three categories. 
First, the close relationship between the related policy goals of 
counter-radicalisation and ‘community cohesion’ under the New 
Labour Government gave rise to accusations of the 
‘securitisation’ (Croft, 2012) or ‘stigmatisation’ (House of Commons, 
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2010a) of the Muslim community in Britain. The Institute of Race 
Relations published a report (Kundnani, 2009) which claimed that 
Prevent 1.0 funding was being used disproportionately within Muslim 
communities thus ‘constructing the Muslim population as a ‘suspect 
community’ (Kundnani, 2009: 6). Secondly, though a ‘fresh start’ in 
2009 saw Prevent 1.0 policy widened to tackle far-right as well as 
Islamist extremism (Travis, 2009a), an attempt to overcome the 
alienation of Britain’s Muslim community, from its inception, the 
‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ agenda seemed to be counter 
productive. Accusations that Prevent 1.0 policy encouraged covert 
‘spying’59 within the Muslim community compounded intra-
community tensions rather than creating cohesion. Indeed, Birt (2009) 
suggested that not only were Prevent 1.0 funding arrangements at risk 
of enabling extremist organisations, they promoted ‘virulent envy’ 
between different community groups. Thirdly, as then Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government, John Dehnam, 
admitted ‘controversy, criticism and lack of clarity have unnecessarily 
limited its effectiveness’ (Travis, 2009b) and in September 2009 issued 
new guidance to local authorities which emphasised the need for 
‘clear objectives, measurable impacts and comprehensive 
arrangements for monitoring and evaluation’ (Travis, 2009a). The 
measurability of Prevent activity has long proved to be difficult as 
acknowledged in the 2011 review (HMG, 2011a:102) meaning that 
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59 For example, Director of think tank Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti, called Prevent 
‘the biggest domestic spying programme targeting the thoughts and beliefs of the 
innocent in Britain in modern times’  (see Dodd (2009).
there has rarely been evidence available to counter the accusations and 
criticisms made.
While I do not seek to challenge these criticisms, and indeed, while I 
recognise that Prevent 1.0 in its various guises has been manifestly 
problematic, in what follows, I re-examine the legacy of the first 
phase of Prevent policy60. Drawing on interviews with serving policy 
officials, I suggest that the volume of criticism levelled at Prevent 1.0 
has created an unhelpful climate of fear among officials when it comes 
to ‘doing religion’, contributing to the culture of ‘religion blindness’ I 
have earlier described. To challenge this culture of fear and resistance 
to religious engagement both at home and overseas, something which 
is critical in the contemporary era, I suggest it is essential to recognise 
the positive legacy of Prevent in increasing the UK Government’s 
understanding of, and attentiveness to, religious issues and dynamics. 
Not only this, I suggest that Prevent can be considered a case study 
example of the sort of issues raised in section one of this chapter - 
Prevent 1.0 policy was demonstrably not the product of a ‘secular’ 
orientation but instead involved a reciprocal relationship between the 
state and religious forms. Hence, while there clear hallmarks of 
institutional experience and implicit Christianity in the way Prevent 
1.0 policy sought to engage the British Muslim community, so too has 
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60 I use the terms ‘Prevent 1.0’ and ‘Prevent 2.0’ to distinguish between the earlier 
version of the Prevent Strategy pursued between 2001 and 2011 (and made public in 
2006) and the reviewed and refocussed Prevent Strategy of the Coalition 
Government. Though there are a number of differences between the two ‘versions’ 
of Prevent, I am primarily concerned with the role given to religion (both as a 
vehicle for radicalisation and as a means of countering radicalisation) in Prevent 1.0 
which has subsequently been revised.
the state been shaped by Prevent 1.0 policy, accommodating an 
increasing diversity of religious identities and a greater institutional 
understanding of certain religious forms.
3.32 Petrol and matches?
Given Prevent 1.0 policy faced myriad criticisms, it is clear that a 
review of both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the strategy was 
timely. Yet, given the resource61 which had been committed to this 
project - and to the wider counter-terrorism agenda - over the years 
between 2006 and 2011, and given the structures both inside and 
outside of government established in support of it not to mention the 
volume of research produced,62 there are important questions to be 
asked about the legacy of Prevent 1.0 for those who shaped and 
delivered it. 
When asked about their engagements with ‘religion’ in recent years, 
the vast majority of the 30 serving policy officials I interviewed 
identified counter-terrorism policy in general and Prevent 1.0 in 
particular as the primary driver of their own religious engagement. 
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61 The Taxpayers Alliance (http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/
council_spending_uncovered_ii_no_5_preventing_violent_extremism_grants_opg_c
2sx5hfy8ds1jjnh3nxm3ak - accessed 31 May 2015) used Freedom of Information 
Requests to ascertain that between 2006 and 2009 over £12m was given to local 
authorities to fund community groups through Prevent projects. A Department of 
Communities and Local Government report from 2008 (DCLG, 2008b) suggests that 
around £6 million was granted through the Pathfinder Fund to assist local authorities 
to tackle violent extremism at a local level. Kundnani 2009:11) quotes a now 
unavailable DCLG document which reveals that over £61.7 million pounds was 
given to local authorities for Prevent work by April 2011.
62 For a good overview of Prevent ownership, delivery, activities and research see 
Kundnani (2009).
Furthermore, it was clear that public criticism of this policy - and a 
lack of evidence of its effectiveness - had created a climate of 
reluctance at best and fear at worst when it comes to ‘doing religion’. 
One official suggested that Prevent 1.0 had comprehensively ‘got 
engagement with religion wrong’ reflecting a ‘fundamental lack of 
understanding’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a) in the policy community. He 
went on to describe a generalised fear of the power and personalism of 
religion in addition to disproportionate political correctness which 
resulted in overall downplaying of religion. Another pointed to the 
accusation that Prevent encouraged spying within the Muslim 
community as evidence that ‘we don’t do it (religious engagement) 
well’ and resulted in an ‘instinctive pulling away’ from religion as a 
policy issue (HMG/4 July 2012/c). The response of policy officials to 
questions about religious engagement, then, suggested the 
internalisation of criticism about specific policy initiatives but also a 
generalised climate of discomfort, and even fear of ‘religion’ and its 
relationship to policy goals with one official explaining that 
‘government and religion go together like petrol and matches’ (HMG/
4 July 2012/c). All of these comments suggest that fear and avoidance 
of religion is another significant driver of the ‘religion blindness’ I 
have described above which pervades civil service culture.
Yet, this sort of fear is not surprising given the considerable criticism 
levelled at the policy community for failing to learn lessons from their 
entanglements with religion in the context of the Northern Ireland 
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Peace Process (see e.g. Croft, 2012). Croft argues that the protracted 
nature of the Northern Irish ‘troubles’ was evidence that everything 
the government did made the problem worse and suggests that 
adopting the same methods for countering international terrorism 
reflects a continued pattern of ‘securitizing’ minority identities. 
However, there were other lessons that policy makers learned from 
their dealings with terrorism in Northern Ireland. Personal and 
institutional experiences of dealing with religion-related terrorism in 
Northern Ireland played a formative role in the response to 
international ‘Islamist’ terrorism. Many of those I interviewed drew 
explicit connections between the two contexts (HMG/3 July 2012/a, 
HMG/4 July 2012/a, HMG/5 July 2012/a, HMG/28 August 2012/d) 
and there are noticeable parallels between the methods of religious 
engagement undertaken in Northern Ireland and under the Prevent 
agenda. The importance of ‘theological credibility’ (HMG/4 July 
2012/a) in Northern Ireland which included ‘lobbying for government 
objectives using Catholic social teaching, with support from 
Bishops’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a) reflects the promotion of ‘credible 
voices’ and direct funding of ‘acceptable’ or ‘moderate’ organisations 
which was a significant part of Prevent 1.0 work.63 What Northern 
Ireland contributed to Prevent 1.0, then, was not only a particular way 
of understanding of the relationship of religion to terrorism but also an 
implicitly Christian blueprint for tackling the radicalisation process by 
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63 See, for example, HMG (2008b:4) ‘violent extremists distort Islam in an attempt 
to justify their actions. We will facilitate debate and amplify mainstream voices 
against them. Government can help credible voices to speak out. It can promote 
discussion and recognize and support people and organisations who speak 
authoritatively about Islam.’
engaging (or supporting others to engage) in theological debate. For 
example, the government looked for representative institutions and 
speakers of the sort which could be found in the Christian traditions, 
but were not always available in Muslim communities64. The 
‘securitisation’ of religion under the auspices of Prevent 1.0 
demonstrates what I have earlier argued: far from being ‘secular’, the 
state has approached religious engagement via implicitly Christian 
assumptions.
However, officials openly admitted to me that their early engagements 
with Muslim communities at home and overseas under the auspices of 
the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ agenda often looked and felt like 
‘floundering around’ (HMG/7 December 2012/a), involving a ‘hand to 
mouth’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a) approach to identifying ‘friendly’ 
commentators. Early versions of Prevent 1.0 spearheaded by the 
Home Office and newly-established Department for Communities and 
Local Government, frequently accused of encouraging spying and 
stigmatizing the British Muslim Community (House of Commons, 
2010) ‘showed that we don’t do it (religion) well’ and that ‘stepping 
into it (religion) creates problems which stops engagement’ (HMG/4 
July 2012/c). One official explained that, faced with the challenge of 
terrorism apparently motivated by religion, the Government ‘came up 
with the idea that the way to tackle Al Qaida’s theological and 
ideological mix was by having a ‘better’ idea about religion’ (HMG/7 
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64 The inauguration of the Muslim Council of Britain in 1997 reflected the sort of 
religious hierarchy the state was accustomed to dealing with (see Birt, 2005).
December 2012/a) which meant working in other countries and at 
home to counter radical voices. The same official went on to explain 
that, in these early days, the ‘policy orthodoxy was that we were not 
sure if religion was part of the problem, but it was certainly part of the 
solution’ and that the majority of engagement with the Islamic world 
and with Muslim communities quickly shifted to a counter-terrorism 
focus. 
Like their critics, then, officials were able to articulate the ways in 
which they had ‘got religion wrong’ in their approach to counter-
radicalisation. The climate of fear created by this public criticism has, 
I would argue, perpetuated the culture of ‘religion blindness’ across 
government. Yet in an era where the terrorist threat has diversified to 
include new actors such as ISIS and its affiliates, and where the 
relationship of religion to international policy priorities has started to 
be recognised (for more on this see Chapter 4), I would suggest that it 
is not only possible but essential to identify a positive legacy for the 
Prevent 1.0 era. First, as a result of attention paid to them as a result of 
the counter-terrorism agenda, the policy community dramatically 
increased their awareness and understanding of religious communities 
in general and the Muslim community in particular. Second, the 
identification of grievances as potential ‘causes’ of radicalisation 
helped policy makers to understand the interconnection between 
diaspora communities in the UK and their counterparts overseas and 
challenged the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ 
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policy. Third, as a result of the high priority placed on counter-
terrorism and national security, significant bureaucratic space across 
government was given to the consideration and analysis of religious 
dynamics and to engagement of religious communities and 
organisations. Fourth, just as the process of developing, implementing 
and reshaping Prevent policy was helping policy makers to recognise 
the multidimensionality of religion’s relationship to policy goals, so it 
helped to stimulate the mobilisation of Britain’s Muslim community 
and its engagement with the ‘state’. These four factors, I suggest, are 
significant not only in challenging the overwhelmingly negative 
perception of Prevent as a ‘signature’ religion-related policy but 
perhaps more importantly suggest ways in which religious 
engagement might be shaped in future. Furthermore, they reveal 
important lessons for sociologists of religion seeking to understand the 
relationship between church and state, suggesting that UK public 
policy, far from secularising, is involved in a reciprocal relationship 
(Ivanescu, 2010) with religious forms. While the state engages 
religious forms according to established patterns that draw both from 
institutional experience and from an implicitly Christian blueprint, at 
the same time the state itself is able to accommodate an increasing 
diversity of religious identities.
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3.33 Learning from their mistakes
Although Prevent was fully and comprehensively reviewed by the 
Coalition Government in 2011, at which time the heavy emphasis on 
religious motivations for violent extremism and theological rejections 
of ‘distorted’ Islamic teachings were removed, in fact, ‘Prevent 1.0’ 
had been under near-continuous review since its first publication in 
2006 and even before then. The first version of ‘Prevent’ appeared 
publicly in the UK Counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, 
which had been in development since 2003 but was finally published 
by the Home Office in 2006. The CONTEST strategy was - and still is 
- structured around ‘the four Ps’: Prevent, Prepare, Protect and Pursue. 
According to the strategy, the ‘Prevent strand’ was concerned with 
‘tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in the UK and 
elsewhere, which sustains the international terrorist threat’ (HMG, 
2006:9) which involved, among other things, ‘engaging in the battle of 
ideas - challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify 
the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute 
these ideas to do so’ (HMG 2006:1 - my italics). This objective was 
rooted in the conventional wisdom of the time about the process of 
radicalisation, which is described in the document (HMG 2006:10) as 
a ‘two stage process’: ‘an alienated individual who has become highly 
radicalised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny minority of 
radicalised individuals actually cross over to become terrorists: by 
financing, lending facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by 
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actively participating in terrorist attacks’. It goes on to describe a 
range of potential factors which might contribute to this process 
including globalisation, anti-Westernism, specific events and 
generalised grievances (for example about Western foreign policy), 
alienation or disadvantage and finally ‘radical ideas’ though it avoids 
identifying any single explanation as a direct cause of radicalisation. 
Tackling this complex process of radicalisation, according to the 
document, requires addressing ‘structural problems in the UK and 
elsewhere’ (HMG, 2006:11), improving opportunities for the Muslim 
community and increasing ‘community cohesion’, deterrence of 
individuals through legislation and ‘acting on unacceptable 
behaviours’ (HMG, 2006:12) and, most significantly for the purposes 
of this thesis, engaging in ‘the battle of ideas’.
While the rudiments of this ‘Prevent’ approach continued to be in 
evidence until the 2011 Prevent Review radically separated 
‘community cohesion and integration’ work from counter-terrorism, it 
is nevertheless important to recognise the extent to which Prevent 1.0 
- as a signature form of religious engagement by public policy makers 
- continued to be a ‘work in progress’ throughout its first decade. 
Though it had been made public alongside the rest of the counter-
terrorism strategy in 2006, a revised version of Prevent 1.0 appeared 
as early as 2007 with a Department for Communities and Local 
Government document ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning 
Hearts and Minds’ outlining the role of ‘strong’ and ‘confident’ 
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communities in resisting extremism, and emphasising four 
community-based approaches to countering radicalisation: promoting 
‘shared values’, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and 
leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and 
leaders’(DCLG, 2007:5). 
When the entire counter-terrorism strategy was reviewed and 
republished in 2009 (as CONTEST 2) it continued to emphasise the 
importance of ‘understanding what leads people to become 
radicalised, so we can stop the process’ as then Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown explained (Brown, 2009). ‘CONTEST 2’ re-stated the 
Government’s commitment to the ‘4 Ps’, but reflected a number of 
subtle differences. Significantly, as the document’s introduction 
outlined, the Strategy had been revised ‘to take account of the 
evolution of the threat and of our understanding of the factors which 
are driving it. The strategy also reflects the lessons we have learned 
and the increasing resources we have made available for counter-
terrorism’ (HMG, 2009a:8). CONTEST 2, then, was the result of a 
process of evolution in the understanding of terrorism and its sources 
in which the religion-related elements of international terrorism 
continued to be judged as significant: ‘The violent extremist ideology 
associated with Al Qa‘ida, which regards most Governments in 
Muslim countries as ‘un-Islamic’ or apostate; claims that these 
governments are sustained by western states who are engaged in a 
global attack on Islam; and considers violent action to be a religious 
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duty incumbent upon all Muslims’ (HMG, 2009a:11). As a result, the 
‘Prevent’ plank of the strategy - with the defined objective ‘to stop 
people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’ (HMG, 
2009a:13 - my italics65) - continued to involve Her Majesty’s 
Government in both theological and practical engagements with the 
Muslim community. 
Despite this important continuity, the extent to which Prevent 1.0 was 
developed and evolved can be - and has been - understated. Officials 
explained to me a steep learning curve during the years immediately 
following 9/11 when there was little internal expertise on the Islamic 
community in particular and religion in general (HMG/4 July 2012/b, 
HMG/7 December 2012/a, HMG/4 July 2012/c, HMG/5 July 2012/b). 
The response, suggested one official, was ‘what the hell?’, followed 
quickly by ‘should we engage with religion and then how?’ (HMG/4 
July 2012/c). Gutkowski (2012:92) has described this era as one in 
which ‘In the absence of a detailed understanding of Islam.... senior 
policy makers and officers filled the gaps about what Islam might be 
like with secular as well as loosely, denominationally neutral Christian 
notions....created a new knowledge category: ‘Islam’’, using this to 
delineate between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ adherents. While there is 
some truth in this portrait of the security community, particularly in 
the characterisation of religious expertise across government as 
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65 I have italicised the part of ‘Prevent’ that was dropped after the 2011 Review, after 
which time Prevent has sought only to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or 
supporting terrorism’.
‘minimal to nil’ (Gutkowski, 2012:97 quoting CLG official), officials 
were keen to point out to me that the policy community was not alone 
in this. One senior official described that ‘looking externally for 
material was a problem....at the time, most books available tended to 
focus on sociological, economic and political explanations of 
terrorism (HMG/3 July 2012/a) and explained that both inside and 
outside of Government ‘very few people felt comfortable talking 
about it as a religious issue’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a). Without a 
substantial evidence base and in a climate of considerable pressure to 
act, both internally and from international allies like the United States, 
early approaches to ‘preventing violent extremism’ in fact absented 
religion as a significant component. 
By 2006, however, and most significantly after the London bombings 
in July 2005 had brought the threat of international terrorism to home 
soil, officials had ‘developed the recognition that part of the 
motivation was extremism ideology based on radical interpretations of 
Islam’ (HMG/4 July 2012/b) and Ministers encouraged a ‘values 
based’ approach to countering extremism. Whatever the drawbacks of 
this new approach, it undoubtedly had two significant implications for 
the way the UK Government ‘did’ religion. There had emerged by this 
time a number of ‘specialists’ (HMG/4 July 2012/b) in community-
facing domestic and international departments who had started to 
focus their attention on understanding the Muslim community. 
Perhaps more significantly, a number of officials involved in the 
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development and delivery of counter-terrorism policy were being 
offered training to increase their knowledge of Islam. One official 
remembered being ‘given a crash course in schools of thought’ as a 
result of which he learned about the heterogeneity of the Muslim 
community (HMG/5 July 2012/b), and another recalled that ‘a lot of 
money was spent on getting people to teach us about Islam’ (HMG/4 
July 2012/c). The establishment of the cross-departmental Research, 
Information and Communications Unit (RICU) in 2007 was not only 
intended to improve counter-terrorist communications but also to 
develop a ‘comprehensive understanding of intended audiences 
including their attitudes, ages, locations, influences and media 
consumption.’ (HMG, 2009a:154) by bringing together ‘specialists in 
audience insight and communications; marketing; digital media; 
anthropology; research methodology and knowledge management; 
and pan-Arab media’ (HMG 2009a:154). This internal research and 
communications capacity helped to provide an evidence-base and 
delivery mechanisms for Prevent activity and was supported by wider 
Government funding of related external research activity.66 Indeed, the 
2011 Prevent Review itself quotes a number of pieces of research 
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66 This included large-scale research programmes such as the AHRC’s £6m 
‘Diasporas, migration and identities’ programme (2005-2011) which explored the 
‘social and cultural processes involving the movement of people, ideas and 
things’ (see Directors Report, p.8 http://www.diasporas.ac.uk/assets/
Final_report_Diasporas_Migration_Identities.pdf - accessed 14 November 2013) 
and AHRC/ESRC’s £12m ‘Religion and Society’ programme which, between 2001 
and 2013, funded 75 separate research projects on the interrelationship between 
religion and society, including the development of the ‘radicalisation research’ 
project (http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/ - accessed 14 November 2013) and 
smaller-scale consultancy work such as the commissioning of a literature review of 
the ‘Roots, practices and consequences of terrorism’ by the Home Office in 2006 
(see http://www.academia.edu/659695/
The_roots_practices_and_consequences_of_terrorism_A_literature_review_of_resea
rch_in_the_arts_and_humanities - accessed November 14 2013). 
commissioned by policy makers under previous iterations of the 
strategy67, demonstrating the extent to which this knowledge-base is a 
direct legacy of Prevent 1.0. All of this suggests that, in the process of 
continuously evolving counter-radicalisation policy, there developed 
an increasingly sophisticated understanding of - and relationship with 
- the Muslim community. The so-called ‘securitisation’ of religion, 
then, rather than revealing secularising tendencies, in fact had a 
profound impact on shaping Her Majesty’s Government, suggesting a 
reciprocal relationship between the state and religious forms of the 
sort Ivanescu (2010) describes in the Netherlands.
3.34 Home and Away
While the diplomatic service has a long history of engaging with 
religious communities and dynamics in an overwhelmingly religious 
world (HMG/28 August 2012/a, HMG/ 13 December 2012/a), 
recognition of the interconnection between domestic and international 
Muslim communities required domestic Government departments to 
better understand the significance of religion at home. As the 2007 
Prevent ‘Action Plan’ published by the Department For Communities 
and Local Government explains, Government was involved in 
‘extensive debate and discussion with many in British Muslim 
communities’ (DCLG, 2007:5) and engaged a wide range of 
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67 For example, the ‘select bibliography’ names no fewer than 46 ‘open source’ 
publications, of which 36 were produced during the years between 2001 and 2010 
(the ‘Prevent 1.0’ era).
government departments (including the Department for Education, 
Department for Work and Pensions, the Home Office and the police, 
the Charity Commission and the Prison Service).
Although academics continue to identify the lack of religious literacy 
in the policy community (Dinham et al, 2009), nevertheless it is clear 
that the high priority placed on Prevent in particular and counter-
terrorism in general, and the vast resources committed to its delivery, 
at least began the conversation about the strategic significance of 
religion within the policy community. Although audience research 
demonstrated that Prevent was ‘increasingly contentious and we had 
started to get evidence that it was alienating’ local Muslim 
communities (HMG/5 July 2012/b), policy makers nevertheless 
started to develop awareness of the relationship between transnational 
terrorism, globalisation and the transmission of religion: of the ‘small 
villages and streets in Pakistan and Bangladesh and how they 
translated to communities here’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b). The first 
CONTEST strategy, published a year after the London bombings 
undertaken by British-born terrorists, underlined that the threat ‘has 
both domestic and international dimensions’ (HMG, 2006:3). By 
2009, the Government was increasingly able to articulate the 
connections between ‘home and away’, acknowledging the 
exploitation of both ‘real and perceived grievances’ (HMG 2009a:13) 
in the radicalisation process, identifying the borderless internet as a 
significant vehicle for radicalisation and funding a range of 
international counter-ideology projects (HMG, 2009a:14). 
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Not only was increased understanding of the ‘transnational’ nature of 
religion - transmitted within and between diaspora communities at 
home and overseas - shaping counter-radicalisation policy, it required 
increased transparency and coordination within central Government.68 
Furthermore, the perceived success of the cross-government counter-
terrorism strategy and structures were likely to have had a direct 
impact on the development of subsequent over-arching National 
Security Strategies which emphasised the ‘diverse and interconnected 
set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom’ (HMG, 
2008a:3) and the need to ‘maintain a set of capabilities, at home and 
overseas, to deal with those threats and risks and underlying 
drivers’ (HMG, 2008a:4) While critics (e.g. Croft, 2012 ) challenge 
the ‘securitisation’ of religion for creating problematic relationships 
between the Goverment and religious communities, as a signature 
religion-related policy, Prevent demonstrated that ‘securitisation‘ 
pushes religious engagement up the policy agenda. This, it seems, is 
one way to overcome cultural ‘religion blindness’ as one official 
explained  with reference to his work on counter-terrorism: ‘I have 
only dealt with religion where it is non-discretionary’ (HMG/4 July 
2012/c ). The ‘securitisation’ of religion, while manifestly problematic 
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68 As the first CONTEST document explains, the counter-terrorism effort brought 
together ‘all parts of Government acting together and taking a joined-up approach to 
dealing with the complex and wide-ranging threat’. It also required the development 
of partnerships ‘led by the Government, and our citizens and communities. Public 
awareness of the threat, understanding of the measures needed to combat it, and 
active support and cooperation with the police are critical to the success of the 
strategy.’ (HMG, 2006: 3 - my itallics)
in many ways, also resulted in a quickly increased understanding of 
and engagement with Muslim communities in the UK. 
3.35 Bureaucratic Space
This improved understanding of religious communities at home and 
their connection to instability overseas, developed under the auspices 
of Prevent 1.0, informed wide-ranging policy initiatives. While the 
explicit focus on religion in the context of security left the 
Government open to criticism, it was not only supported by an 
increasing literature on religion and insecurity 69 but was also critical 
in enabling the opening up of bureaucratic space for discussion of, and 
engagement with, religion. It was as a direct result of Prevent 1.0 that 
a wide range of departments were required to develop awareness of 
religious communities, beliefs and practices as one senior official 
explained ‘the development of a preventative strategy forced HMG to 
engage with religious issues’ (HMG/4 July 2012/b). A number of 
officials suggested to me that Prevent 1.0 played a significant role in 
teaching central government about the global and national significance 
of religion. In the beginning, suggested one, it was ‘surprising how 
little they (local authorities) knew about their Muslim communities’ – 
often they ‘had no idea about where or who communities 
were’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b). Another suggested that ‘if we’d had a 
better part of government that understood religion, we might have 
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69 See Lindsay (2014a) for a discussion of political science literature and the 
religion-security nexus.
been better placed’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a), and yet another recalled the 
process of consultation with ‘experts’ on religion as a steep learning 
curve: ‘if we’d have been faced with a problem of plumbing or 
economics, we’d have sat back....been a more intelligent 
customer’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c). 
On the one hand, as a result of the 2011 Review, ‘the fact that Muslim 
faith is connected is deemphasised now... breaks down links to beat 
Prevent with’ (HMG/10 May 2012/b). Yet the distinction  of 
‘integration’ and civil society development from security has meant 
decreased capacity for religious engagement, particularly in domestic 
departments. While the diplomatic service routinely engages religion 
in the international context (HMG/28 August 2012/a, HMG/ 13 
December 2012/a), it remains the case that the ‘Government 
institutionally struggles to deal with domestic religion’ (HMG/7 
December 2012/a). While most officials I spoke to were aware of 
global religious trends and dynamics and recognised that ‘although 
religion may not be a fundamental motivation in Western Europe, it is 
an important and possibly increasingly important factor 
elsewhere’ (HMG/ 13 December 2012/a), there remains a lack of 
central government structure for religious engagement and while there 
is ‘much increased capability in understanding Islam’ (HMG/7 
December 2012/a), those engaged in religion-related policy remain 
isolated and under-resourced (HMG/ 23 August 2012/a, HMG/27 July 
2012/a).  
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3.36 Mobilisation of the Muslim community
While the system has ‘learned the lesson’ that engagement of people 
in communities might not be ‘best done by faith’ and has started to 
recognise that the implicitly Christian assumptions manifest in the 
identification of representatives and institutions ‘like us’ (HMG/7 
December 2012/a) is problematic, there have been positive 
implications of Prevent 1.0 beyond central Government. Critiques of 
Prevent, as discussed above, have often focussed upon its 
stigmatisation of the Muslim community but this often belies both the 
heterogeneity of the community and the ways in which it has evolved 
in direct response to policy makers’ attention. Perhaps the most 
obvious example of this sort of ‘mobilisation’ is in the relatively 
recent evolution of the role of the ‘religious’ or ‘Islamic’ adviser to 
central government departments and agencies. 
Although there is no data on the number of such advisers across 
government, anecdotal evidence would suggest that this role came to 
particular prominence as a result of the Prevent 1.0 agenda, when 
counter-radicalisation became a priority not only for community 
engagement, but also in conflict situations, in schools, on university 
campuses and within the prison population (HMG/7 December 2012/
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a, HMG/5 July 2012/b, HMG/4 October 2013/a)70. One official 
explained to me that ‘there were more Muslims working on Prevent 
than I’ve ever worked with’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b), including a range 
of faith advisors drawn from different career backgrounds such as 
former local councillors, community experts and equalities and human 
rights advocates who would suggest the significance of religious 
dynamics, for example, in relation to poverty statistics: ‘I would argue 
its a class thing. He would say it was about being Muslim’ (HMG/5 
July 2012/b). 
A related, though quite different role, emerged in the form of the 
development of a multi-faith chaplaincy corps in the military and 
prisons71, which was ostensibly the result of equalities policy (see e.g. 
Beckford, 2012) and a pragmatic response to the diversity of the 
armed forces and prison populations. However, the urgency with 
which this multi-faith chaplaincy corps was mobilised and 
professionalised was likely influenced by the priority given to counter-
terrorism and the Prevent 1.0 agenda as one former chaplain 
suggested: ‘without it (Prevent), would there be 200 Muslim chaplains 
in the Prison Service? Probably not’ (HMG/4 October 2013/a). Indeed, 
just as the Government opened itself up to greater diversity, so it 
helped to shape an increasingly visible Islamic civil society. This 
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70 For more information on these specific policies, see for example the Preventing 
Violent Extremism Action Plan http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/
Publications/Documents/Document/DownloadDocumentsFile.aspx?
recordId=133&file=PDFversion - accessed November 15 2013
71 For detailed discussion of the role of chaplains, see Beckford and Gillat (2005) 
and Todd (2013).
observation is not a new one (see e.g. Herbert, 2003; Cesari and 
McLoughlin, 2005), nor was the mobilisation of the Muslim 
community solely the result of Prevent (see e.g D’Costa, 1990), but 
overwhelmingly, Prevent has been perceived negatively.
The idea that ‘government interest in Prevent reorganised 
communities around religion’ (HMG/7 December 2012/a) is a 
common perception, yet little attention has been given in the literature 
to the very institutions and individuals engaged with and funded as a 
result of Prevent 1.0 policy. Advisers I spoke to, though critical of the 
way in which Prevent 1.0 had alienated Muslim communities, were 
also able to identify ways in which it had enabled and encouraged 
debate within and between communities and, even, challenged 
Muslim scholars and communities by offering new avenues and 
contexts for reflection and practice (HMG/4 October 2013/a). It also 
helped to develop the sort of ‘policy literacy’ within the Muslim 
community which I identified as critical in Chapter One, enabling 
representatives to explain Islamic perspectives ‘in terms government 
understood’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b). Furthermore, increased 
engagement with Government from the Muslim community 
challenged policy makers to recognise the multidimensionality of 
religion and broke down dominant perspectives.  During interviews, 
officials offered what might be surprisingly sophisticated perspectives 
on ‘religion’, with one explaining that ‘government really doesn’t care 
about theology except where it has ideological overtones..... where it 
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affects public policy’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c). There are, then, a number 
of positive legacies of Prevent 1.0 which have rarely been 
acknowledged. At the same time, there are a number of lessons from 
Prevent 1.0 which are of significance not only to policy makers but to 
scholars with an interest in church-state relations: not only does a 
review of Prevent 1.0 expose the implicitly Christian assumptions by 
which the UK state approaches religious actors, it further challenges 
accusations of public sector secularism by revealing that religious 
groups being ‘engaged’ themselves become implicated in shaping the 
state’s management of religion. 
3.4 The ‘baby and the bathwater’
Though this re-examination of Prevent 1.0 and its legacy, I have 
sought to suggest that, while counter-radicalisation policy pursued by 
the New Labour government was manifestly problematic, and while 
the recent review has helped change the public perception of Prevent 
as ‘securitising’ the Muslim community, there were a number of 
positive outcomes of Prevent 1.0 - particularly for the way religion 
was understood and engaged with by the policy community - which 
have hitherto been overlooked. First, as a direct result of the counter-
terrorism agenda, there has been a dramatic increase in the policy 
community’s understanding and awareness of religious communities 
in general and the Muslim community in particular. Secondly, a more 
sophisticated understanding of the radicalisation process challenged 
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the formerly held distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ 
policy. Third, because of the high priority placed on counter-terrorism, 
bureaucratic space was opened up to consider religious dynamics and 
to engage religious communities and organisations. Fourth, Prevent 
1.0 policy helped to shape the mobilisation of Britain’s Muslim 
community and its engagement with Her Majesty’s Government. But 
there are broader lessons, too, that we learn if we consider Prevent 1.0 
as a blueprint for the way HMG ‘manages God’. Significantly, it is 
apparent that Prevent 1.0 policy was demonstrably not the product of a 
‘secular’ orientation within central government - policy makers 
frequently not only engaged with religious actors but engaged in 
theological debate to expose ‘distortions’ of Islam. In fact, it might be 
more helpful to describe the relationship between religion and state 
evidenced in Prevent 1.0 policy as ‘reciprocal’. While the approach of 
Her Majesty’s Government to the Muslim community bore the 
hallmarks of institutional experience and implicit Christianity, at the 
same time, the Muslim community helped to shape the state which 
now accommodates an increasing diversity of religious identities and 
exhibits greater institutional understanding of certain religious forms.
In the current era where governments of other countries are increasing 
their religious engagement apparatus,72 it is important to recognise 
that although ‘the situation is much better than even 10-15 years ago... 
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72 For example, the US State Department established an Office for Religion and 
Global Affairs in 2013 while in the same year, the Canadian Government opened its 
Office of Religious Freedom in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade.
knowledge and understanding of religious perspectives is still 
piecemeal’ (HMG/ 13 December 2012/a). In these circumstances, the 
fact that the policy community has extensively encountered religion 
under the auspices of counter-radicalisation should be recognised as 
an advantage rather than a drawback. While, as one official explained, 
experience has determined that ‘religion has evolved to have far less 
of a role than before in counter-terrorism’ (HMG/7 December 2012/a), 
policy makers must avoid throwing the metaphorical ‘baby out with 
the bathwater’. It may be that too much religious engagement was 
done in the name of counter-terrorism, but it remains the case that not 
enough is done overall. 
In this Chapter, I have suggested that the British policy context is 
demonstrably not secular. First, while it has repeatedly been relocated, 
public policy engagement with religion has been in evidence at least 
since the Millennium. Furthermore, a more positive construal of the 
relationship between religion and policy was conceived by the 
Coalition Government. Secondly, I suggested that policy making 
should not be described as secular but rather as evidence of a ‘religion 
blind’ culture in which policy makers’ commitment to impartiality, as 
well as fear of ‘getting religion wrong’, causes them to avoid engaging 
with religious actors and dynamics where such engagement is 
perceived as ‘discretionary’. Finally, I gave an account of one area 
where religious engagement was described as ‘non-discretionary’, 
demonstrating that there are important lessons to be learned from 
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historic approaches to preventing violent extremism. Far from secular, 
then, the UK Government is extensively involved in both the 
mobilisation of religious communities in the UK and in ‘managing 
God’ in ways which are consistent with our Christian heritage and 
constitution, equalities legislation and the ‘impartiality’ required of 
civil servants. While this chapter has focused on the relationship of 
domestic policy to religion, in Chapter Four I explore some potential 
new avenues for religion-related policy in the international context 
and consider the extent to which they support sociological theories 
about the globalisation, the resurgence of religion and the emergence 
of the ‘post-secular’. 
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Chapter Four: The Casualty of Globalisation? Religion and the 
Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (or How are UK Foreign 
Policy Makers Managing God?)
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter Three, I considered current UK public policy on religion in 
the light of contemporary sociological narratives and argued that the 
accusation of public policy’s ‘secularism’ is misplaced, given the vast 
array of religion-related policy that has been in evidence since the 
Millennium and even before. Highlighting a range of examples of 
religion-related domestic policy, I argued, a common pattern emerges.  
Far from being secular, the UK Government is extensively involved in 
both the mobilisation of religious communities in the UK and in 
‘managing God’ in ways which are consistent with our Christian 
heritage and constitution, equalities legislation and the cultural values 
implicit in the Civil Service Code.
In this Chapter, I turn to the foreign policy context. Here, I note, 
different sociological narratives are in evidence – narratives that focus 
on the characteristics of globalisation including the waning of the 
nation-state and the logic of ‘post-secularism’. According to 
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Christopher Hill (2003), the changes wrought by globalisation have 
relegated foreign policy to nothing more than a historical practice. In 
the era of international relations, neo-realism has emerged as the 
model by which theorists understand agency in the international arena. 
According to this model, the international system has its own logic 
with the agency of nation-states diminished; new transnational and 
even global actors (Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2004) emerge. 
Contemporary narratives of religion, I argue, have contributed to this 
characterisation, presenting international relations theorists with a 
paradigm ‘transnational’ or ‘non-state actor’ (Haynes, 2007), and are 
thus implicated in the marginalisation of ‘foreign policy’ within 
international relations scholarship. Yet, I go on to demonstrate that my  
own research into British religion-related foreign policy reveals that 
understanding religion-related international policy requires us to re-
engage with the sort of foreign policy analysis advocated by Hill. 
Starting with an exploration of international religious freedom, I 
demonstrate that - while it responds to global circumstances – it is 
significantly shaped by the domestic constitutional context. Using this 
as a starting point, I go on to consider a number of recent religion-
related international policy initiatives, demonstrating that they too 
draw from, and are shaped by, the domestic context. These examples, I 
argue, demonstrate that it is necessary to recognise the domestic 
sources of foreign policy and to understand the cultural and structural 
patterns that shape the agency of the nation-state.
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4.2 Why religion has been bad for foreign policy
Christopher Hill has suggested that foreign policy has been neglected 
by international relations theorists who wrongly consider it to be a 
historical practice no longer relevant in the era of globalisation. At the 
same time, religion is being ‘brought into’ (Fox and Sandler, 2004) the 
discourse of international relations theory after decades of 
marginalisation. In this section, I suggest that these two movements 
might be related. First, I explore the relationship between 
globalisation and international relations demonstrating that the 
literature overwhelmingly recognises globalisation as a challenge to 
the nation-state at economic, democratic and territorial levels. Next I 
consider the characterisation of religion in international relations 
literature. Religious actors, I argue, have fitted neatly into the 
frameworks of international relations scholarship as ‘non-state’, 
‘transnational’ actors, or contributors to what Thomas has called 
‘world civil society’ (Thomas, 2001:50). It is exactly the proliferation 
of these actors - and their perpetuation of neorealist international 
relations models which emphasise systemic and structural influences 
rather than domestic strategies or motivations – which Hill has argued 
have undermined foreign policy, reducing it to a dwindling number of 
diplomatic issues (Hill, 2003: 3). Religion, it seems, is implicated in 
the marginalisation of foreign policy within international relations. 
Yet, I argue, sociological accounts of globalisation - and specifically 
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Robertson’s account of the relationship between religion and 
globalisation - complicates the issue. Religion is both a response to 
and contributes to the forces of globalisation in ways which cut across 
and serve to undermine the autonomy of the national society. This, I 
argue, serves as a basis for contributing constructively to the sort of 
foreign policy analysis Hill advocates and opens the doors for my own 
analysis of the domestic sources of UK foreign policy. 
4.21 Globalisation and international relations
Globalisation is a complex phenomenon and it is beyond the scope of 
this section to explore its full premises. However, for the purposes of 
this chapter, it is worth making some exploratory comments about the 
relationship between globalisation and both international relations and 
religion. First, globalisation has fundamentally challenged 
international relations as a discipline, it ‘defies traditional conceptions 
of levels of analysis in political science and international 
relations’ (Cerny, 1996: 620). Described as ‘vague’ and 
‘wooly’ (Strange, 1996: xii-xiii), Scholte (2005:81) has suggested that 
‘there can be, and are, many globalisations.’ Nevertheless the idea of 
‘globalisation’ remains central to accounts of global change in the late 
twentieth and early twenty first century, such that literature concerning 
the subject abounds. It is described at once as promoting ‘societal 
convergence built around common recognition of the benefits of 
markets and liberal democracy’ (Hurrell and Woods, 1995:449 and at 
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the same time as what Marshall (1996:195) has called ‘perpetually 
restructuring capitalism’ which is both exploitative and which 
perpetuates existing global and national inequalities. There is further 
debate about the extent to which globalisation is an autonomous force 
or whether it is something which is ‘contingent upon political 
dynamics and frameworks’ (Clark, 1998:484). Finally, there is debate 
about whether globalisation is characterised as change (Scholte, 
1997:430), or whether it is regarded as continuity (Marshall, 1996).  In 
each account, suggests Clark, there seems to be some agreement that 
‘At the very least, degrees of internationalisation and interdependence 
may have been causally related to the advance of globalisation’ (Clark, 
1998:484.) 
4.22 Globalisation and the nation state
One common theme of globalisation discourse (Therborn, 2000) is 
that which points to globalisation as having a inverse relationship to 
state potency. That is to say, as Timson (undated:2) has suggested, 
globalisation ‘may broadly describe the nation-state becoming de-
prioritised as the central unit of importance in studying world politics 
in favour of focussing on a global level of processes instead.’ While 
there is debate about the extent to which globalisation is a recent 
phenomenon (Wallerstein, 2000), it seems that the rise of 
neoliberalism in the post-cold war era and the consequent proliferation 
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of international institutions and intergovernmental organisations, has 
had a number of implications for the nation state. 
The rise of globalisation as a paradigm for understanding the world 
has emerged in a context where, as Cerny (1996: 617) suggests, ‘the 
Westphalian or realist understanding which posits a priori that the key 
actors in international relations are states... is being challenged..’ 
While there is debate between those who argue that globalizastion has 
reduced and even diminished the potency of the state and those who 
suggest that the decline of the state has been overstated (see e.g Clark, 
1998), importantly as Timson (undated: 2) acknowledges, 
globalisation usually refers to forces not working against the nation 
state but forces which transcend it.  
Predominantly, globalisation is described as an economic process - the 
so-called ‘strong globalisation thesis’ (Hirst et al, 2009:16). According 
to this perspective, external economic forces place demands on 
domestic governments which compromises state autonomy (Held and 
McGrew, 2007: 25). While Cerny (1996:627) rejects the idea that 
globalisation has created a single ‘playing field’ upon which economic 
activity happens, he nevertheless admits that the multiple playing 
fields which do exist ‘are no longer co-terminous with the traditional 
convergence between Second Industrial Revolution production 
structures, on the one hand, and the Weberian bureaucratic state on the 
other...’. Increasingly, then, the state’s role is to enforce decisions 
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which emerge in circles beyond its structures at transnational and 
global levels, suggesting a reduction in its potency as a force in 
international affairs. The irony of this situation, suggests Cerny (1996: 
634-5) is that given the process by which former welfare states have 
pursued a policy of ‘increased marketisation’, the state itself has been 
an agent in the process of globalisation yet ‘as states have attempted to 
promote competitiveness in this way, they have - seemingly 
voluntarily - given up a range of crucial policy instruments...states are 
seeing their political capacity and political autonomy eroding in a way 
which cannot be recuperated.’ 
Furthermore, in the circumstances of globalisation, it has been 
suggested that the sustainability of territorially based democratic 
institutions comes into question (Clark, 1998: 480).  State regulation is 
often rendered powerless in the face of transnational corporations and 
international non-governmental organisations like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund which ‘are frequently seen as interfering 
with the sovereignty and autonomy of states and promoting a global 
corporate agenda’ (Goodhart, 2001: 527). Furthermore, the increasing 
interconnectedness of the world due to communication and transport 
has made borders porous and created the circumstances for the 
emergence of the ‘transnational’ actor in global politics. The state’s 
role as ‘economic and political gatekeeper’ (Bisley 2007: 62) is 
rendered increasingly problematic in these circumstances.  Indeed, 
while economic globalisation has been at the forefront of the 
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discourse, in reality globalisation has thrown up in the air traditional 
political scientific conceptions of order such that there is now 
questioning of the ‘idea of a national economy (within IPE), of the 
viability of the state as provider of security (within security studies), 
of the moral identity of the state (within normative IR theory) and of 
the sustainability of democratic institutions on a territorial state basis 
(within political theory)’ Clark, 1998:480.
4.23 Religion as a transnational non-state actor
Allied to the dramatic decentring of the nation-state in international 
relations theory has been the emergence and rise of the so-called ‘non-
state’ actor (see e.g. Reinalda, 2013). After the Cold War, the 
‘cosmopolitan worldview’ challenged the state-centrism of 
international relations further as individuals rather than states became 
the principal analytical unit (Bretherton, 1996). Independent of state 
control, the ‘non-state actor’ shifted the premises on which 
international activity took place and reshaped the way international 
political outcomes were reached - significantly the number of 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) grew from 
2000 in 1972 to more than 5000 in 1992 (Haynes, 2001: 145). While 
domestic ‘civil society’ was territorially limited, the emergence of 
what Lipschutz (1992) has called ‘global civil society’ typically 
features the movements of transnational non-state actors cutting across 
the activity of national societies. Importantly, as Attina (1989) 
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suggests, this ‘international social layer claims primacy over the 
diplomatic layer’. It would appear, then, that the emergence of 
transnational actors as a specific component of the movements of 
globalisation has implications for the nation state. 
It is highly significant, then, that the category ‘religion’ has largely 
been brought into international relations scholarship in precisely this 
role. While, as Haynes (2001:146) acknowledges, ‘theoretical 
literature on transnationalism has devoted little concentrated attention 
to religious phenomena’,73 nevertheless in the body of literature which 
is dedicated to the nexus between religion and international relations 
(see e.g. Fox and Sandler, 2004, Thomas, 2005) it is widely 
acknowledged that ‘it is by recognizing religious groups or 
organisations as one of the types of non-state actors that religion has 
frequently been brought back into the theory of international 
relations’ (Thomas, 2005: 98). As Thomas elaborates, there are many 
problems associated with using the terminology ‘non-state’ and 
‘transnational’ to describe religious actors - not least because it often 
perpetuates a particular Western conception of ‘religion’. However, 
religion conceived as a system of ideas fits neatly with the 
‘transnational’ paradigm alongside major ideologies like feminism or 
Marxism. As such, religion takes its place alongside others in global 
public space ‘a densely packed, cross-cutting arena of key individuals, 
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73 Though it should be acknowledged that the Roman Catholic Church was 
recognized as a non-state actor at an early stage in the debate - see for example 
Vallier (1971).
states, and non-state actors that form various types of transnational 
solidarities and transnational communities as part of a global or 
transnational civil society’ (Thomas, 2005:108). It is in this way, I 
argue, religion has played its own role in the marginalisation of the 
nation-state in international relations.
Haynes (2001) has undertaken to empirically determine the impact of 
transnational religious communities on state sovereignty by 
considering the cases of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland during 
the 1980s and in African democratisation. He claims that neither case 
represents the Church seeking to undermine state sovereignty but, 
instead, both contexts should be interpreted as reflecting the dual 
processes of globalisation and nationalisation. The Catholic Church 
faced tensions between its own claim to universality and the distinctly 
national peculiarities of each situation. Haynes characterises the 
Church’s increasing political engagements over legitimate forms of 
authority as reflecting at once, the globalisation of the Catholic 
Church and at the same time, its nationalisation in particular contexts, 
and rejects the claim in either case that transnational religion undercut 
state sovereignty. Nevertheless, Haynes acknowledges ‘national 
churches ceased viewing themselves as ‘integrative community cults’ 
of the nation-state, and instead adopted new transnational global 
identities permitting them to confront the state’ (Haynes, 2001: 151). 
Furthermore, not only has religion – conceived of as a ‘transnational’ 
and ‘non-state’ phenomenon – contributed to the narratives of 
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globalisation, it has itself benefitted from other drivers of 
globalisation: 
 Global networks of religious activists exist who communicate
 with each other, feed off each other’s ideas, collectively develop 
 religious ideologies with political significance, perhaps aid each 
 other with funds, and, in effect, form transnational groups 
 whose main intellectual  referent derives from religious dogma 
 which is of much greater relevance to them than the traditional 
 ideological mobilisers, such as nationalism, communism, fascism 
 or liberal  democracy....Over the last few decades, interpersonal 
 communications have been greatly facilitated by the mass use 
 of the telegraph, telephone, personal computer, email, and fax 
 machine. This communications revolution helped stimulate a 
 globalisation of ideas which governments could not control... 
 (Haynes, 2001: 157).
While both Haynes and Thomas point to wider and more sophisticated 
analysis of the relationship between ‘transnational’ religion and the 
state, for the sake of this chapter, it is sufficient to recognise that the 
rise of the ‘non-state’ actor has challenged the state-centricism of 
international relations theory and that religion - conceived of as a 
transnational non-state actor - has played its part in this. But the 
changes wrought by globalisation - originating in neoliberal economic 
programmes - are not the only challenge presented to traditional 
political scientific models.
4.24 The end of the state and the marginalisation of foreign policy
According to Christopher Hill (2003), the art of foreign policy has 
been neglected by international relations theorists who consider it to 
be a historical practice no longer relevant in an era of globalisation. In 
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this context, he suggests, foreign policy has been reduced to a 
dwindling number of ‘diplomatic’ issues and agency is found either in 
international structures (markets, power balances) or in actors other 
than the state. International relations theory has favoured models of 
realism - the assumption that states pursued clear interests in a rational 
fashion - and more recently neo- realism which holds that the 
international system reflected a balance of power with its own logic of 
anarchy (Waltz, 1979). As a result, in the late twentieth century, 
foreign policy itself was rarely discussed or analysed as it was 
assumed that patterns of power in the system determine events.
For Hill, a combination of factors have impacted on the way we 
understand foreign policy. These factors include: the end of the Cold 
War - the death of a set of ideas as well as a transnational ideology; 
globalisation - often considered to have rendered foreign policy 
redundant in the face of global markets and ‘global civil society’; and 
the era of humanitarian intervention which, through international 
human rights norms, enables ethical challenges to sovereignty. 
However, he argues, this combination of factors should not be 
interpreted as making foreign policy redundant. Rather, foreign policy 
is newly implicated in a range of concerns which mean it can no 
longer be isolated from the rest of government as ‘states need some 
form of external strategy, and machinery, for managing their external 
environment’ (Hill, 2003:14). 
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Advocating ‘foreign policy analysis’ (Frankel, 1963), Hill (2003: xix) 
argues that international activity is not merely a series of processes but 
is a system of action in which ‘actors constantly redefine themselves 
through interaction with others’. By contrast with realist and liberalist 
international relations models, foreign policy analysis recognises the 
interconnection between domestic and external sources of behaviour. 
Foreign policy analysis, then, can provide a common language for 
understanding foreign policy which, in practice, falls between a 
number of different academic disciplines: ‘foreign policy needs 
liberating from the narrow and over-simplified views that are often 
held of it, and IR as a subject needs to move forward in reconstructing 
its notions of agency after the waves of attack on realism in recent 
decades..’ (Hill, 2003:2) Hence, rather than defining foreign policy as 
international relations models have frequently done as limited to 
marginal ‘diplomatic’ issues, where agency is found beyond the state 
in the market or systemic power balances, Hill (2003:3) provides a 
new definition of foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in 
international relations’. The blurring of the boundaries between 
domestic and international issues - now widely recognised in 
international relations theory - makes foreign policy more rather than 
less significant, given foreign policy is not just action or an expression 
of power, but is action in pursuit of objectives. Therefore ‘foreign 
policy must always be seen as a way of trying to hold together or 
make sense of the various activities which the state or even wider 
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community is engaged in internationally. In that sense, it is one way in 
which a society defines itself, against the backcloth of the outside 
world’ (Hill, 2003:5).
4.3 The domestic sources of foreign policy
Elsewhere Aron (1966: 17), prefiguring Hill’s approach, has described 
the relationship between domestic and external factors thus: ‘foreign 
policy becomes crucial both as an expression of statehood, and as a 
means of brokering what is now a simultaneous stream of internal and 
external demands upon government’. Rather than merely being a 
response to systemic pressures, as neo-realist international relations 
theorists would have it, external activity is as much an expression of 
domestic concerns, hence foreign policy’s role is ‘is to mediate the 
impact of the external and the domestic and to find ways of projecting 
a particular set of concerns in a very intractable world’ (Hill, 2003: 
31). While the categories ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ are useful in 
describing institutions and the allocation of resources, Hill argues that 
they exist on a continuum and that ‘foreign policy can never be 
abstracted from the domestic context out of which it springs’ (Hill, 
2003: 37). 
In light of the shifts wrought by globalisation, it has become 
impossible to deny the interconnectedness of ‘home’ and ‘away’. As 
Wendt (1999:2) argues ‘foreign policy behaviour is often determined 
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primarily by domestic politics’. So too Hill argues that even realists 
can no longer suggest that international dynamics alone determine 
outcomes. Quite contrary to the theories of nation state decline which 
have emerged as a result of globalisation, a number of models have 
emerged which speak to the continued importance of the nation state 
and domestic concerns in shaping international activity. Indeed, as Hill 
points out, interest in the domestic sources of foreign policy long 
predates globalisation - in fact, arguments about the impact of 
domestic politics on foreign policy date back to the 1920s when 
Eckart Kehr and Fritz Fischer identified particularly ‘Prussian’ 
characteristics in German foreign policy. By the mid 1960s, the phrase 
‘domestic sources of foreign policy’ became common parlance (see 
Rosenau, 1967), but there is no single explanation of this phenomenon 
- in some instances it describes the way domestic politics constrains 
foreign policy, in others it describes proactive inputs. Robert Putnam 
(1988) has proposed what he calls ‘two level game theory’ which 
exposes the Janus-face of decision makers who play a game 
simultaneously on two boards. In this model, international 
negotiations between states consist simultaneously at the intra-
national or domestic level and at the international level.
For Hill, the relationship between domestic and international is 
complex: in some circumstances, domestic society may act as a 
constraint upon foreign policy decision making through parliaments, 
pressure groups or the press but in other circumstances, domestic 
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culture is shaped by past foreign policy. Critically, he points out that 
the constitutional structure of a state not only frames the domestic 
context but also has an impact both on the way the state does foreign 
policy and on who does foreign policy. In a similar way, Doyle (1983) 
has suggested that there is a link between the nature of a regime and 
its foreign policy - specifically, he argues that democratic states are 
innately cooperative.
Advocating ‘foreign policy analysis’ - a model which recognises 
foreign policy less as a series of processes and more as a system of 
action - Hill sets out to consider the interplay between domestic and 
external sources of behaviour in contrast to realist/liberalist dominated 
international relations which marginalize foreign policy and explain 
action purely in terms of systemic factors at international level without 
any reference to the domestic context. Crucially, ‘foreign policy 
analysis can and should be open, comparative, inter-disciplinary and 
range across the domestic-foreign frontier... it should not be positivist, 
in the sense of assuming that ‘facts’ are always external and 
disconnected from actors’ perceptions and self-understandings’ (Hill, 
2003:10)  In what follows, I take on this challenge offering an 
interdisciplinary approach to understanding the relationship between 
religion and UK foreign policy, suggesting that this relationship 
traverses domestic and international and is dramatically shaped by our 
own constitutional settlement and self-understanding.
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The changing relationship of external to domestic matters, argues Hill, 
not only makes foreign policy newly relevant but promotes debate 
about the relationship of foreign policy to agency and about the 
relationship between structure and agency. The debate about the extent 
to which agents are shaped by their structures or vice versa (see e.g. 
Wendt, 1999 and Hay 1995) helps us to understand foreign policy as 
neither purely positivistic nor entirely relativistic, but instead as a 
‘complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially 
embedded in a wide range of different structures’ (Hill, 2003:28). 
Crucially, argues Hill, it demonstrates that actors are not completely 
free to act because their ‘freedom’ is affected by their domestic 
environment, which influences the way they understand the world. 
This conception of foreign policy - as a model of the relationship 
between structure and agency - reminds us of a different account of 
globalisation than the ones we have already described. 
4.31 An alternative model of the religion-globalisation debate 
Contrary to accounts that underplay the significance of the nation 
state, Roland Robertson (1989) has argued that the prevalence of 
national societies is a distinctive feature of globalisation. There is, he 
points out, ‘nothing to suggest that the nationally organized society, 
more specifically the state, is about to wither away’ (Robertson, 1992: 
184). Instead, suggests Robertson, globalisation involves a 
paradoxical process - as there is no single model of the ideal society to 
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which national societies can conform, they each create their own 
national identity and it is the interaction of these national identities 
which enables concern about the ‘universal’. Robertson calls this 
process the interpenetration of the ‘particularism of the universal (the 
rendering of the world as a single place) and the universalisation of 
particularism ‘the globalized expectation that societies... should have 
distinct identities’ (Robertson, 1989:9). For Robertson (1992) there 
are, therefore, four major reference points in understanding 
globalisation: national societies, individuals, the world system of 
societies and humankind. In his so-called ‘model of globality’ (1992: 
26), he outlines what he considers to be the crux of globalisation, 
‘comparative interaction of different forms of life’ (1992:27). At the 
heart of this model are a number of processes of relativisation - by 
which he proposes that ‘challenges are increasingly presented to the 
stability of particular perspectives...’ (1992:29). ‘In a world which is 
increasingly compressed...’ writes Robertson (1992:98) ‘in which its 
most ‘formidable’ components - nationally constituted societies and 
the inter-state system - are increasingly subject to the internal, as well 
as external constraints of multiculturality....the conditions of and for 
the identification of the individual and collective selves and of 
individual and collective others are becoming ever more complex’. 
Success in this context is generated by the successful negotiation of 
universalism and particularism such that ‘the particularisation of 
universalism - involves the idea of the universal being given global-
human concreteness;...the universalisation of particularism - involves 
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the extensive diffusion of the idea that there is virtually no limit on 
particularity, to uniqueness, to difference, and to 
otherness’ (1992:102). Viewed in this way, resistance to globalisation 
can be characterised either as opposition to the world as a single 
homogenized system or, importantly, as opposition to the world as ‘a 
series of culturally equal, relativized, entities or ways of 
life’ (1992:102). 
Importantly for this thesis, this account of globalisation hinges upon a 
particular conception of the relationship between nationalism and 
internationalism. As Smith (1979:2) has explained ‘At the root of the 
‘national ideal’ is a certain vision of the world...According to this 
vision mankind is ‘really’ and ‘naturally’ divided into 
distinct...nations. Each nation has its peculiar contribution to make to 
the whole, the family of nations’. In other words, suggests Robertson, 
particularism develops alongside universalism; the two are not 
incongruent. 
Not only does Robertson recognise the continued significance of the 
national society, so too he exposes mainstream sociology’s relative 
indifference to extra-societal issues. Even despite the influence of 
Spencer over the establishment of a tradition-based Japanese identity 
and of Durkheim’s ideas over the foundation of the Turkish republic in 
the 1920s, Robertson argues that traditional sociologists were largely 
‘ill equipped to deal with inter-societal let alone global 
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matters’ (1992:110). Critically for us, he suggests, this was manifest in 
a general acceptance of ‘something like a dominant ideology of 
common culture thesis at the level of nationally constituted societies 
(1992:110). Sociology, then, has been complicit in undermining the 
particularity of national societies. Contrary to this portrayal, and of 
accounts of globalisation taken from the political sciences, which 
emphasise the demise of the nation state, Robertson both points to the 
significance of the particular as a dimension of globalisation and also 
clears the ground for us to recognise that there are critical differences 
between nationally constituted societies which ‘have been 
differentially formed in interpenetration with significant others 
(Robertson, 1992:113). This particular finding is important for this 
thesis. In sections 4 and 5 of this chapter and in chapter 5, I outline the 
domestic sources of UK and US foreign policy, pointing to significant 
cultural and structural differences between Western nations that 
influence their approach to the religion-foreign policy relationship. 
Specifically, in what follows in this chapter, I demonstrate the 
determinative influence of the British church-state settlement and 
domestic cultural dynamics over religion-related foreign policy.
4.32 Constituting ‘the particular’
Elsewhere, Robertson (1991) has described Parsons account of the 
particular development of American society as being crucial to 
understanding how it is able to engage the rest of the world in a 
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unique way (Robertson, 1991: 138). He suggests that Parsons’ account 
of the particular development of American society emphasises the 
notion that Western cultural phenomena take on increasingly universal 
significance, moving beyond Weber’s hermeneutical context to 
describe evolution towards a single global system. Yet, at the same 
time, it is in this ‘system of modern societies’ (Parsons, 1971) that the 
United States emerges as ‘the highest point yet reached in the 
evolution of systems of human action’ (Robertson, 1991: 139). What 
we get from Parsons, then, is recognition both of the global system 
and yet of different - we might say ‘particular’ - types of cultural 
formation within that system. Significantly, Parsons makes reference 
to the role of religion in the evolution of these particular societies - 
most notably the United States. It is the unique form of religion-
society relationship found there - a combination of privatised faith 
commitments with a moral sphere governed by a civil religion - which 
makes the United States the most advanced form of society.
Robertson, in his work with Chirico (1985), has also argued that, 
while religion contributes to globalisation, it is also utilised to 
underline national identity through civil religious forms. Robertson 
and Chirico (1985) then turn to religion to understand the idea of 
‘global order’ that has emerged in the current era. This is a challenge 
for social scientists attuned to the mere ‘societal’ level. Robertson and 
Chirico (1985: 222) argue that ‘the virtually worldwide eruption of 
religious and quasi-religious concerns and themes cannot be 
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exhaustively comprehended in terms of focussing on what has been 
happening sociologically within societies’. Though there are some 
societal clusters which may provide meaningful insights, instead, they 
argue, there is a need to take a global perspective. Importantly, 
Robertson and Chirico critique Wuthnow’s (1980:60) account of new 
religious movements as primarily shaped by ‘the instabilities present 
in the larger world-system’. In an echo of the debates already 
described in the political sciences, Robertson and Chirico ‘seek to 
promote a way of thinking about the modern world which transcends 
the old internal v. external...’ by emphasising the simultaneity of  
‘trans-societal’, inter-societal and ‘intra-societal’, primarily with 
reference to ‘outward ‘flows’ from societies’ (Robertson and Chirico, 
1985: 224). They do so by focussing on the relationship of religion to 
state, arguing that there have been simultaneous processes of 
secularisation and desecularisation: the state has enlarged its ‘sphere 
of operation’ but has at the same time ‘become embroiled in quasi-
religious matters on two fronts: one intra-societal, the other extra-
societal’. Specifically, they point to a range of ‘deep life’ matters 
including birth, death, sexuality which have brought the state into 
contact with religious issues and dynamics as well as international 
issues of human rights, inequalities, national identities and conclude 
‘the state has become more and more concerned internally and 
externally with what Parsons calls ‘telic matters’’ (Robertson and 
Chirico, 1985: 224-225).  
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There are, then, two features of globalisation which open up religious 
or quasi religious concerns. Globalisation removes the security of the 
individual-society relationship opening up questions both about what a 
good society looks like and what mankind is. In this sense, the 
relativisation process creates insecurities which religion can fill. 
Furthermore, the globalisation process leads to cleavages within 
societies, particularly resistances to the processes of relativisation as 
well as to questions about the identity of the society: ‘at the collective 
societal level there is thus a thrust in a quasi-religious direction as 
some take it upon themselves to define in politico-religious terms 
what ‘their’ society ‘ultimately stands for’ and what is sacred about 
it’ (Robertson and Chirico, 1985:238).  There is also a concern for the 
legitimacy of the world order hence there have emerged a range of 
theologies of liberation and increasing interest in ‘world theology’. 
There is, then, a conjunction of societal-civil religion and world civil 
religion which describes the role of religion in the globalisation 
process: ‘religion is centered in the process of globalisation by virtue 
of both the religious or quasi-religious matters raised as a result of 
universalistic tendencies involving mankind and relations between 
societies and by the particularizing responses to universalistic 
tendencies’ (Robertson and Chirico, 1985: 239). 
Robertson in his solo work and his collaboration with Chirico presents 
us with an account of globalisation which is radically different to that 
which has dominated political science literature, and in which religion 
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has become complicit in the negation of the nation state and the 
marginalisation of foreign policy. Here we see religion as no less of a 
driving factor in the narrative of globalisation but it takes this role in 
three distinct movements: first, understanding the role of religion can 
no longer be done merely by reference to a single societal model, there 
is a need to move beyond the confines of traditional sociology and 
develop an account of inter-societal dynamics; however, secondly, 
while these inter-societal dynamics open up consideration of universal 
questions and rights so too, thirdly, do they demand that societies 
define themselves in politico-religious terms. Religion’s role in 
globalisation, then, both requires us to understand globalisation as an 
‘inside-out’ phenomenon but, in doing so, underlines and underscores 
the continued existence and potency of the national society. This 
dramatic reversal from the ‘outside in’ ways of understanding 
globalisation that appear in the political science literature is, I argue, a 
better place to start to understand the relationship between religion 
and foreign policy as it is currently in operation in the UK and the US. 
We have seen, then, that there is one narrative of globalisation in 
which religion - as a transnational force or non-state actor - helps to 
undermine the nation state and contributes to the marginalisation of 
foreign policy. However, both Hill (2003) and Robertson (with 
Chirico, 1985; 1991; 1992) have presented a corrective to these 
accounts. For Hill, the interconnectedness of home and away gives the 
domestic sources of foreign policy new relevance and for Robertson, 
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religion is centred in the globalisation process as much for its helping 
to define national societies as for opening up universal questions. In 
the next section, I explore the UK’s pursuit of international religious 
freedom in light of these issues, suggesting that it is evidence of the 
deep interconnection between domestic circumstances and foreign 
policy.
4.2 On religious freedom: foreign policy as an expression of 
church-state relations 
During the first years of the Coalition Government, the pursuit of 
international religious freedom emerged as a new foreign policy 
priority. Then Minister of State Baroness Warsi’s delegation to the 
Vatican in February 2012 resulted in a joint communiqué on ‘working 
together to combat intolerance and discrimination based on religion, 
wherever it is manifest’ and, in April 2012, then Foreign Secretary 
William Hague himself committed the Government to ‘Protecting 
religious freedoms and preventing discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief.’ Though ‘freedom of belief’ has long been a part of 
core Human Rights legislation, it was only under the Coalition 
government74 that its profile was raised to that of an explicit human 
rights priority. But where has this renewed emphasis on religious 
freedom come from? What is its significance and what motivated it?
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74 While my interviews were undertaken during the Coalition Government, it is 
worth noting that the Conservative Party manifesto (Conservative Party, 2015) made 
a commitment to continue to pursue international religious freedom though, unlike 
the Labour (Labour Party, 2015) and Liberal Democrat (Liberal Democrats, 2015) 
manifestos, it made no commitment to augmenting existing structures.
Interviews with Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials 
(HMG/23 August 2012/b, HMG/ 23 August 2012/a, HMG/28 August 
2012/a) revealed that ‘freedom of religion and belief’, was not only 
one of the Foreign Secretary’s identified global human rights 
priorities, but was a subject to which a range of Ministers devote 
considerable time and energy. A small hub team has been established 
in the Multilateral Policy Directorate of the FCO to drive policy and 
strategy on freedom of religion and belief (and women and child 
rights) as part of the broader human rights remit. This hub acts as a 
source of advice based on the ‘presumed competence’ of country 
desks and staff in post to make human rights in general, and religious 
freedom in particular, part of all country plans. In layman’s terms, this 
means that those responsible for developing Government policy 
toward a specific country or region are required to incorporate policy 
which promotes religious freedom in that area and to monitor and 
measure levels of religious freedom, especially where it is a particular 
concern. 
The pursuit of International Religious Freedom has long been an 
objective of the US government, and there are echoes of its approach 
in the work currently being undertaken by the Foreign Office. So too 
does the international context, in which there is egregious persecution 
on the grounds of religion, where we face the ever-present and 
recently diversified threat of international terrorism and are dealing 
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with the new challenge of the post-Arab Spring era, make it 
impossible for the government to ignore ‘religious questions’. Yet 
evidence drawn from interviews with Foreign Office officials, as well 
as analysis of key statements and policy initiatives would suggest that 
there are also important domestic factors which have motivated the 
government’s renewed focus on what Tony Blair (2012) has called 
‘the proper place for religion in democracy’.  
In this section, I will explore the significance of each of these factors, 
arguing that while both the global context and US influence have 
likely played a significant role in the development of UK religious 
freedom policy, a comparison of international approaches to the 
advancement of ‘religious liberty’ reveals a more complex picture: 
that foreign policy has deep and formative connections to the domestic 
context from which it emerges, and in particular to the relationship 
there between religion and society. Importantly, I suggest, contrary to 
the ‘outside in’ narratives of international relations theory, the UK’s 
pursuit of religious freedom looks more like an example of 
international agency as the sort of ‘inside-out’ process described by 
Hill and Robertson and one in which religion plays a significant role 
in defining rather than undermining the nation state.
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4.41 The global context 
Until relatively recently, international relations theorists have tended 
to ignore religion. Petito and Hatzopoulous (2004) suggest that the 
secularism of international relations is a genetic disposition, and 
Philpott (2002) identifies the 1980s and 1990s as periods when 
religion was almost entirely absent from consideration by international 
relations theorists. 
Philpott (2009) now recognises that 'talk of religion has risen'. For 
some, this role is evidence of just how dangerous religion is, just how 
incompatible with the values of freedom, democracy (Baruma, 2010), 
and with our security (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Kepel, 1994). For others, 
religion plays a more ambivalent role, offering solutions to conflict, 
models for successful diplomacy and stabilisation (Appleby, 1999; 
Johnson, 2003) and its value should be better recognised and 
harnessed (Johnson & Sampson, 1994; Seiple & Hoover, 2004). Most 
importantly, there is emerging a range of ‘constructivist’ attempts to 
come to terms with religion’s role which challenge and redefine the 
intellectual frameworks of international relations, inextricably tied to 
the modern distinction between church and state (Fox & Sandler, 
2005; Thomas, 2005; Snyder, 2011; Hurd 2011).  Part of the broader 
'post-positivist' movement in international relations theory, these 
constructivist approaches widen the scope of international relations 
theory to include the behaviour motivation and activity of non-state 
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actors and utilise non-rational methodology by looking for meaning, 
'thick' description and interpretation. As we earlier described, religion 
is now the subject matter of political science but its location is 
significant: it is associated with the 'globalisation' narrative which has 
made the non-state actor a significant player in the international 
context - this means that there is a tendency for theorists and policy-
makers to locate religious agency outside the structures of the nation-
state.
Of course, these analytical developments have not occurred in a 
vacuum but are both a response to global events and have helped 
shaped our conception of those events and response to them. In recent 
decades, the global context has increasingly required Western policy 
makers to engage with religious issues and actors in ways they have 
been unaccustomed to. The so-called Islamic Revival, dating back to 
the 1970s, has undoubtedly shaped both the policy and intellectual 
context. Not only did the 1979 Iranian Revolution confound policy 
makers and international relations theorists (Ammuzegar, 1991) alike, 
given it was not prompted by financial crisis, nor by war or class 
struggle, but seemingly by some combination of political and religious 
motivations. A range of subsequent issues including the Satanic Verses 
controversy in the UK, the headscarf incident in France75 and, of 
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75 The so-called ‘affaire du foulard’ refers to a controversy which emerged in France 
in 1989 over the right of girls to wear Islamic veils in French public schools. It was 
sparked on 18 September 1989 when three girls were suspended for refusing to 
remove their hijab. This complex and controversial issue has raised questions about 
the principle of laicite and its compatibility with religious freedom. For more 
discussion of the issues raised see Jones (2009).
course, 9/11 have not only coincided with but contributed to 
perceptions of the ‘desecularisation of the world’ (Berger, 1999). So 
too has the West's response to these incidents - including the pursuit of 
counter-terrorism policy at home and overseas, the counter-insurgency  
in Afghanistan, and events in Syria and Iraq brought Western policy 
makers into contact with religious issues and actors in previously 
unprecedented ways. 
Notably, the Arab Spring created a new challenge for Western 
governments who had associated democracy with the differentiation 
of church and state: how to work with a religious democracy? As one 
senior foreign office official explained to me 'The National Security 
Council is taking the matter seriously...considering how Islamist the 
Muslim Brotherhood is and whether it is a secular organisation with 
extremist margins that can be separated or whether Islam will be 
central' (HMG/3 July 2012/a). This sort of response is characteristic of 
the UK policy establishment, which has struggled to understand when 
and where ‘religion’ is a policy issue and has historically marginalized 
or ignored it, as one official explained to me ‘we have never done this 
(religion) before as we have tended to see religion as something that 
might upset existing relationships’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a). However, 
there seems to be a developing conception of what has been called 
'proper place for religion in democracy' (Blair, 2012) and an 
increasing number of external policies now incorporate some religious 
dimension (for more on this see section 3). 
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A commitment to human rights and the protection of religious 
minorities certainly seem timely given the complex range of ‘religious 
issues’ facing contemporary policy-makers. Neorealist international 
relations scholars would almost certainly argue that the FCO is merely 
responding to systemic pressures in developing this new agenda. 
However, there is almost certainly something else going on - Lord 
Howell, discussing developments in Egypt, explained that ‘the 
treatment of religious minorities will be a valuable litmus test of 
whether we are watching a truly liberalising democratic process 
unfolding in the Middle East region’ (Howell, 2011), and the current 
Ambassador to the Holy See, Nigel Baker (2012), blogged to the same 
effect on July 2 2012, suggesting that religious freedom is ‘an area of 
work that remains a key test of the health of any pluralistic 
democracy’. This suggest that religious freedom policy is not merely a 
matter of ‘negatively’ protecting human rights but a ‘positive’ 
promotion of a particular model of state governance – an approach 
which is shared by counterparts in the United States. 
 4.42 The American precedent
Our transatlantic allies have been pursuing religious freedom via 
foreign policy since 1998 when the controversial International 
Religious Freedom Act was passed (the US approach to religious 
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freedom is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). This Act mandated 
the establishment of an Ambassador-led Office of International 
Religious Freedom in the State department and the publication of an 
annual report on religious freedom around the world and on countries 
of concern. 
Though different administrations have pursued each of these 
responsibilities with varying degrees of vigour (and Obama was 
particularly strongly criticised for his delay in appointing an IRF 
Ambassador), there is now what UK officials describe as a ‘mammoth 
bureaucracy’ in the US supporting IRF work, though ‘they weren’t 
necessarily having impact in relation to what they were 
spending’ (HMG/23 August 2012/b). There are, then, important 
differences between the two countries in their pursuit of religious 
freedom - most significantly, the UK adopts a ‘devolved 
responsibility’ approach using existing posts and policies to advance 
religious freedom while the US has developed its own bureaucratic 
structures in the form of the ‘IRF Office’. Despite these differences, 
the Foreign Office’s policy approach is significantly influenced by the 
US precedent. Officials explained to me that there is regular exchange 
and engagement with the US from officials at all levels (HMG/ 23 
August 2012/a) and that Foreign Office staff in British embassies 
overseas are encouraged to consult the US annual report on religious 
freedom to identify countries of concern. In fact, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office seems to use the US example as an informal 
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‘benchmark’: officials reflected on the extent of ‘on-going debate’ 
about the approach including ‘whether there’s enough welly’ (HMG/
23 August 2012/b) going into it and whether the UK should employ an 
‘envoy or ambassador’ as is the case in the US.
However, there is one critical point of distinction, identified by 
officials, which I consider to be particularly important: in the US, their 
religious freedom policy operates within a legislative framework 
which couches a policy that seeks to protect the human rights of 
religious minorities overseas in the language of domestic politics. One 
of IRFs most prominent advocates in the US, former diplomat Thomas 
Farr, argues that it is a policy which should be mainstreamed 
throughout the foreign policy apparatus and that diplomats working to 
achieve it overseas should ‘recall the relative success that their own 
country has had in balancing the competing authorities of religion and 
state’ (Farr, 2010: 48). Similarly, a recent report on religious freedom 
(Georgetown Symposium, 2010:3) identifies the range of different 
issues which fall under the auspices of the US ‘religious freedom 
agenda’, including about belief, practice, proselytization and charity 
work and draw a direct parallel between it and the operation of 
religious freedom in US law which includes the right ‘to make 
religiously-informed arguments about public laws and policies, within 
due limits’.
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While it is clear that there are strategic international reasons for the 
pursuit of religious freedom - including the fact that (as noted by the 
Georgetown symposium) many countries of strategic interest to the 
US for economic or security reasons (e.g. Iran, North Korea, China, 
Saudi Arabia) also suppress religious freedom, there is nevertheless a 
strong sense of connection between this international policy and the 
domestic US context. In fact, the subject of religious freedom is both a 
highly contentious and yet highly consistent part of US public policy 
debate and there are strong parallels between the debates about the 
pursuit of religious freedom overseas and the 'correct interpretation' of 
the first amendment at home (a full discussion of these debates can be 
found in Chapter 5).
There are then, deep and formative connections between the pursuit of 
religious freedom through US foreign policy and its socio-political 
significance at home. And these connections are known to UK policy 
officials who frequently draw a distinction between the UK and the 
US on these specific grounds. One senior official described 
disagreements about ‘how we define ourselves’ (HMG/28 August 
2012/a), another commented on the ‘clash of cultures’ between the UK 
and US over certain religiously-sensitive issues such as the death 
penalty (HMG/28 August 2012/c). There was a strong sense from UK 
policy officials that they identified the role of religion in politics as an 
area of considerable distance between the countries - one explicitly 
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suggesting officials distance themselves from religion because ‘we 
want to avoid becoming American’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c).
Given this antipathy towards what is perceived as there being ‘too 
much religion’ in US foreign policy, it might be that rather than 
explaining the Coalition Government’s prioritisation of religious 
freedom as a result of the US influence, we might instead consider 
how much the UK approach mirrors the American model in a different 
way. There are three dimensions of the Foreign Office approach, I 
argue, which demonstrate that the UK’s religious freedom policy is 
also a product of its domestic context. First, I suggest, there are 
continuities between a broader Government agenda on religion and 
the shape of religious freedom policy; second, I will demonstrate that 
the management of religious freedom overseas mirrors our approach 
at home; and third, drawing on both of these, I will suggest that there 
is a shared concept of religious freedom, and ultimately, religion 
which is at the heart of both. 
4.43 Managing religion
In December 2011 David Cameron (2011a) called the UK a ‘Christian 
country’, a marked change from the official policy of ‘not doing God’ 
under New Labour and part of a broader and more positive approach 
to religion than has been seen before.  Government Ministers and 
officials seem more confident in speaking publicly about religion – 
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both as a cultural resource (e.g. Hope, 2011), as a source of personal 
motivation (Bowcott and Morris, 2012), and as having a positive role 
in society:’ adherence to a faith based discipline brings groups 
together and thereby strengthens community cohesion; and it provides 
in many cases a motivation to do good works for the benefit of 
all’ (Grieve, 2012).
Although my research has revealed a complex picture within 
government, reflected in wider society, in which a range of ideas about 
the role religion should play in public life are in evidence, there is 
nevertheless a clear message emanating from Government policy and 
rhetoric that ‘not doing God’ is no longer an acceptable position. 
Moreover, I suggest, there are several ways that this new ‘religion 
positive’ approach also seems to be reflected by the decision to 
prioritise international religious freedom. First and foremost, it 
involves close and strengthening bilateral relationships with religious 
institutions. Officials explained, in particular the building of formerly 
neglected relationships with the Church of England was a priority 
(HMG/28 August 2012/a, HMG/ 23 August 2012/a). So too has it 
involved ongoing communication (including a joint communiqué) 
with the Holy See. Secondly, it has necessitated broad engagement 
with religious civil society organisations and representatives beyond 
the ‘usual suspects’, from Christian Solidarity Worldwide to the 
National Secular Society (HMG/ 23 August 2012/a). In fact, the 
Secretary of State’s advisory group on human rights includes Joel 
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Edwards of evangelical lobby organisation Micah Challenge. Finally, 
and perhaps most significantly, it has been characterised by clear 
statements of UK values. The FCO human rights report (FCO, 2011a:
54) explicitly identifies ‘freedom of religion and respect for religious 
plurality is at the core of British society’. In this, it reflects the 
language the Prime Minister used in the so-called ‘Munich 
speech’ (Cameron, 2011b) of February 2011, in which he explained 
his views on the presence of extremists even within democratic 
societies as being the result of a failure to ‘provide a vision of society 
to which they feel they want to belong’, and of toleration of 
‘segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely 
counter to our values’. In a clear articulation, the Prime Minister 
explained: ‘I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it 
believes in certain values and actively promotes them.  Freedom of 
speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights 
regardless of race, sex or sexuality.  It says to its citizens, this is what 
defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things’.
It is apparent, then, that the UK’s pursuit of religious freedom reflects 
a broader attempt by the Coalition Government to engage religion as a 
public policy issue. Not only this, I suggest, there are strong echoes in 
religious freedom policy of the way religion is managed in the UK. 
Notably, the UK’s religious freedom toolkit76 uses our own church-
state settlement as an example: ‘no-one in the UK is discriminated 
190
76 Officials explained to me that this toolkit had been developed under the previous 
Labour administration but has been mainstreamed more recently.
against because they do not belong to a State church. All people in the 
UK, whatever their religion or belief, enjoy the same freedom of 
religion or belief’ (FCO, undated: 12). Though some religious 
communities might contest the reality of this, and while it points to the 
heterogeneity of western church-state settlements, this statement 
foreshadows similarities between the management of religion at home 
and our approach to religious freedom overseas. Both, for example, 
involve an ‘equalities’ approach to religious freedom: ‘religion and 
belief’ has been a protected characteristic in UK since 2003 and the 
current Equality Act (2010) and applies to both employment and the 
provision of goods and services. The UK’s approach to the governance 
of religion draws heavily from human rights legislation and both 
conceive of ‘freedom of religion or belief’ as an individual right to be 
protected. As a result, there is a tendency to manage religion (and 
clashes between religious freedom and other rights) with reference to 
law, something which has been increasing in recent years across 
Europe as noted by Ganiel and Jones (2012). The UN’s International 
Charter of Civil and Political Rights places two requirements on states 
regarding religious freedom - it must be mandated by law and the only  
appropriate exemptions are on the ground of public safety, public 
order, health and morals. Just as UK law has developed at pace since 
the Satanic Verses controversy, so the international approach to human 
rights involve reliance on transnational legal models and structures.
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In fact, not only does our international ‘religious freedom’ policy 
reflect the church-state relationship at home, it is entirely dependent 
on a concept of religion that originates there. The religious freedom 
toolkit advises officials that religion or belief is defined in terms of 
belief in transcendent deities and/or the cogency, seriousness, 
cohesion and importance of beliefs. This means that druidism, 
veganism, pacifism, the Divine Light Mission, Scientology, Krishna 
Consciousness Movement, humanism, atheism and agnosticism all fall 
within the protection of this freedom. Indeed, the measurement of 
religious freedom also reveals some interesting assumptions about 
religion, most notably that ‘freedom of belief’ is monitored by the 
freedom to carry out a set of activities including to change or 
discontinue one’s religion; to express one’s beliefs and to criticise the 
beliefs of others in a non-violent manner; to worship or assemble in 
connection with a religion or belief and to establish and maintain 
communications with individuals and communities in matters of 
religion and belief at the national and international levels. This is, 
however, subject to limitations including public safety, order and the 
protection of other rights and freedoms. This tension between 
religious freedom and public order make religious freedom a highly 
complex policy to pursue and, in practice, often involves a distinction 
between ‘absolute’ and ‘limited’ elements of religious freedom (HMG/ 
23 August 2012/a). There is a clear sense that government policy 
promotes the right to ‘believe’ as absolute and not to be contravened 
in any circumstances. But, the manifestation of religion is ‘limited’ 
192
and can be curtailed in certain circumstances (specifically, where 
conflicts over other rights emerge and where such manifestations are 
perceived to be a threat to the political or legal order).  
The emphasis, then, is placed on a conception of religion as a private, 
individual belief system, a conception which has been challenged in 
recent years by analyses of non-Western experiences which have 
emphasised the communal, active and pre-rational elements of 
religious identity (see e.g. King, 1999). This would suggest that the 
interpretation of ‘religious freedom’ is culturally contingent rather 
than universal, something which makes it a problematic addition to 
human rights norms. Indeed, policy officials seem to recognise exactly 
this tension, suggesting that religious freedom ‘is hard to argue against 
in general but difficult to agree on specifics’ (HMG/28 August 2012/a) 
and, critically, that while multilateral legal approaches are ‘the only 
thing that delivers legitimacy’ (HMG/28 August 2012/a) they may not 
be the only way to achieve religious freedom. Similarly, the religious 
freedom toolkit (FCO, undated: 8) acknowledges the limits of a legal 
approach: ‘In order to enjoy both rights, there has to be tolerance. 
Religious believers cannot impose their views on others, as this would 
violate their human rights, and vice versa. States have an obligation to 
uphold the rights of all persons within their jurisdictions, and 
sometimes this will involve restricting rights for the common good.’ 
Both the concepts of tolerance and the ‘common good’ are 
sociological rather than legal concepts, their interpretation and 
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application in different contexts will vary considerably. As Ganiel and 
Jones (2012) explain, the tension between religious freedom and other 
rights is unlikely to be resolved by legislation and, as such, is ‘an issue 
for which a society’s public culture on what constitutes acceptable 
treatment of religious subjects is likely to matter more than the letter 
of its law.’
Given this, it may not only be the case that insufficient attention is 
being paid to the connection between domestic church-state 
settlements (and the interpretation and management of religious 
freedom there) and the way in which religious freedom is pursued 
overseas, but that these connections will be important also in contexts 
to which we seek to transport religious freedom, suggesting that there 
is a need to underpin religious freedom strategies with deep 
sociological and cultural analysis. While Davie (2002: 3) argues that 
the influence of constitutional arrangements points to European 
exceptionalism, it might be the case that UK model of religious 
freedom, based as it is on a particular church-state settlement and the 
management of religious diversity might offer us a comparative 
advantage77 over our US allies in certain contexts given it 
demonstrates that religious establishment and religious freedom can 
go hand in hand.
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77 The notion of ‘comparative advantage’ originated in economic theory where it 
describes gains that individuals, companies or nations might make due to differences 
in their ‘factor endowments or technological progress’ (Maneschi, Andrea (1998). 
Comparative Advantage in International Trade: A Historical Perspective. 
Cheltenham: Elgar. p. 1.). It has, however, been extended to different contexts: for 
example the 2010 UK National Security Strategy describes as ‘our areas of 
comparative advantage’ as ‘the particular strengths and skills we can bring to bear’. 
The example of religious freedom policy highlights the deep 
connections between our church-state settlement and one particular 
signature foreign policy initiative. But what of foreign policy more 
generally? In the next section, I consider the emergence of a range of 
religion-related foreign policy initiatives. Having now established that 
the religion-state background of the UK government impacts upon 
how the government perceives and engages with religion globally, I 
suggest it is possible to use this as a way to challenge the notion of the 
‘post-secular’ which - like globalisation - has become an increasingly 
dominant narrative in accounts of the religion-society-state 
relationship. Highlighting Beckford’s (2012) critique of the ‘post-
secular’, I suggest that recent foreign policy engagements with 
religion are less evidence of the ‘post-secular’ and more part of a long 
history of the state’s ‘interpellation’ of religious identities. This has 
important implications for the way we understand the relationship 
between religion and global dynamics, challenging narratives of 
globalisation and religious change and once more putting emphasis on 
continuity and the domestic sources of foreign policy. 
 
4.5 Post-secular foreign policy?
As explained in Chapter Two, since the 1990s, scholars in a range of 
disciplines in the social and political sciences, have utilized the 
expression ‘post-secular’ to describe a set of circumstances which 
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traditional secularisation theories have not been able to adequately 
explain. For some (e.g. Stark, 1999) , the ‘post-secular’ is evidence of 
the failure of secularisation theories which had been the most widely 
utilized accounts of religious change throughout the 20th century. For 
others, the ‘post-secular’ is better described as an evolutionary stage 
after secularisation in which secular as well as religious values are 
being taken seriously (see e.g. Knott, 2010).
What ‘post-secular’ narratives have in common - and indeed, what 
they share with other influential analyses such as the ‘deprivatisation’ 
of religion thesis (Casanova, 1994), ‘desecularisation’ or ‘counter-
secularisation’ paradigms (Berger, 1999) and accounts of ‘religious 
resurgence’ (e.g. Thomas, 2005) - is that they all offer accounts of 
religious change prompted by global dynamics. In what is perhaps the 
most famous articulation of the ‘post-secular’, Habermas (2008) 
suggests that increased public visibility of religion and/or increased 
public policy engagement with religion has taken place in inverse 
relation to the differentiation of spheres and the subjectivisation of 
religion. This range of ‘post-secular’ narratives, then, share common 
elements: they point to changes in either the numerical or public 
significance of religion in the world to which public policy makers are 
having to respond. Yet what if the opposite were true? Might it be the 
case that domestic, rather than global, circumstances are shaping the 
way policy makers engage with religion?
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In this section, I consider whether the emergence of religion-related 
UK foreign policy is evidence of the ‘post-secular’. While interviews 
with serving UK Government officials suggest religion-related policy 
initiatives are a response to changing global dynamics, echoing the 
narratives of ‘post-secularity,’ I suggest that attention should be paid 
to religious continuity as well as change and to domestic, as well as 
international, sources of foreign policy. Extending Beckford’s (2012) 
argument that increased public policy engagement with religious 
actors in the UK is evidence of the state’s ‘interpellation’ of religious 
identities to the foreign policy context, I demonstrate the extent to 
which both domestic policy engagements with religion, and the 
domestic church-state settlement, have helped to shape religion-
related foreign policy. This discussion, then, once more underlines the 
continued significance of national society in the globalised era and 
suggests that religion - far from contributing to the marginalisation of 
the nation state and foreign policy - actually helps to shape 
distinctively national foreign policy responses. 
4.51 Religious resurgence and the ‘post-secular’
The ‘post-secular’ has been used by social and political scientists in a 
variety of ways. Neuhaus’s early description of ‘post-secular 
America’ (1982) describes the collapse of the dominance of 
secularism in the public sphere, though more recent works (e.g. Hurd, 
2009) continue to identify ‘secularism’ as a political doctrine which is 
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at odds with an increasingly religious world. Others too present 
contradictory accounts of the ‘post-secular’ offering it either as a 
description of the failure of secularisation theories to account for 
religious change (e.g. Martin, 1969) or as an evolutionary extension of 
secularisation processes (Knott, 2010). Perhaps most significant for 
this section are those for whom the ‘post-secular’ describes a 
significant change which requires a policy response - in which the 
public resurgence of religion places new demands in the public sphere 
where the religious and the secular now coexist (see e.g. Taylor 2007). 
Two commonalities emerge from such accounts: first, the 
contemporary era is one in which considerable religious change is 
taking place, usually as a result of the dissolution of public/private 
boundaries; and second, that Western public policy makers are having 
to respond to such religious change. 
John Carlson (2009:51) has described the US military’s attempts to 
‘fill the...religious gaps’ in a globalised era where ‘they routinely 
operate within populaces or locations that recognize no clear line of 
demarcation between private individual faith and secular public 
life’ (2009:52). These realities, Carlson argues, are symptoms of a 
‘post-secular landscape’ which requires formerly ‘secular institutions’ 
to adjust to ‘new realities’ (2009: 51). Importantly, then, Carlson uses 
the ‘post-secular’ not only to describe the globalised context in which 
religion seems to resist ‘privatisation’ but also to describe the changes 
taking place within the military to come to terms with that context. 
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Hence, the process by which the military negotiates a move away 
from limited ‘secular models’ toward greater institutional ability to 
‘engage the complexities of religion in ways that are attentive to the 
nuances, challenges and dangers’ (2009: 55) is characterised as ‘post-
secular’. 
Like Carlson, Bettiza (2013) contextualises changes which are taking 
place in American foreign policy with reference to broader trends. 
Here, however, Bettiza makes reference both to global dynamics and 
to intellectual currents.  The twin ‘post-secular turn in world politics 
and the social sciences’, he argues, has meant the ‘realisation among 
social and political theorists that religions are not only still alive and 
thriving in today’s world, but they have also become increasingly 
politically salient worldwide’ (2013: 13) and this, in turn, has led 
‘American foreign policy experts and IR scholars to advocate for the 
desecularisation of American foreign policy’ (2013:20). 
In the UK, the ‘post-secular’ label has also been applied to describe 
the attempts of policy makers to come to terms with the presence and 
vitality of religion in the world (see e.g. Dinham, Furbey and 
Lowndes, 2009). Under the Coalition Government, there were active 
attempts to invigorate religious or ‘faith based’ organisations and 
communities using the motifs of ‘social capital’ (Halpern, 2004) and 
‘civil society’ (Casanova, 1994) and Ministerial rhetoric has 
emphasised not only the continued significance of religion in 
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contemporary society, but has sought to actively engage with religious 
communities and dynamics in the achievement of public policy goals 
at local, national and even international levels.78 Yet the overwhelming 
majority of scholarly attention has focussed on the local and national 
picture leaving comparatively little analysis of the religion-foreign 
policy relationship.
This is not to suggest that such analysis is completely absent. There is, 
for example, a relatively long history of discussion of the relationship 
between religion(s) and international development, including a 
number of significant outputs from the large-scale ‘Religions and 
Development Programme’ funded by the Department for International 
Development as well as more recent contributions (e.g. Tomalin, 
2013). Macro-level discussions of religion and international relations 
have also been forthcoming, pointing to a range of ways in which 
publically engaged religion has challenged the practice and theory of 
international relations. Thomas (2005: 83) argues for the inclusion of 
religion in international relations theory via a ‘narrative’ approach in 
which religion is recognized less as a dependent variable and more as 
a contributor to ‘the constitutive rules, norms and practices that help 
give meaning to the actions of states and provide the reasons why 
states act the way they do in international society’. Haynes (2007) 
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78 For example, on 16 December 2011, David Cameron called the UK ‘a Christian 
Country’, highlighting what he considered to be the ‘positive role’ religion can play 
in society. The following February, Baroness Warsi emphasised ‘the importance of 
the Established Church and our Christian heritage’ (see https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/baroness-warsi-speech-in-the-holy-see - accessed 22 June 
2013).
advocates the introduction of religion to international relations theory 
through the prism of the ‘soft power’ concept. However, while he 
recognizes the significance of ‘values, norms and ideals’ in the making 
of foreign policy, he falls short of undertaking such analysis of UK 
foreign policy, focussing instead on European external relations as a 
whole (2007:267). With a few notable exceptions, then, little has been 
written about the religion-foreign policy or religion-diplomacy 
relationship in the UK. Seeking to contribute to the conversation, my 
own original interviews have enabled me to better understand the way 
policy makers contend with, and articulate, engagements with 
religious actors. Moreover, they coincided with the emergence of 
religion-related UK foreign policy in the form of four international 
initiatives.
4.52 The emergence of religion-related UK foreign policy
First, and perhaps most significantly, a Minister for Faith and 
Communities was briefly appointed. In this role, Baroness Saida Warsi 
- a major critic of what she describes as ‘militant secularism’ in the 
public sector, had a number of notable successes in raising the profile 
of religion within Whitehall, including the announcement of London 
as a centre for Islamic finance79. Though she lacked the political 
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79 On 29 October 2013, at the World Islamic Economic Forum, held in London, the 
Prime Minister announced that the UK would be the first non-Muslim country to 
offer an ‘Islamic bond’ which would help make London ‘stand alongside Dubai as 
one of the great capitals of Islamic finance anywhere in the world’ (see http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24722440 - accessed 17 January 2013). Significantly, 
Saida Warsi has been at the forefront of this agenda and, the same day, announced 
the establishment of ten Chevening Scholarships (for overseas students to study in 
the UK) in Islamic Finance.
capital to initiate any major structural or institutional change,80 her 
appointment opened up bureaucratic space for dialogue across 
government and gave impetus to work on international freedom of 
religion or belief and religious literacy among policy makers and 
diplomats. It is, however, significant that her successor as Minister of 
State in the Foreign Office did not have the ‘Faith and Communities’ 
portfolio, nor has a Minister for Faith and Communities been 
appointed in the new Conservative Government. 
Secondly, as discussed in Section 2, though ‘freedom of belief’ has 
long been a part of core human rights legislation (including the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights), under the Coalition Government its profile in the 
UK was raised and a hub team established within the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to drive policy and delivery on this and other 
human rights (HMG/ 23 August 2012/a). Importantly, this team has 
also been responsible for the development of training to improve the 
‘religious literacy’ of diplomats and policy makers.
 
Thirdly, elsewhere there are signs of ‘awakening’ to religious issues 
and dynamics. In June 2012, a long-awaited ‘Faith Partnership 
Principles’ paper was published by the Department for International 
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80 Saida Warsi was Conservative Party Co- Chairman between May 2010 and 
September 2012 and the first Muslim woman to serve in a UK Cabinet. However, 
after controversies over parliamentary expenses and a minor breach of the 
Ministerial Code, she was shuffled from the Chairmanship to a new post as Senior 
Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. She later resigned this 
position over a disagreement on Government policy towards Gaza.
Development (DFID). This document outlined plans for greater 
engagement of ‘faith groups’ by the British Government, reflecting a 
commitment made by then Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell in 
2011.81 Although the ‘Faith Partnership Principles’ (DFID, 2012) 
focuses on DFID’s core priority of reducing poverty, it reflects a 
willingness to engage with religious communities and organisations in 
‘building resilience and peaceful states and societies’, ‘reducing 
certain types of conflict’ and ‘changing beliefs and behaviours’ (DFID, 
2012: 3). Furthermore, it identifies the three ‘partnership principles’ of 
transparency, mutual respect and understanding, responding directly to 
concerns about the intentions of religious organisations and to 
critiques of the ‘instrumentalising’ nature of Government engagement 
with faith-based organisations. While the impact of this document on 
practical development engagements is unclear, it suggests that there is 
a combination of bureaucratic space and political will for religion to 
be taken seriously in the Department for International Development. 
Finally, the same is true in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) where the 
recent appointment of a ‘religious adviser to the Chief of Defence 
Staff’, represents a conscious attempt to avoid ‘making the same 
mistakes’ as in recent conflicts both by preparing soldiers to act ‘more 
responsibly’ in different cultural settings and by ‘ensuring that the 
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81 On 7 February 2011, then Secretary of State for International Development, 
Andrew Mitchell addressed the General Synod of the Church of England, speaking 
about the contribution NGOs and faith-based organisations make to development. 
During the speech, he announced the establishment of a ‘steering group which will 
work together with those who lead the faith communities, to try to work out how we 
can take this partnership further’. For full text of the speech, see Report of 
Proceedings, February 2011 http://www.churchofengland.org/media/1240726/feb
%202011%20consolidated%20with%20index.pdf - accessed 1 April 2014.
MOD considers issues of religion and culture before entering 
conflict’ (HMG/4 October 2013/a). 
Not only this, my own interviews with serving policy officials from a 
range of externally facing Government departments reveal a gradual 
process of realisation that ‘although religion may not be a fundamental 
motivation in Western Europe, it is an important and possibly 
increasingly important factor elsewhere (HMG/ 13 December 2012/a). 
A range of international events - not least the Arab Spring - brought 
the relationship between religion and foreign policy to the forefront as 
‘we were suddenly confronted with peoples wanting to self determine 
(with reference to religion) in a way we hadn’t anticipated’ (HMG/4 
July 2012/a). It seems, then, that policy makers in central Government 
departments now constitute a more informed or prepared audience for 
diplomatic reports about religious actors and dynamics, as one 
suggested ‘I have been struck by how strong the response has been on 
religion in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office...one thing nobody 
questioned was whether it was a sensible topic’ (HMG/ 13 December 
2012/a). Policy makers have come around to the idea that ‘there is a 
need for greater understanding of faith communities whose boundaries 
of politics and religion are not the ones we’re familiar with’ (HMG/3 
July 2012/a). 
Global dynamics, then, are putting the UK’s experience of religion-
state boundaries into sharp relief in ways that are resonant with 
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Habermas’ notion of the ‘post-secularity’. Not only this, policy makers 
I interviewed echoed the sort of ‘post-secular’ narratives described by 
Carlson (2009) and Betizza (2013) in the US context: increased policy 
attention to religion is portrayed as a challenge to the ‘secularism’ of 
existing practices, and policy makers pay increasing attention to 
religion as a ‘public’ rather than private phenomenon82.
4.53 Post-secular in question
However, in his analysis of the ‘post-secular’ as it applies to religion 
and domestic policy in the UK, Beckford (2012) reflects on the extent 
to which the increased visibility of public religion in the UK reflects 
continuity as much as change. The combination of equalities 
legislation, immigration and social enterprise among faith-based 
organisations, he suggests, has brought public policy makers in the 
UK into contact with a wider range of religions than might have 
traditionally been the case. Nevertheless, he suggests, this reflects the 
‘enduring mutual embrace of statutory and religious interests’ (2012: 
16) rather than a new ‘post-secular’ era. The current context is simply 
one in which a greater range of religious identities are ‘interpellated 
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82 It is worth noting that, while policy makers described what might be called the 
conditions of post-secularity, none during my interviews actually utilised the 
expression ‘post-secular’ nor was there evidence of any engagement with the 
academic debate on the subject. At best, ‘post-secular’ narratives offer a sort of 
shorthand to describe an operating context in which engagement with religion was 
becoming increasingly necessary.
83’ than has been traditionally the case. It is possible, I would argue, to 
extend this analysis to the international context. Each of the 
developments identified by Beckford, in fact, has an international 
counterpart. Or in other words, each of the initiatives I have identified 
as constituting the ‘emergence’ of religion-related UK foreign policy 
have significant domestic connections and precedents. 
While Baroness Warsi’s post as ‘Senior Minister’ in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office could be interpreted as evidence that UK 
foreign policy was briefly ‘post-secular’, in fact, this post was shared 
with the domestically focused Department for Communities and Local 
Government. This ‘double-hatted’ role emphasised the connection 
between religion-related policy initiatives at home and overseas which 
is borne out by further evidence. Beckford (2012:15) identifies the 
‘confluence of communitarian and neoliberal currents‘ as helping to 
create a ‘faith sector’ in the delivery of public services in the UK. In 
style and content, the Department for International Development’s 
‘Faith Partnership Principles’ mirrors this development, helping to 
mobilise religious groups as part of both the national and international 
‘faith sector’. Similarly, while the promotion of international religious 
freedom has come to significance in a global context of the ‘rising 
tide’ of religious persecution (Pew Forum, 2012), as established in 
Section 2, it draws on a blueprint of ‘religious freedom or belief’ 
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83 Popularised by Althusser (1984) the philosophical idea of ‘interpellation’ 
describes the process by which an ideology - expressed through social and political 
institutions - addresses an individual creating an identity and making him/her the 
subject of that ideology.  
designated by the 2010 Equalities Act which identified ‘religion or 
belief’ as protected characteristics under UK Law. Finally, while the 
Ministry of Defence has only recently appointed a religious adviser, 
this sort of arrangement has been commonplace in domestic 
government departments - notably the Ministry of Justice and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government - during the last 
two administrations (HMG/4 October 2013/a, HMG/5 July 2012/b). 
4.54 Religion and diplomacy
It is important to recognise, then, that while my interviews revealed 
the extent to which policy makers are able to describe narratives of 
religious change described by accounts of ‘post-secularity’ and global 
religious resurgence, the emergence of religion-related foreign policy 
reflects two important continuities.  First, though they have not always 
been standardised or institutionalised, religion-related engagements 
are a routine part of diplomacy. As one official explained, working in 
post requires regular engagement with religious representatives 
(HMG/23 August 2012/b). Though unprepared for an encounter with 
religion in Afghanistan, another official explained that meetings with 
what we would call ‘political parties’ were, in fact, ‘almost completely 
religious’ (HMG/5 July 2012/b) and that in fact working on the ground 
required an understanding of ‘tribal, ethnic and religious differences’. 
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Similar experiences were shared by a number of those I interviewed, 
such that one explained that ‘working overseas gives interesting and 
varied perspectives on the role of religion’ (HMG/28 August 2012/a). 
In fact, diplomatic work in a vast array of countries was described as 
religion-related. Officials described, for example, the blurring of lines 
between politics and religion in Russia (HMG/5 July 2012/b) and 
extensive engagement with the Holy See where policies coincide 
including in Somalia, Syria, the Middle East, Nigeria, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Libya (HMG/ 13 December 2012/a). This 
sample barely scratches the surface but reflects the diplomatic reality 
that it is almost impossible to avoid religion in most regional contexts.
Secondly, international policy priorities have brought diplomats and 
policy makers into contact with domestic religious groups. The 
Department for International Development, for example, has 
appointed an ‘advisory board’ of UK faith-based representatives 
(DFID, 2012); officials working in counter-terrorism described the 
‘interconnectedness’ of religious communities at home and overseas 
(HMG/4 July 2012/b); and policy makers working on human rights 
(HMG/23 August 2012/b; HMG/ 23 August 2012/a) cited a number of 
UK faith-based organisations with whom they regularly engaged in 
the promotion of religious freedom overseas.
Though diplomats have historically faced a considerable challenge in 
trying to ‘translate’ religious issues and engagement into language 
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understood by Whitehall policy makers after what was described to 
me as a 20 to 50 year legacy of avoiding religion (HMG/ 13 
December 2012/a), it is clear that encounters with religious actors are 
commonplace for diplomats working overseas. Yet this is not the only 
continuity. In fact, the relatively long history of domestic policy 
engagement with religion has likely also influenced the religion-
foreign policy relationship in the UK. 
4.55 Religion and domestic policy
An indicative mapping reveals that there has been, and continues to 
be, widespread engagement with religious issues and organisations in 
the domestic policy arena. Considerable academic attention has been 
paid to the relationship between religion and public life in the UK 
since the 1980s (see e.g. Woodhead and Catto, 2012). What this 
reveals is just how common it is for the UK Government to fund, 
commission and engage with religious organisations and communities 
in support of public policy objectives. 
Across a range of public policy areas - from community integration 
and counter-extremism to education and social welfare, the British 
Government has directly funded and commissioned religious groups 
and organisations. This approach has been both criticised and 
welcomed - often depending on the social acceptability of the public 
policy objective and the implied celebration or criticism of religion - 
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suggesting that it is the real or perceived impact of religious 
engagement on religious groups and organisations rather than on the 
system of Governance which is at issue. There is, however, an 
established pattern of religious engagement by the UK Government 
which, I would suggest, has been extended to the international 
context.
As outlined in Chapter 3, over the course of the last three 
administrations, the relationship between religion and public policy 
seems to have been repeatedly re-envisaged. During the Blair 
administration, from the establishment of a Home Office ‘faith unit’ to 
the management of citizenship and integration, religion was 
increasingly recognized as a source of social division. With the 
movement of the ‘faith unit’ to the newly established ‘Department of 
Communities and Local Government’, under Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, religion was increasingly drawn upon as a narrative and 
source of social cohesion while being construed, at the same time, as a 
transnational source of division and conflict in counter-terrorism and 
security policy (see e.g. Chapman, 2008). More recently, the Coalition 
Government has shifted the focus of religion-related policy from 
minority communities to the unifying heritage of ‘Christian Britain’. 
Consistent with the increasing reliance on voluntary - including faith-
based - provision of welfare, health and education services, the 
removal of theological elements of deradicalisation programs, and the 
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defence of Christian traditions84, Coalition Government policies 
focussed almost exclusively on religion’s positive contribution85. 
While these shifts may seem to suggest that the religion-policy 
narrative over the last 15 years has been marked by considerable 
change, in part the result of a lack of strategic or ‘joined up’ approach 
to religion 86, I would suggest that it reflects a more fundamental 
continuity.
As Loughlin (2013: 1) explains, contrary to the fixed constitutions 
which govern many Western democracies, the British constitution has 
continued to develop organically and in response to economic, 
political, social and cultural dynamics and, as a result, has evoked 
‘bewilderment and sometimes even derision’. This process of 
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84 For example, on February 18th 2012, the Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government Eric Pickles defended the right of Local Councils to begin 
meetings with prayer effectively overturning a High Court Ruling, explaining ‘We 
will stand for freedom to worship, for Parliamentary sovereignty, and for long-
standing British liberties.’ For more on this incident, see https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/eric-pickles-gives-councils-back-the-freedom-to-pray--2 - 
accessed 12 March 2014.
85 There are two significant exceptions to this. First, in aftermath of the suspected 
murder of Lee Rigby, an British army soldier in May 2013 by two men claiming ‘the 
only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by 
British soldiers’ (see transcript in the Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2013 http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10075488/Woolwich-attack-
the-terrorists-rant.html - accessed 1 June 2013), the Prime Minister established an 
‘extremism task force’ to review counter-radicalisation policy. Second, in light of a 
recent decision by a London judge to allow a woman to stand trial while wearing a 
full-face veil but not to give evidence with her face covered s ‘the ability of the jury 
to see the defendant for the purposes of evaluating her evidence is crucial’, Liberal 
Democrat Home Office Minister Jeremy Browne has called for a national debate on 
the wearing of veils in public explaining that while ‘We should be very cautious 
about imposing religious conformity on a society which has always valued freedom 
of expression’, but that there may be circumstances where a full-face veil is not 
appropriate (for the full story see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-24112067 
(accessed 20 September 2013).
86 Although a number of Government departments employ ‘faith advisers’ and there 
are specific officials with responsibility for engagement with religious communities 
and organisations vis-a-vis particular policy goals (e.g. integration, religious 
freedom, international development), there is no coordination of effort at working or 
evolution and adaptation has interacted with a changing - and 
increasingly religiously diverse - population meaning that domestic 
policy engagements with religion over the last twenty years have 
repeatedly been characterised by a unique ambivalence: policy makers 
have at once sought to galvanize the socially cohesive potential of 
religion while at the same time ‘manage’ increasing religious 
diversity. 
These twin objectives have been necessitated by the interaction of 
religious pluralism with the constitutional arrangements which govern 
the United Kingdom, in which the constitutional monarch acts at once 
as Head of State and Supreme Governor of the Church of England; 
where parliament retains a degree of authority over the Church of 
England; and where the Prime Minister holds a nominal responsibility 
for senior church appointments. Though, in practice, the Church of 
England has increased its ability to self-govern, it remains both 
established and the ‘official’ state church, and 26 Church bishops 
currently sit in the second legislative chamber as so-called ‘spiritual 
peers’ which seek to be a voice for people of faith (see e.g. Fox, 2008)
87. As Beckford (2012:16) describes, these arrangements mean there 
has long been a ‘mutual embrace’ between religion and state in the 
UK, extending to a network of faith-based organisations involved in 
delivering public services such as education and social welfare. In an 
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87 For more information, see ‘The Lords Spiritual’,  Church of England: https://
www.churchofengland.org/our-views/the-church-in-parliament/bishops-in-the-
house-of-lords.aspx - accessed 6 July 2015.
era of increased religious pluralism, then, successive Governments 
have sought to extend to religious minorities the same rights and 
opportunities enjoyed by the majority. Not only this, religion has been 
made a ‘protected characteristic’ according to British Law.88 Both of 
these developments, while enabling and empowering religious 
communities and organisations on the one hand, on the other, subject 
religion to a degree of national management and intervention (Back et 
al, 2002). 
These domestic circumstances, I would suggest, have influenced the 
shape of recent religion-related foreign policy initiatives by providing 
a blueprint for policy makers seeking to ‘do God’ in different contexts. 
As Beckford (2012:13) explains, given our constitutional settlement 
and the array of ways in which religion is implicated in public service 
provision, ‘it is clear that the British state is not secular at any level - 
national, regional, or local’. I would suggest that ‘international’ be 
added to this list.
4.6 Religious Continuity
In this chapter, I have traced the emergence of religion-related UK 
foreign policy and considered whether it is evidence of the ‘post-
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88 The 2010 Equality Act codified a range of anti-discrimination legislation and 
includes a requirement for all protected groups equal treatment by, employment in 
and access to both private and public services. Protected characteristics are 
identified in the act as age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. For more on the Act, 
see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents (accessed 31 August 
2013). 
secular’ era which many commentators describe. While policy makers 
themselves use language which is characteristically ‘post-secular’, I 
have suggested religion-related foreign policy initiatives draw from a 
longer history of domestic policy engagement with religion as well as 
from extensive diplomatic encounters with religious actors. As a 
result, I argue, the emergence of religion-related UK foreign policy is 
less evidence of the sort of global religious change described by ‘post-
secular’ narratives and more evidence of continuity with domestic 
policies and precedents, both of which draw from and are influenced 
by our unique church-state settlement. 
The argument that foreign policy draws on our constitutional church-
state settlement is one that has featured throughout this chapter. This 
argument has a number of significant implications. First, this evidence 
would suggest that Beckford’s (2012) idea of ‘interpellation’ might 
apply as much to the international policy context as it does to the 
domestic one: this has significant implications for the way we 
understand ‘civil society’ mobilisation which looks less like 
‘resurgence’ or ‘de-privatisation’ and more like a reflexive activity of 
certain states. Secondly, in light of this, the idea that religion - as a 
transnational force - has contributed to globalisation and the 
disappearance of state autonomy comes under scrutiny. It is clear that, 
in important and instructive ways, existing domestic arrangements 
have helped to shape the emergence of religion-related foreign policy 
in the UK. Rather than reaching for the idea of global or national 
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‘post-secularity’ to explain the way British foreign policy makers have 
started to ‘manage God’ in the international context, we are called to 
recognize the domestic sources of international policy. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, then, we are called to consider whether the 
label ‘post-secular’ might be more problematic than its widespread 
usage would suggest and requires us to challenge its application on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, it is to the other side of the Atlantic 
that I turn in Chapter Five.
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Chapter 5: Both Religious and Secular (or How Are US Policy 
Makers ‘Managing God’?)
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter Four, I considered whether the label ‘post-secular’ 
adequately described the way foreign policy makers in the UK are 
‘managing God’. I suggested that - contrary to the narratives of 
religious change provided by post-secular theorists - the UK case was 
evidence of continuity between religion-related foreign policy and 
domestic policy, both of which are influenced by our church-state 
arrangements. In this Chapter, as a foil to the UK situation, I offer an 
account of the American experience of the religion- policy nexus. 
I begin by outlining the most significant ‘post-secular’ narrative to 
emerge as an explanation of the American context. While rational 
choice theories of religion contend that a religious ‘marketplace’ exists 
in positive correlation to religiosity in the United States, I point to a 
radically different way to understand the relationship between 
‘freedom’, ‘choice’ and ‘religion’ in American society and make two 
observations. First, I explore the fate of ‘religion’ in recent electoral 
and domestic politics. Here, I suggest ‘religious freedom’ repeatedly 
acts as a source of both division and constraint, in that it provokes 
debate but at the same time provides boundaries beyond which debate 
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cannot go. In so doing, I suggest, ‘religious freedom’ acts as a source 
of cultural renewal, refocusing attention on core cultural values. In 
fact, I argue, ‘freedom’ might have a different relationship to 
religiosity than that defined by supply side models in that it is woven 
into something of a ‘sacred narrative’. As a result, I argue, the rational 
choice paradigm becomes less an analytical tool for understanding 
religion in societies and more a reflection of something sacred in one 
specific society. Secondly, interpreting my own interview data with 
US Government officials and civil society representatives, I 
demonstrate that increased engagement with religion by the US 
Government is mediated through the First Amendment and therefore 
results in increased secularism (vis privatisation) rather than increased 
religiosity.  What emerges from the American data, therefore, is a 
more complex picture than a single theory of religion-state can 
account for, and certainly more nuanced that the simple expression 
‘religious America, secular Europe’ ( Berger et al, 2008) would 
suggest. As in the UK, I demonstrate the domestic church-state 
settlement influences religion-related foreign and domestic policy in 
ways which demonstrate that the US policy context is at once 
structurally secular yet culturally  religious.
5.2 The God Gap
While the role frequently played by religious dynamics in global 
affairs has brought religion-state relationships back to the forefront of 
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academic attention (Berger, 1999; Fox and Sandler, 2004: Petito and 
Hatzopoulos, 2004), in critiquing Western models as insufficiently 
attentive to religion, political scientists all too often conflate vastly 
different modern church-state settlements by reference to the 
‘secularising’ effect of the Treaty of Westphalia (see e.g. May et al, 
2014: 332-333)89. Yet, for some time, comparative analyses of religion 
and society in the US and Europe have repeatedly revealed a 
significant ‘God Gap’. Indeed, as described in Chapter Two, the two 
theoretical approaches which have dominated the sociology of religion 
during the twentieth century - secularisation theory and rational choice 
theory - have been predicated and developed based on the 
fundamental differences between the religious complexions of the 
United States and Europe.
Drawing on numerical data on religious affiliation and on the public 
visibility of religion in the United States, historically, scholars 
identified it as an ‘exceptional’90 case which has resisted the modern 
trend toward increasing secularisation. By contrast, Northern 
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89 For a longer discussion of the Treaty of Westphalia and its legacy see Chapter 6.
90 In his landmark two volume text ‘Democracy in America’ (originally published in 
1835 and1840:36) Alexis De Tocqueville suggested that  that ‘The position of the 
Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic 
people will ever be placed in a similar one’. Since then, the idea of American 
exceptionalism has come to incorporate a range of characteristics such that Roberts 
and DeCuirci (2012) ask ‘Why has the myth of American exceptionalism, 
characterized by a belief in America’s highly distinctive features or unusual 
trajectory based in the abundance of its natural resources, its revolutionary origins 
and its protestant religious culture that anticipated God’s blessing of the nation—
held such tremendous staying power, from its influence in popular culture to its 
critical role in foreign policy?’. Later, as Casanova (2006:17) explains, it became 
fashionable for European sociologists of religion to appropriate the motif of 
American exceptionalism to point to differences between it and the European 
context.
European data suggested a continued downward trend in religious 
affiliation that provided the basis of classic secularisation theory 
(Bruce, 2002). More recent accounts present the European experience 
as exceptional both in relation to the US (Stark, 1999, Warner, 1993) 
and the rest of the world (Davie, 2002).
In my interviews with UK officials about the relationship between 
religion and foreign policy, one message sounded loud and clear: ‘we 
want to avoid becoming American’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c). Though 
most of those I interviewed suggested that there had been little 
evidence of religion in their own dealings with colleagues in the 
United States, most still sought to point out what they considered to be 
the extensive influence of religion in American foreign policy. Some 
were able to connect this to their own experience - for example, in 
relation to the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, one official noted 
that a US military officer had explained to a number of ‘incredulous’ 
UK officials that ‘what these people need here is the Bible’ (HMG/5 
July 2012/b). Another suggested that there are disagreements between 
the two countries on ‘how we define ourselves’, noting that there are 
occasions where ‘we expect a rational response but get an emotional 
one’ (HMG/28 August 2012/a). Some were also able to identify 
specific areas of disagreement such as the death penalty, gun control 
and criminal deportation rights (HMG/28 August 2012/a, HMG/28 
August 2012/c). 
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Most, then, acknowledged significant transatlantic differences in the 
religion-policy relationship. For example, one official lauded the 
‘secularity’ of the UK Civil Service and suggested that America was a 
‘classic example where it (religion) skews the agenda horribly’ (HMG/ 
24 July 2012/a). Another argued that the level of conversation on the 
subject of religion and foreign policy is ‘more mature’ (HMG/3 July 
2012/a) in the US because ‘the floor level of assumptions about 
religion in the US is higher’. Importantly, the same official went on to 
suggest that this might be because ‘British leaders tend not to worry 
about the religious constituency like the US ones do’ (HMG/3 July 
2012/a) and another explained that, unlike the US, ‘we have been 
reasonably successful at keeping electoral politics away from 
religion’ (HMG/4 July 2012/c).  
Indeed, my interviews with American officials and civil society 
representatives also drew on ideas of a ‘God Gap’, here expressed in 
terms of the ‘secularism’ of British politics. When asked about the 
difference between the US and the UK, one civil society 
representative explained concerns that ‘Europe seems to be going in 
the French direction’ in which secularism is characterised as ‘anti-
religion’ (USCS/7 May 2013/a*). One former Government official 
suggested that ‘civil society as a phenomenon is probably more well 
developed in the US than in European countries’ (USCS/26 March 
2013/b*). He went on to suggest that the European Convention on 
Human Rights has meant that ‘religious liberty has been lost in 
continental Europe’ given ‘equality trumps conscience’, a point that 
has been articulated on this side of the Atlantic by Roger Trigg (2013). 
There is, then, a persistent perception that when it comes to public 
policy, it is a case of ‘religious America, secular Europe’ (Berger et al, 
2008).
5.3 Being In, Being Out
At this point, it seems worthwhile for me to comment on a significant 
point of difference between my UK and US fieldwork. While I had 
intended to replicate exactly my UK fieldwork in the United States, it 
quickly became apparent that the range of sources of relevance was 
much greater in the US. It would come as no surprise, for example, to 
Steiner (1987) that a far greater number of civil society 
representatives, public intellectuals and ‘advisors’ came forward to be 
interviewed in the United States than in the UK. In part, this was the 
result of my position (where I had been an ‘insider’ to the UK policy 
community, I was forced to approach most of my potential US 
interviewees with an introduction from a UK counterpart or, on many 
occasions, cold), but it likely also was due to what Steiner calls the 
‘open and shut’ nature of decision making in American and British 
foreign policy. Calling diplomacy ‘Janus-faced’ in engaging in the 
international arena while at the same time operating ‘in a domestic 
context which shapes the national interest and the choice of 
options’ (Steiner, 1987:1), Steiner outlines noticeable differences 
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between the foreign policy process in the US and the UK. The former, 
in which the US President has the primary initiative, is characterised 
by the inclusion of a wider range of actors such that he ‘can pick who 
he wishes for this office (the State Department), bypass the 
department of state at will, engage in personal negotiation and use his 
own agents abroad’ (Steiner, 1987: 6-7). By contrast, in the UK, most 
obviously the Foreign Office, and more recently the Cabinet Office 
have acted as centralising forces for foreign policy making such that ‘ 
the moulding of a national interest is a far more complex and open 
process in the US than in the UK’ (Steiner, 1987:16). 
I would suggest that there are important implications of this relative 
openness for the relationship between religion and foreign policy. 
First, as Steiner demonstrates, the separation of executive and 
legislative powers in the US both limits the President’s actions and 
brings a wider range of players into the process meaning that lobby 
groups, congressional caucuses and the media play a significant role. 
This is certainly noticeable in my selection of interview subjects, 
which included what I have called ‘civil society representatives’ from 
Congressional staffers to lobby group/think tank analysts in addition 
to Federal Government Employees. In the UK, my interviews were 
limited to Government officials, many of whom reported consulting 
external sources but usually in an informal and ad hoc way. The 
relative openness of the US policy community to outside influences, it 
seems, might explain the perception held by UK officials about the 
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extensive influence of religion on policy making in the US. In the 
course of my research, I was frequently made aware of two noticeable 
departures from my own experience of work in Government: while 
there is a cadre of permanent officials, a system of political 
appointments for senior positions in the US gives the President the 
opportunity to reward with appointment those who have been helpful 
in a successful election campaign and to appoint representatives of 
important constituencies. This has the effect of creating what one 
former Government official described as a ‘revolving door’ (USCS/26 
March 2013/b*) through which people move in and out of diplomatic 
or policy careers. The result is a large pool of those with some policy 
experience or expertise in the wider epistemic community where 
‘policy people will get academic positions without academic 
credentials to share their experience and teach something 
practical’ (USCS/26 March 2013/b*).91 This contrasts significantly 
with the UK where all my interview subjects were career civil 
servants, often drawing on considerable experience and creating 
significant institutional memory. 
5.4 Religious America, Secular Europe?
The relative ‘openness’ of the US foreign policy machine (which 
makes it more likely that religious voices will be represented in the 
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91 According to Peter Haas (1992:3) an epistemic community is ‘a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-
area.’
diplomatic process), then, is yet another reason why it is necessary to 
point towards constitutive differences between the American and 
British foreign policy context. Yet, while I have suggested that a 
picture is emerging of ‘religious America, secular Europe’ (Berger et 
al, 2008), it might be necessary to complicate that picture. As we have 
seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the UK policy context is demonstrably not 
‘secular’, does not marginalise religion but rather is extensively 
engaged with religious communities and dynamics at home - and 
increasingly overseas - in ways which are consistent with and draw 
from the relationship between state and church in Britain. The UK 
policy machine, I suggested, is structurally religious but culturally 
‘religion blind’. In this Chapter, I introduce some of the evidence 
derived from my American interviews and that too suggests a more 
complex situation than conventional wisdom might suggest.
As I explained in Chapter 2, the dominant ‘post-secular’ narrative 
relating to religion and society in the United States is the so-called 
‘rational choice’ model (see e.g. Warner, 1993). This paradigm is 
predicated on the idea that religious liberty creates a free marketplace 
in which religion thrives. As Davie (2002:36) explains, it is as though 
‘the principle of voluntarism ..[is].. the fundamental reason for the 
continuing vitality of religion in American civic life’. Rational Choice 
models are distinctive in the sociology of religion both because of 
their deductive methodology and because they challenge long 
established narratives of secularisation. But they are also significant 
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for us in that they challenge the notion of a single ‘Western’ 
experience of religion and state and, in so doing, undermine simplistic 
international relations models. However, while the ‘religious 
economy’ paradigm has made important gains for the sociology of 
religion (not least in elevating its core subject matter from the micro to 
the macro level), the connection of pluralism to religious mobilisation 
in a linear upward slope (Finke and Stark, 1992) may be problematic 
in the context of the religion-policy nexus. 
Davie (2002:36) importantly derives from rational choice theory that 
constitutive differences between American and European experiences 
of religion relate to the differing constitutional arrangements in these 
contexts. She suggests that the difference can be characterised as 
‘voluntarism..compared with a relatively immobile state Church’. This 
much I would agree with. Yet, what supply side models also do, Davie 
notes, is align voluntarism or ‘religious freedom’ with increased levels 
of religiosity. While this positive correlation may seem to describe the 
relationship between ‘freedom’ and public religiosity in the United 
States, it may be less successful in accounting for the relationship 
between religion and public policy making. In what follows, I suggest, 
rational choice models which posit a positive and direct correlation 
between ‘freedom’ and ‘religiosity’ do not adequately reflect what is 
going on in domestic and electoral politics. In fact, it is necessary to 
introduce a theoretical alternative to both secularisation and rational 
choice theories which is, I suggest, useful in helping us to understand 
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a different way in which ‘freedom’ and ‘religion’ seem to be inter-
related in the US polity. Hence, I refer to a recently revived 
conversation about the theory of ‘civil religion’, an established 
alternative to both secularisation and rational choice models, which 
emphasises the endurance of ‘sacred’ values in American society. 
5.5 Land of the free? Religion and domestic politics in the US
In the 2012 race for the Republican presidential nomination, religion 
was a much discussed factor, not least because of the range of faith 
backgrounds being represented. What looks like religious diversity 
among the candidates in the Republican nomination process actually 
reveals the narrow scope of ‘pluralism’ in political leadership: this 
‘diverse’ group comprised four Christian candidates - one Mormon, 
two Roman Catholics and one Southern Baptist. While the general 
acceptance of Catholic candidates indicates a greater appetite for 
pluralism in political leadership than in the pre-Kennedy era, the 
extent of this pluralism should not be over emphasised. Indeed, the 
extent of scrutiny to which front-runner Mitt Romney was exposed, as 
a result of his declared Mormon faith, reveals that the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of conscience is quite noticeably 
limited when an individual enters public life.  
The sheer number of opinion polls taken on the subject of the 
candidates’ religious affiliation is a testament to the significance of the 
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issue92. According to the Gallup data93, 22 per cent of Americans 
would not vote for a Mormon candidate (compared to 7 per cent for a 
Catholic and 9 per cent for a Jewish candidate). Further, a Washington 
Post-ABC News poll in June 2011 found that 20% of Republicans 
would be less likely to vote for a candidate who was Mormon94. It is 
not clear exactly what aspect of Mormonism offends public 
sensibilities. A recent BBC documentary95 revealed that problematic 
associations with polygamy and underage marriage in the breakaway 
‘fundamentalist’ Latter Day Saints (LDS) community may be a factor. 
So might the so-called ‘cultish’ practices of the LDS community, and 
perceived lack of biblical basis for their beliefs. Importantly, however, 
Romney defended himself based on the principle of religious liberty: 
‘The great majority of Americans understand that this nation was 
founded on the principle of religious tolerance and liberty. Most 
people do not make their decision based on someone's 
faith’ (McGreal, 2012). That said, there is considerable evidence that 
Romney sought to underplay his Mormonism during the campaign 
and instead to emphasise that he is a man of faith, using generalised 
theistic rhetoric. His decision to discuss his faith at one event was 
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92 This is in stark contrast to the 2015 UK General election where there was very 
little discussion of religion, something which is evidenced by the Field’s (2015) 
short round-up of data - see http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2015/religion-and-the-
general-election/ - accessed 15 June 2015
93 See Chingos and Henderson (2012)
94 Full polling data can be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
polls/postabcpoll_110311.html - accessed 20 June 2015
95 This World: The Mormon Candidate, BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
b01f87w2 - accessed 20 June 2015
acknowledged as a rarity 96. Even in these circumstances, rather than a 
mark of difference, he chose to emphasise the way his religion 
connects him to the American people: “This gentleman wanted to talk 
about the doctrines of my religion. I’ll talk about the practices of my 
faith’. 
It seems that Romney’s invocation of religious liberty, combined with 
his public presentation as a man of faith and values persuaded voters. 
His success in the Republican primaries suggested that his ‘different’ 
faith was less of an issue than it has been in the past 97. Indeed, the 
idea that his Mormonism was a major political weakness declined as 
he successfully directed attention towards common values. As James 
Richardson (2012) in The Guardian noted: ‘Romney has largely 
managed to assuage evangelical concerns by merely emphasising the 
shared ethics of faith, family and freedom.’ The significance of this, I 
would suggest, must not be underestimated. Romney, assisted by a 
major LDS public relations initiative ‘I am Mormon’, has managed to 
align Mormonism with mainstream American beliefs and values in a 
way which suggests that it is now no longer only a numerically 
significant symbol of religious pluralism, but also now considered to 
be a legitimate religious position for a potential President. Given US 
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96 Town Hall Meeting, Moore oil, Milwakee Wisconsin, April 2 2012 - see articles 
from NBC newshttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46938512/ns/politics-primaries/t/
wisconsin-romney-offers-rare-insight-mormon-faith/#.T3wfCI4WXLY wall street 
journal http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/04/02/romney-is-asked-on-faith-and-
interracial-marriage/?mod=google_news_blogmaking
97 The public’s lack of acceptance of the Mormon faith is widely recognised as one 
cause for Romney’s unsuccessful run for the Republican candidacy in 2007 and his 
father’s against Nixon in 1968.
Presidents’ religious affiliations have, in the past, extended only a 
limited way along the Christian spectrum, 98this might be considered a 
notable breakthrough. What it also demonstrates, I would suggest, is 
the way in which the ideal of religious liberty exerts influence over the 
American population. 
The Romney case is evidence not only that the President’s religion is a 
significant electoral issue, but also that it must be of a particular 
character and quality. According to one Gallup poll99 (June 2012), 
43% of the American electorate would not support an atheist 
candidate: it would be inconceivable for a Presidential Oath not to be 
sworn ‘so help me God’, or for a speech to be ended without the 
words ‘God Bless America’.  This is highly significant, for it points to 
a deep connection between religion and national identity and might 
suggest that the President’s religion is most significant to the 
electorate not in terms of its theological or doctrinal position, but 
because it is sort of test of his commitment to American values. As 
one of my interviewees explained: ‘in terms of a candidate for office, 
their faith is considered to reflect something bigger - being religious is 
part of being American’ (HMG/ 21 March 2013/a). 
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98 The actual breakdown is as follows: 11 Episcopalians, 8 Presbyterians, 4 Baptists,  
4 Methodists, 4 Unitarians, 3 no formal affiliation, 2 Disciples of Christ, 2 Dutch 
Reformed, 2 Quakers, 1 Catholic, 1 Congregationalist and 1 United Church of 
Christ.
99 For the full polling data see http://www.gallup.com/poll/155285/atheists-muslims-
bias-presidential-candidates.aspx - accessed 20 June 2015
Spickard (2014), Casanova (2006) and Warner (2000) have all drawn 
attention to the value of Will Herberg’s (1956) idea of the ‘American 
Way of Life’ as critical in understanding religion and immigration in 
the United States. In fact, Herberg’s is a classic text in the sociology of 
religion and is recognised as offering a particularly important insight 
into the development of religious congregations in situations of 
pluralism. As Herberg (1956: 87) himself explains, religion plays a 
crucial sociological role in American society: ‘over and above 
conventional religion, there is to be found among Americans some 
sort of faith or belief or set of convictions, not generally designated as 
religion but definitely operating as such in their lives in the sense of 
providing them with some fundamental context of normativity and 
meaning’. 
This expression of a version of ‘civil religion’ theory, I suggest, can 
help us to understand the role ‘religious freedom’ plays in United 
States government policy and electoral politics. ‘Religious Freedom’ 
has become part of what Herberg (1956) calls the common religion, 
the ‘American Way of Life’ that is a normative structure of ideals, 
aspirations, values, beliefs and standards. Going beyond the scope of 
traditional civil religion theory (e.g. Bellah, 1967, Parsons, 1966), 
Herberg (1956: 90) argues that the American Way of Life has been 
able to incorporate resistance identities, demonstrating that it is 
organic, responsive and ‘genuinely operative in their lives’. Does 
increased receptivity to Romney’s Mormonism not reflect exactly this 
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sort of organic renegotiation of the American Civil Religion? 
Herberg’s account of the American Way of Life is an instrumental one, 
in which belief in God underpins and furthers US sacred values - it is 
a religion based on activism and service, not on theology or doctrine. 
In discussing his missionary background and his work with American 
communities, Romney aligned himself with exactly this American 
tradition, seemingly presenting Mormonism not as a source of 
‘difference’ but as a legitimate and natural expression of his American 
values. 
In the same way, political figures from the past have sought to use 
religious expression to demonstrate suitability for office, making 
explicit connection between theism and national values.  In the midst 
of a sex scandal that would mar his presidency, Bill Clinton was 
conspicuously photographed outside the Foundry United Methodist 
Church, Bible in hand. In the same spirit, quiet evangelical Jimmy 
Carter was elected to ‘redeem’ the presidency after the disgrace of the 
administration under Nixon and Ford. More recently, in the midst of 
political and economic crises, then presidential candidate Barack 
Obama was repeatedly construed as a Messianic figure, ‘a potential 
saviour that might come and absolve the country of all its sins.’100
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100 The words of Chicago art student, David Cordero, who created the ‘Blessing’ 
sculpture of Obama. Of other artistic and linguistic representations of Obama as 
Jesus, most significant is ‘The Truth’ by Michael D’Antuono which was due to be 
unveiled in New York City to celebrate his 100th day in office but was considered 
insulting to Christians.
Yet, perhaps the most contentious issue concerning religion and 
Presidential politics in recent years has actually concerned President 
Obama but has cast him in a rather different light. Despite his 
professions of Christianity and conspicuous attendance at church, a 
minority of the American public remain unconvinced about the  
President’s religious affiliation101. Like Romney, Obama has spoken 
of his Christian faith in terms of action and service, presenting Jesus 
as a role model, a symbol of interfaith friendship102, as a servant103, 
and as a teacher104. This does not seem to have been universally 
convincing, as John Feffer (2012) argues. Continued attempts to 
‘expose’ Obama as Muslim - including at official Republican party 
events involving John McCain and Rick Santorum - seem to revolve 
around his being ‘too soft’ on Muslims, despite a strong record on 
counter-terrorism and national security. Feffer (2012) suggests this is a 
political tool: desperate Republicans have focused on spurious 
arguments about race and religion because their traditional area of 
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101 According to a Pew Forum Poll (August 18 2010) 18% of those questioned 
consider Obama to be Muslim and only 34% believe that he is a Christian - see 
http://www.pewforum.org/2010/08/18/growing-number-of-americans-say-obama-is-
a-muslim/ - accessed 20 June 2015.
102 Obama makes reference to Islamic story of Isra in which Moses, Jesus and 
Mohammed pray together, 4 June 2009, Cairo. See full text of speech http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/04/barack-obama-keynote-speech-egypt - 
accessed 20 June 2015.
103 In a speech given at Notre Dame University, (17 May 2009), he explained that 
the idea of ‘service’ had brought him to Christianity and expressed admiration for 
Jesus’ good works. For full text of speech, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-notre-dame-commencement - accessed 20 June 2015
105 In a speech on economic policy at Georgetown University in April 2009, Obama 
invoked the Sermon on the Mount, saying “we cannot build this economy on the 
same pile of sand”. For full text see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Obama_Economy_Georgetown.html - accessed 20 June 2015.
comparative strength - national security - has been a particular success 
for Obama. Whether this is the reason for the prominence of religion 
in the 2012 election is open to question; that Islam (unlike the three 
communions - Protestant, Catholic, Jew) which all participate in 
Herberg’s Common Religion) is incompatible with American values, it 
seems, is not. The President, as leader of the nation, is responsible at 
once for protecting the constitutional separation between church and 
state and yet must himself publicly declare, practice and espouse 
values based on faith; he must be, as one interviewee told me ‘Pastor 
in Chief’ (USCS/27 March 2013/a*), at once embodying the ideal of 
religious liberty, and at the same time being a person of ‘faith’. This 
dual role, I would argue, epitomises the unique contradiction that 
governs the way American policy makers ‘manage god’.
The debate about candidates’ religious faith, then, is an example of the 
practical outworking of the first amendment, but at the same time, 
reveals it to be part of a more complex fabric: a sort of national sacred 
narrative. In my MA thesis (Lindsay, 2011), I suggested that the work 
of both Parsons (1966) and Bellah (1967) was critical in helping us to 
understand the relationship of religion and national security in the 
American context given - through theories of civil religion - we are 
able to recognise a process by which the profane is ‘sacralised‘. 
Indeed, building on Parsons’ work, Tiryakian (1982) has suggested 
that the Puritan ethic in the US had effectively caused the breakdown 
of the dualism between ‘this’ and ‘other’ worlds which had previously 
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been characteristic of Christianity.This had the effect of extending the 
earthly horizon, making the sacralisation of the mundane possible. 
Contrary to the assumption of classical modernists such as Marx and 
Weber, this demonstrated that America was not experiencing 
disenchantment, but simply an altered horizon upon which the sacred/
profane distinction operates with the result that America itself has 
been sacralised and Christian motifs such as mission and service have 
been assimilated into the civil polity.
And I am not alone in re-making the case for civil religion theories to 
explain the American context. A number of recent re-interpretations 
focus on comparative assessments of different expressions of civil 
religion (Markoff and Regan, 1982), and recognise civil religious 
phenomena as emerging at key historical moments, characterised by 
the tension between local and nationalising identities (Gorski, 2010; 
Markoff and Regan, 1982; Crook, 2010). In fact, with Crook (2010), I 
suggest, the challenges posed by globalisation are giving new 
credence both to the description of the United States as a civil 
religious culture and to the emergence of civil religion as a 
legitimating aspect of secular democracy.
Hence, I would argue that motifs of ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ have been 
assimilated into the civil polity and civil religion theory can help us to 
frame the relationship between ‘freedom’ and ‘religion’ in the 
American context. The principle of ‘religious freedom’ appears to act 
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simultaneously as a guarantee of pluralism and at the same time a 
constraint which ensures coherence within diversity to the extent that, 
as Herberg (1956: 247) suggests, ‘this underlying unity... sets limits 
within which their conflicts and tensions may operate and beyond 
which they cannot go’. In other words, pluralism and its associated 
tensions are critical to - and formative of - national life, but they are 
contained and continually expressed in terms of the relationship 
between church and state. What civil religion theory offers us is a way 
to recognise that the relationship between ‘freedom’ and ‘religion’ in 
American society should not only be understood numerically (as 
secularisation theories would suggest) or deductively (as rational 
choice theorists would have it) but substantively: in this sense 
‘freedom’ is less a condition of religious vitality and more a 
‘religious’ or ‘sacred’ value.
5.51 Culture War...
‘Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt 
religious faith - and I don’t care what it is’ (Henry, 1981:41). The 
words of President  Eisenhower were particularly resonant in the run-
up to the 2012 Presidential election, where religious values - and 
particularly religious liberty - took centre stage in key policy debates. 
While Republican candidates Michele Bachmann, Herman Cain, Rick 
Perry and Rick Santorum all declared that God asked them to run for 
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higher office, they - and others - have accused Obama of imposing an 
altogether different set of values in the policy arena. 
As part of Obama’s controversial effort to increase access to and 
provision of healthcare to lower socio-economic groups, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) represents a significant 
reform of health care legislation in the United States, making it 
mandatory for all Americans not already covered to purchase a 
minimum level of health insurance. Attacks on the ‘unconstitutional’ 
nature of this policy have abounded. According to Lambert and 
Pelosfky (2011), the majority of US states have enacted lawsuits 
against the Federal Government challenging various aspects of the 
Act. While the reasons for these challenges are numerous, significant 
among them are those which seek to focus the debate on the question 
of religious liberty and the relationship between church and state. 
Part of the PPACA mandate includes a requirement that all healthcare 
providers - including faith-based organisations - offer contraception, 
abortion and sterilisation as part of their services. While the 
‘individual mandate’ allows individuals to opt out of the purchase of 
health insurance for religious reasons, even Catholic health providers 
who have serious doctrinal opposition to such provision, are forced to 
offer these services. As a result, the policy - labelled ‘Obamacare’ - is 
perceived as contravening religious freedom. According to 
sympathetic commentators (drawn largely from Catholic and 
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evangelical Christian constituencies), forcing faith-based health 
providers to offer preventative services as part of mandatory health 
insurance is a direct violation of the First Amendment. It is ‘an 
unprecedented and untenable abrogation of religious freedom in the 
United States’ say Kevin Vann and Kevin Farrel105, two Catholic 
bishops from North Texas who suggest that ‘this is part of a pattern in 
the United States that has degenerated from the recognition of religion 
as good and salutary to our society to religion being subjected to 
punitive discrimination’. 
In fact, fears that Obama leads from a position of ‘aggressive 
secularism’ have achieved mainstream appeal. Romney, the 
Republican candidate who faced Obama on election day, has criticised 
‘Obamacare’ as representing an ‘attack on religion’, and 
commentators accuse Obama of seeking to introduce European 
models of social welfare in to the United States, and with them, 
European secularism106. Legal scholar, Thomas M Messner, quoted in 
the National Review Online (Lopez, 2012) summarises the argument: 
‘the HHS mandate is about whether government should force 
individuals and institutions to purchase or provide insurance plans that 
include goods and services that violate deeply held religious and 
moral beliefs. In short, the HHS mandate is about freedom in general 
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105 Full text of the Bishops Joint Statement can be found here: http://
www.knowingisdoing.org/2012/01/26/a-clear-catholic-message-regarding-the-hhs-
ruling/ - accessed 20 June 2015
106 See for example the article by William Inboden: http://foreignpolicy.com/
2012/01/23/is-the-white-house-trying-to-turn-america-into-france/ - accessed 20 
June 2015
and religious freedom in particular.’ The degree to which such a 
complex debate can be reduced to a single issue is characteristic of US 
political rhetoric, thus while there are numerous other issues - legal 
and moral - involved in the debate over healthcare (it is a debate 
which has dominated presidential politics for generations) - its 
presentation in terms of religious freedom remains front and central. 
Populist right-winger Bill O’Reilly (2007) uses the expression ‘culture 
war’ to paint Obama’s ‘secular progressivism’ - associated not just 
with universal healthcare, but also gay marriage, alignment with 
Europe and secularism - as ‘contemptuous of American values’ - using 
his interpretation of the first amendment not only to challenge a 
specific policy, but to cast wider aspersions about Obama’s suitability. 
Yet, at the same time, supporters of the Act also make appeals to 
religious liberty in defending Obama, presenting the legislation as 
inspired by the very essence of the First Amendment: ‘as our nation 
becomes more pluralistic and welcomes those with different faiths; as 
we sharpen our understanding of sexual orientation and gender 
identity; and as we see issues of conscience play out on both sides of 
the reproductive rights debate, we struggle to discern where religious 
liberty is under assault and where it is growing in strength and 
understanding’(Steenland, 2012). According to them, the PPACA is a 
necessary protection of the establishment clause, a symbol of 
pluralism and a guarantor of religious liberty even for those affiliated 
to non-Judaeo-Christian traditions or no religion at all. 
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 This sort of debate that polarises the electorate is far from new. In fact, 
it echoes conversations through the ages in which the relationship 
between religion and public policy in the US has been continually re-
expressed in terms of the First Amendment, and specifically, tensions 
between the free exercise of religion and the establishment clause. The 
‘grey area’ in which the ‘wall of separation’ between Church and State 
was erected has frequently been the subject of national controversy 
over issues ranging from prayer in school107 to the Pledge of 
Allegiance108. Debates repeatedly revolve around interpretation of the 
first amendment which both grants the liberty to exercise religion (or 
lack of religion) freely and at the same time seems to condemn this 
exercise in any public institution as unconstitutional because it could 
be construed as ‘endorsement’. This tension has been particularly 
pronounced in recent years, and especially since the 1980s, given 
matters of personal morality have increasingly featured in public 
policy debates. Yet cases such as the famous John Scopes trial over the 
teaching of evolution in the 1920s, reveal that these matters are 
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107 Since two landmark cases in 1962 (Engel vs Vitale) and 1963 (Abington School 
District vs Schempp) public schools in the US have been banned from conducting 
religious observances based on the prohibition in the First Amendment that 
‘congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’ i.e. the 
establishment clause. However, there have been numerous cases brought since the 
1960s which have sought the reintroduction of school prayers based on the ‘free 
exercise’ clause in the first amendment. - see Makula and Mabunda (1999)  Lee v. 
Weisman. Great American Court Cases. Ed. Mark Mikula and L. Mpho Mabunda. 
Vol. 1: Individual Liberties. Detroit: Gale, 1999. Gale Opposing Viewpoints In 
Context. Web. 7 Sep. 2011
108 see http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,266658,00.html - on the 
case of Elk Grove Unified School District vs Newdow when an atheist went to court 
to prove that the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional due to the ‘under God’ 
phrase.
perennial and fundamentally connected to the relationship between 
religion and American society. 
Indeed, I would suggest that these debates are an essential - and 
constitutive - part of American socio-political culture. While they 
seem to reflect divisions in American society, the terms and scope of 
the debate are contained. As Herberg (1956) noted, this ensures that 
there is unity even amidst diversity: the ‘sacred’ value of religious 
liberty constrains the public policy debate, creating a space for the 
periodic renewal of the sacred narrative and focussing the nation on 
matters of national values and identity. While, in his structural-
functionalist account of social systems, Parsons has been accused (see 
e.g. Wrong, 1961 and Holmwood, undated) of paying insufficient 
attention to the role of conflict within the system, given both sides 
engaged call upon the First Amendment, my evidence would suggest 
that what looks like a ‘culture war’ is in fact an on-going negotiation 
over a set of principles which both sides accept. In this respect, the 
sacralisation of ‘religious freedom’ is a critical and constitutive part 
of America’s secular democracy.
5.52 ..or cultural renewal
According to Senator Joseph Lieberman (Democrat, Connecticut), the 
International Religious Freedom Act is rooted in the First Amendment. 
In his speech introducing the Act to into the Senate on October 8 
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1998109, Lieberman explained that the Act honoured the fact that ‘this 
nation, founded under God, with freedom of conscience, of religion as 
its cornerstone is prepared to do what it can to extend those values 
reasonably, ostensibly around the world...’.
Given the centrality of ‘sacred’ values, including religious liberty, in 
American political life, it should be unsurprising that there has been 
widespread bipartisan support of the use of American foreign policy in 
support of international religious freedom. Indeed, former US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (2007: 88) has herself 
acknowledged that, though the Christian right in the US has largely 
been responsible for bringing private and personal issues of morality 
to the international stage, there is considerable consensus in the US 
and ‘both the political left and the Christian right agree that ‘moral 
values’ should be near the centre of US foreign policy.’  It is, however, 
the expression of these ‘moral values’ that tends to cause controversy. 
The Act was passed unanimously at the time, but has provoked debate 
and division since its inception. 
At stake in these discussions has not been the principle of religious 
freedom, but whether the Act should be interpreted positively or 
negatively. Arguments such as those advanced over the Obamacare 
issue reappear in this context, where proponents of a stronger IRF 
policy (e.g. Farr and Hoover, 2009) argue that the current 
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109 For video of the full speech made to the Senate see http://www.c-span.org/
video/?c4487898/international-religious-freedom - accessed 7 April 2015
arrangements focus too heavily on persecution and seek to achieve the 
freedom of religious prisoners rather than seeking to foster the 
principles of religious freedom more generally as part of the 
democracy promotion agenda. IRF, they suggest, is not only 
marginalised within the State Department (the IRF Ambassador is of 
junior rank and located within the Human Rights and Democracy 
division) but is not sufficiently integrated as support to broader 
priorities such as counter-terrorism and national security. On the other 
hand are those who advocate IRF, but express concern about the 
strong association of IRF advocacy with both the Christian Right in 
the US  and with accusations of cultural imperialism which make IRF 
policy counter-productive. Indeed, this division is noticeable in my 
interview data. Among those participants in my US fieldwork, some 
members of the international religious freedom lobby had started to 
focus their attention on domestic matters as one former Government 
official explained: ‘it has become apparent that there are problems 
with religious freedom in Western Europe and data suggesting 
religious freedom is also problematic in the US’ such that they are 
now part of the ‘religious freedom project’ (USCS/26 March 2013/
b*). Other members of the IRF lobby sought to distance international 
efforts from domestic partisan politics as one civil society 
representative explained: ‘some people have tried to connect 
international religious freedom to the domestic agenda.... but this link 
needs to be broken’ (USCS/24 April 2013/a*). 
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Indeed, the Report of the Task Force on Religion and the Making of 
US Foreign Policy (Appleby and Cizik, 2010: 12) reveals extensive 
and notable disagreement on the matter of the future direction of IRF 
policy. All parties involved in discussion agreed that IRF is a central 
part of US Foreign Policy and needed to address not just persecution 
but must include ‘the right of religious individuals and groups to 
advance their values publicly in civil society and political life’. 
However, as is now a familiar refrain, the First Amendment emerged 
as a sticking point. Some Task Force members argued for IRF to be 
integrated strategically into foreign policy, but with recognition that its 
pursuit may be subsumed by other strategic priorities, for example in 
bilateral relationships with China. Others, contrarily, argued for the 
centrality of IRF in a way which creates a foreign policy 
establishment, as well as international context, which is more 
comfortable dealing with religion. In other words, the former 
recognise IRF as an objective but do not seek to integrate religious 
motives or activities into the development of foreign policy, while the 
latter argue the opposite. The core of this disagreement, then, revolves 
around the precedent set by the First Amendment: does it enable ‘a 
constructive tension between church and state’ or create ‘a separation 
between religion and the act of governing?’ (Farr and Hoover, 2009: 
32). Once more, it seems, America’s feted ideal of religious liberty 
acts as a policy constraint, limiting debate about the relationship 
between religion and foreign policy to a fight over whether the first 
amendment guarantees freedom ‘from’ religion or freedom ‘of’ 
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religion. Yet at the same time, this sort of debate - as we have seen in 
the domestic context - is less ‘culture war’ and more ‘cultural 
renewal’ given that it offers an opportunity for the rehearsal of well 
established positions and focuses attention on the ‘sacred narrative’ 
within which religious liberty plays a central role.  
5.53 Religious freedom or sacred economism?
In electoral, domestic and international policy, then, we have seen the 
role that ‘religious freedom’ plays in at once provoking debate and in 
so doing, renewing America’s civil religion. The 2012 Presidential 
election, debates over Obamacare and on-going tussels over 
international religious freedom policy all epitomise a recurring 
phenomenon in US social and political life whereby the nation’s 
sacred values come under scrutiny only to be renewed. But how far 
can existing sociology of religion models help us in understanding this 
context where ‘freedom’ is at once a policy constraint and at the same 
time a sacred value? Evidence drawn from the domestic and electoral 
context demonstrates that there is a deep cultural religiosity that 
accompanies structural secularism in the American polity. Rational 
choice models posit a direct causal relationship between religious 
freedom and high levels of religiosity. However, in the context of civil 
religion, rational choice theory looks less like a theoretical explanation 
and more like a reflection of the sacred narrative. 
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In arguing for a Durkheimian ‘religious sociology’, Alexander (1988: 
192) suggests that political contexts can be understood in symbolic 
terms. Using the example of the Watergate scandal, he argues that 
political office can be likened to sacred power which - at key crisis 
moments - is ‘re-transcendentalized’. In these periods of effervescence 
‘the classificatory system of collective symbols can sometimes be 
drastically changed.... the relation of social actors to these dominant 
classifications is always shifted and transformed. Cultural myths are 
recalled and extended to contemporary circumstance. Social 
solidarities are reworked.’ We might suggest, as a result of the analysis 
presented here, that religious freedom plays a key role in these crisis 
moments: it provides a guarantee of difference and therefore of 
energetic debate, while at the same time it is part of a unifying cultural 
narrative. 
Ultimately, then, religious liberty is a guarantor of both pluralism and 
unity, something uniquely constitutive of the American experience. 
But it may constrain the religion-policy relationship at a more 
strategic level. Both sides of the ‘establishment clause’ debate in IRF 
policy agree that disagreement over the First Amendment has resulted 
in the inability of the policy establishment to engage effectively with 
religion: ‘the separation of church and state affects the way we 
approach the issue of religion in political affairs and has contributed to 
its marginalization’ (Appleby and Cizik, 2010: 26). Not only, then, 
does religious liberty constrain specific policy debates, both domestic 
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and international, it limits the way the relationship between religion 
and policy is conceived. This has highly significant implications for 
further research. It suggests that, like in the United Kingdom, the 
domestic context, as well as the global environment, is a significant 
influencer of foreign policy, making the culture-policy relationship an 
important factor. So too does it indicate the uniqueness of American 
political and social life which is characterised by both macro-level 
structural secularisation and at the same time macro-level cultural 
religiosity. Finally, and most importantly here, it has implications for 
the way we understand religion in American political and social life. 
First, it re-states, rather than challenges, the ‘exceptionalism’ or 
‘uniqueness’ of the American religion-society relationship, demanding 
that we revisit the contributions of Bellah (1967) and Parsons (1978) 
who explain the public visibility of religion in America is not 
necessarily the result of ‘deprivatisation’ (Casanova, 1994) or 
‘resurgence’ (Thomas, 2005) but an expression of macro-level 
secularization (via the first amendment). Notably, Parsons (1978: 201) 
called religious freedom ‘not an index of religious indifference, but of 
consensus on the religious principles involved’. Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, it enables us to re-interpret rational choice theory 
not as being in opposition to secularisation theory (per decline of 
beliefs) or as in inverse relationship to secularisation (as supply siders 
suggest) but in a different position altogether, independent of the 
premises of secularisation theory. Here rational choice theory becomes 
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a natural expression of the very First Amendment principles which we 
have seen constrain public policy debate in the United States - an 
expression of what we might call ‘sacred economism’. The ideal of 
religious freedom, and its expression via the analogy of the market 
should less be considered an explanation of religious vitality and more 
a reflection of the ‘sacred’ values inherent in American culture.
5.54 Civil religion in the context of the secular
It is evident, then, that the religion-policy nexus in the US operates in 
the context of a civil religious culture which frames electoral, 
domestic and foreign policy. Religious freedom operates as a civil 
religious value, which, at once is the subject of and at the same time 
constrains public policy debate on a range of issues and is, ultimately, 
a source of cultural renewal. Given this, I have suggested that rational 
choice models of religious vitality need to be inverted to explain the 
‘religiosity’ of American political culture: rather than predicating 
increased religious vitality based on the relative freedom of the 
religious marketplace, religiosity is inherent in that religious freedom 
as it is a civil religious value. This civil religious culture may well be 
what UK officials were describing when they spoke of the differences 
between American and British political culture. Indeed, one 
unclassified Foreign Office (2011b) paper shared with me on 
‘Religion in North American Politics and Foreign Policy’ itself 
suggests that ‘the genius of the US system is that diversity is balanced 
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by common adherence to Americanism and this prevents social 
conflict from getting out of hand’ (FCO, 2011b:1). It goes on to 
explain that ‘what the US does have is a civic religion in which 
allegiance to Americanism, defined as a set of ideas rather than a 
territorial entity, substitutes for an official religious perspective’ (FCO, 
2011b:4). The perception that the US is a civil religious culture, then, 
is not only a way to understand the relationship between ‘freedom’ 
and ‘religion’ in the US, but offers a useful prism through which 
Foreign Office officials can understand the religion-state relationship 
there. Yet the paper also acknowledges both the pragmatic 
‘realism’ (FCO, 2011:6) of Obama in his foreign policy and the steady 
increase in the number of religious ‘nones’ which has doubled in the 
past three decades (FCO, 2011:2). 
It is, we are reminded, important to recognise the secular context that 
structures the cultural ‘religiosity’ I have described. In fact, although 
my UK interviewees were keen to point out what they considered the 
undue influence of religion over American policy, it was also common 
for those I interviewed to claim that they had ‘never had a 
conversation about or including religion with US counterparts’ (HMG/
4 July 2012/b) and that ‘on a practical level, religious beliefs have 
never been part of the conversation’ (HMG/3 July 2012/a). Exploring 
and explaining the apparent combination of overt religiosity in 
American politics with little practical evidence of religion at the 
working level represents the analytical core of this chapter. In what 
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follows, I demonstrate that - at a working level - the impression of 
‘religious America’ given by rational choice models is inadequate. So 
too is Casanova’s theory of religious mobilisation - the deprivatisation 
thesis - found wanting to explain what is going on in the context of 
American foreign policy.  Instead, I suggest, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that a process of secularisation or ‘reprivatisation’ is 
going on when American foreign policy makers ‘manage God’. 
5.6 Deprivatisation or reprivatisation? Religion and the State 
Department
Though the debate about religion and public policy has proliferated 
since 9/11110 and Madeleine Albright (2007: 9) suggests 9/11 was the 
most significant factor in ‘adjusting the lens’ through which diplomats 
understand the world, Casanova (1994: 3) has identified the 1980s as 
the era in which religion ‘went public’. He identifies the emergence of 
the moral majority in the US, the Iranian Revolution and Salman 
Rushdie controversy along with the opening up of the Soviet Union all 
as symptoms of religion ‘leaving its assigned place in the private 
sphere’. While I agree with Casanova that it is necessary to go back 
further than 2001 to understand the contemporary religion-public 
policy relationship in the United States, using a contemporary case 
study - the establishment of the Office for Religion and Global Affairs 
- I will offer an alternative to Casanova’s ‘deprivatisation’ thesis, 
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110 As Philpott (2009:184) exclaimed: in the last decade, ‘talk about religion has 
risen’.
suggesting that what has actually occurred in the US is a dual 
movement of religious engagement through re-privatisation.
In his landmark text, ‘Public Religions in the Modern World’, Jose 
Casanova (1994) changed the landscape of the study of secularisation 
by untangling three commonly conflated propositions. While he 
recognises that institutional ‘differentiation’ of spheres has largely 
taken place in Western societies, he suggests that the empirical decline 
of religious belief and practice has taken different courses in different 
contexts. In doing so, he cleared useful ground for a comparison of 
European and American versions of ‘secularisation theory’ which had, 
hitherto, often been talking past one another. Perhaps most 
importantly for this section, he articulated a new position in the 
conversation by challenging a third dimension of secularisation theory 
- the ‘privatisation’ of religion or its confinement to the private sphere. 
Significantly, for Casanova, the post-secular era is characterised as 
one in which religion has rejected its relegation to the ‘private’ sphere 
and has re-emerged as a major force in world politics (Casanova, 
1994).
In his 2000 article, Haan identifies a number of ‘problems’ with the 
deprivatisation thesis. His main concern is to demonstrate that the 
religion-state relationships in both Poland and Turkey are evidence of 
the sort of ‘privatisation’ Casanova considers to have been one 
dimension of classic secularisation theories. But, importantly, his 
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article makes a decisive point that ‘privatisation is a fundamental 
feature of the dominant liberal model of modernity in at least two 
senses. First, private interest and ownership of the means of 
production are the dominant principles of capitalist economic 
organisation. Second, though strong versions of secularisation theory 
are untenable and religion does not disappear, it is largely confined to 
the ‘private sphere’ (Haan, 2000: 14). Furthermore, he suggests with 
reference to Weber, it is likely that these two dimensions of 
privatisation are related.
In this section, I suggest that evidence I have gathered supports Haan’s 
argument. Drawing on evidence from interviews with serving and 
former US Government officials and with a range of public 
intellectuals and ‘civil society’ representatives, I suggest that what 
Casanova considers to be a sign of ‘deprivatisation’ - the involvement 
of religious groups in ‘civil society’ - is actually a symptom of 
religious ‘privatisation’. Using the example of the newly established 
State Department ‘Office of Religion and Global Affairs’, I suggest 
the increased visibility of religion in the form of policy makers’ 
engagement of religious actors and dynamics has taken place through 
a process of privatisation (or perhaps re-privatisation).
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5.61 A religious ‘awakening’
In the time I have been researching for my PhD, the foreign policy 
establishments of the UK and the US have made significant strides in 
their understanding of, and engagement with, religious dynamics. 
What began as a thesis about a niche lobby of conservative Christians 
in the United States - and almost no advocates in the UK - has 
blossomed into a still small but increasingly mainstream diplomatic 
activity and popular academic subject. Perhaps the singularly most 
significant development has been the establishment of a new Office 
for Religion and Global Affairs in the US State Department with a 
remit to ‘to engage more closely with faith communities around the 
world, with the belief that we need to partner with them to solve 
global challenges’111. The new Office will task State Department 
colleagues to ‘go out and engage religious leaders and faith-based 
communities in our day-to-day work.’
The culmination of what was described to me as an institutional 
‘awakening’ (USG/15 May 2013a, USCS/24 April 2013/a*, USCS/26 
March 2013/a*, USCS/25 July 2013/a*) of the State Department to 
the global significance of religion, this office has been hailed as a 
‘singular, historic’ (Kerry, 2013) initiative. For the first time in history, 
US diplomats and foreign policy makers are being encouraged to 
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111 See Secretary Kerry’s remarks at the launch of the office (then called the Office 
for Faith Based Community Initiatives http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/
2013/08/212781.htm - accessed 2 April 2015.
engage with and actively influence religious communities and 
organisations overseas. Yet, Olmstead (2013) reflects concerns raised 
by a number of scholars about the constitutional implications of this 
‘great leap faithward’ (Birdsall, 2013a) posing the question: ‘How 
much can the state interact with various faith groups without violating 
the Establishment clause?’. 
In this section, I set out to answer this question by demonstrating the 
three ways in which the new Office represents an outworking, rather 
than a betrayal, of religious freedom. First, I acknowledge that recent 
developments have emerged out of Hillary Clinton’s ‘dialogue with 
civil society’, an approach to religion-related foreign policy that starts 
with a particularly American understanding of the relationship of 
religion to state. Secondly, though this Office is led by a ‘religionist’ 
in the form of seminarian Sean Casey, its mission is evidently 
outcome-oriented rather than value-led. Finally, I trace a trajectory of 
the development of religion-related policy in which increasing 
engagement with religion is contrarily characterised by increasing 
secularisation. In each of these ways, I argue, the new Office reflects 
an extension of the guiding principles of the First Amendment - albeit 
a new interpretation of them - and demonstrates the uniqueness of the 
American combination of high public visibility for religion with 
structural secularism.
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Although I undertook my American fieldwork between March and 
June 2013, before the August announcement of the new Office, this 
initiative was very much ‘in the pipeline’ and therefore on the minds 
of serving federal government officials. As one explained to me, the 
Working Group on Religion and Foreign Policy ‘has developed a 
White Paper with a number of proposals including the establishment 
of an office for religious engagement’ (USG/15 May 2013a). This 
was, the same official went on to explain, part of ‘a major cultural 
shift’ to a position where ‘there is consensus that religion 
matters’ (USG/15 May 2013a). The immediate policy context into 
which this Office has emerged was one in which ‘major changes have 
taken place’. Although one civil society representative explained that 
‘the political community is not that effective at engaging with or 
talking about religion’ (USCS/24 April 2013/a*), there had been an 
‘awakening’ in various government agencies such that ‘there is 
definitely a sense that understanding what is happening with religion 
in a country is seeping into national security policy’ (USCS/24 April 
2013/a*).
Though in general, ‘there has been considerable intellectual 
development post 9/11’ (USCS/7 May 2013/a*), most of those I spoke 
to - within and outside Government - explained this increased 
awareness of religion as a relatively recent development and a direct 
result of Hillary Clinton’s ‘dialogue with civil society’ initiative 
(USG/15 May 2013a; USCS/24 April 2013/a*; USG/7 May 2013/a.) 
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As one serving official explained to me ‘the strategic dialogue with 
civil society set up under Hillary Clinton formalised a long-existing 
process for the engagement of NGO’s’ (USG/7 May 2013/a), while a 
civil society representative explained to me that ‘The Clinton 
initiative...and the working groups were massively significant - there 
is a real sense that their recommendations were being listened 
to’ (USCS/24 April 2013/a*). In fact, suggested another former 
Government official, as a result of the dialogue with civil society, 
when it comes to religion, the state department ‘is now probably the 
most progressive department in the US administration’ (USCS/26 
March 2013/a*). So too have Birdsall (2013) and Mandaville (2013) 
both described work ongoing ‘behind the scenes’ in the Obama 
administration which demonstrates the extent to which it has ‘taken 
religion seriously’. On the surface, then, this institutionalisation of 
religious perspectives through the lens of ‘civil society’ looks a lot like 
Casanova’s (1994) model of the deprivatisation of religion.  But how 
far is this the case?
While the sort of institutionalisation of religious perspectives through 
‘civil society’ which is evidenced might be interpreted in support of 
Casanova’s thesis, in fact, it could be argued that the extension of 
‘dialogue’ between policy makers and civil society reflects exactly the 
sort of privatisation described by classic secularisation models. First 
and foremost, the State Department is still considered to be a ‘secular’ 
environment as one official explained to me: ‘the State Department is 
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open to people of any and no faith, but it can be considered a secular 
institution in that its objective is secular - beliefs are not allowed to 
infuse work’ (USG/7 May 2013/a). He went on to explain that he has a 
role in ‘educating people on why the state department can’t fund work 
to promote moderate forms of Islam overseas - constitutionally, the 
US Government cannot influence or promote faith of any kind’ (USG/
7 May 2013/a). Another former official cast the net wider, explaining 
that ‘the foreign policy world is secular’ (USCS/27 March 2013/a*). 
There is a sense, then, that despite increased efforts to engage religion, 
structurally, the State Department remains a ‘secular’ space. 
Furthermore, though the leader of the new Office is a person of faith, 
his mandate is deeply pragmatic and outcome-focused112. The Director 
of this new Office, Dr Sean Casey, has explained that ‘As religious 
leaders and faith communities shape their environments, they also 
have an influence and shape our own foreign policy concerns here in 
the United States. It’s essential for the United States to understand 
them and to bring them into our diplomacy and development efforts.’ 
113 Indeed, in the course of a dialogue between the US and UK 
256
112 One former US government official explained to me that Dr Casey’s appointment 
itself was significant - while he is a person of faith, he is also a scholar of religion 
and as such he - like Melissa Rogers his counterpart in the White House - would be 
well schooled in the limits of the First Amendment and would be ‘constitutionally 
minded’ (USCS/29 March 2015).
113 See ‘Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-based community initiatives’ 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm - accessed September 1 
2013
Governments on religion and foreign policy114, it has become apparent 
that the new Office has three strategic priorities for its religious 
engagement: development and stabilisation, countering violent 
extremism and the promotion of religious freedom.115 As such, the 
new office promotes understanding of, and engagement with, religious 
communities, organisations and dynamics in support of a broad range 
of strategic foreign policy priorities and represents a pragmatic 
response to global circumstances rather than what Casanova calls the 
‘renormativization of the public economic and political 
spheres’ (1994:6). Indeed, Shaun Casey himself placed a commitment 
to the First Amendment at the head of his priorities. When launching 
the office he explained: ‘First of all, we will ensure that our 
engagement efforts will be consistent with the United States 
Constitution and other laws, both in terms of the spirit and letter of the 
law.’116
There has been strong political will in support of greater engagement 
with religious dynamics and communities throughout the two terms of 
the Obama administration. There is a sense, then, in which the 
establishment of the new office is the product of a strong political will 
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114 As I explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis, I have organised and participated in 
two State Department-Foreign and Commonwealth Office roundtables which have 
sought to identify and discuss religion-related policy on both sides of the Atlantic 
and to learn transatlantic best practice.
115 See ‘Notes from the UK- US Roundtable on International Religious 
Engagement’: June 14, 2013, London
116 See ‘Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-based community initiatives’ 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm - accessed September 1 
2013
from the current administration and a natural outworking of a 
conscious attempt to engage religious minorities (USCS/27 March 
2013/a*), identified by Obama in his famous Cairo speech.117 As such, 
it might be considered an attempt to recalibrate foreign policy after 
George W Bush’s ‘war on terror’ was identified as crusade-like118 and 
was criticised as being counter-productive.119 Indeed, there are signs 
that current efforts to engage religious groups overseas are a response 
to previous eras of ‘deprivatisation’ rather than evidence of it. 
5.62 The emergence of international religious freedom
We have already heard that, though controversial, the International 
Religious Freedom Act was passed unanimously in 1998. This Act 
required the creation of three mechanisms for the advancement of 
religious freedom as a core foreign policy objective: the establishment 
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117 On 4 June 2009, in one of his first speeches as President, Barack Obama pledged 
a ‘new beginning’ for the relationship between the West and Islam. He recognised 
that ‘the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalisation led many 
Muslims to view the west as hostile to the traditions of Islam’ but suggested ‘I have 
come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around 
the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon 
the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in 
competition.’ (Full text of the speech can be found at http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2009/jun/04/barack-obama-keynote-speech-egypt - accessed 28 December 
2013). 
118 G.W Bush himself described the War On Terror as a ‘crusade’ on a number of 
occasions, including in reacting to the events of September 11 2001 and again on the 
day of national mourning (16 September 2001) when he explained ‘This crusade, 
this war on terrorism is going to take a while.’ (See Waldman and Pope 2001).
119 In both the UK and the US, the expression ‘GWOT’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ 
was widely used during the Bush and Blair administrations but both of their 
successors - Obama and Brown - changed the language used to describe counter-
terrorism policy due to the perceived alienation it created. In July 2007, as the 
Economist recognised, ‘the language of war (and the conduct of wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan) has alienated much of the world, among them Muslims who believe 
incorrectly that the West has been waging a ‘war on Islam’ for decades, if not 
centuries. Such vocabulary reinforces the propaganda of al-Qaeda, which claims to 
be fighting a global jihad to defend Islam against ‘Crusaders and Jews’ - see http://
www.economist.com/node/9441305 (accessed 28 December 2013).
of an Office for International Religious Freedom (IRF Office) within 
the State Department which would publish an annual report on 
religious freedom and the appointment of an International Religious 
Freedom Ambassador; as well as the establishment of an independent 
commission (USCIRF) which would operate ‘as part think-tank, part 
watchdog to observe religious freedom around the world and to 
observe what the government is doing to promote it’ (USCS/27 March 
2013/a*). The International Religious Freedom Act was ‘a remarkable 
piece of legislation which was passed quickly as a mark of post-cold 
war foreign policy’ (USCS/27 March 2013/a*), creating bureaucratic 
space both within and without the executive branch of Government for 
the consideration of religion in relation to international policy. 
However, the fact that this Act was passed unanimously conceals a 
complex and controversial history. 
In fact, it emerges that although the International Religious Freedom 
Act was passed unanimously in 1998, it was actually the result of 
compromise between conflicting positions on the ‘right’ piece of 
legislation to enact. Hertzke (2006) describes the history of the Act, 
explaining that there was considerable tension between the religious 
lobbies and Republican Party who favoured an alternative Bill (the 
Wolf-Specter bill) which would protect persecuted Christians overseas 
and others, including the President, who argued for the broader 
‘international religious freedom’ legislation which was eventually 
passed on the grounds that the automatic sanctions for perpetrators 
259
implied in the Wolf-Spector Bill could actually increase persecution 
and that this Bill offered a de facto foreign policy preference to 
Christians. 
While the Act sought consciously to avoid this sort of preference, in 
fact this has been the beginning rather than the end of the 
conversation. A number of those I interviewed explained that ‘one of 
the challenges faced by religious freedom advocates is the perception 
that they are primarily interested in the persecution of Christians 
abroad’ (USCS/27 March 2013/a*), and that this extends to the IRF 
Office where ‘there have been concerns in the past about the emphasis 
on the persecution of Christians’ (USG/25 April 2013/a). These 
concerns, it seems, were exacerbated during the term of the second 
IRF Ambassador, John Hanford (2002-2009), appointed by President 
Bush, who ‘promoted a particular perspective which emphasised 
protection of Christian minorities’ (USG/7 May 2013/a). 
As Hertzke describes, then, the emergence of international religious 
freedom first as an American foreign policy and later as a ‘universal’ 
right originated in ‘lobbying for the faithful’ (Hertzke, 1988). Under 
Hanford, a number of evangelical Christians were appointed to the 
State Department office and the leadership of USCIRF was overtly 
connected with the congressional religious lobby which sought to 
tackle the persecution of Christians overseas. Beyond the Government 
machinery, the promotion of religious freedom also seemed to be 
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dominated by religious right ‘culture warriors’, as one civil society 
representative explained, the IRF Office has been marginalised and the 
pursuit of religious freedom ‘has suffered because many people 
outside the government are promoting the religious freedom narrative 
as a way to challenge the ‘evil’ of secularism (USCS/7 May 2013/a*). 
It seems, then, that this early flagship ‘religion-related’ US foreign 
policy was shaped by religionists flexing their muscles in the political 
sphere. Yet, as this policy has developed - and as a result of new 
leadership - the pursuit of international religious freedom has 
undergone a sort of internal ‘secularisation’ such that the traditional 
religious freedom community now criticises state department 
structures as ‘secular’ and ‘considers itself to have lost one of their 
own in Hanford who was driven by faith to promote religious 
freedom’ (USG/7 May 2013/a). We might reasonably suggest, given 
this history, that the emergence of international religious freedom as a 
policy priority in the late 1990s reflects the sort of ‘deprivatisation’ of 
religion described by Casanova given the political mobilization of the 
Christian lobby (as described by Hertzke, 1988). Yet recent 
developments seem to suggest a different trajectory.
5.63 The ‘secularisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of international 
religious freedom
First, I want to suggest that the pursuit of international religious 
freedom has been ‘secularised’ in that it is no longer dominated by the 
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Christian evangelical lobby but by a broader, more ecumenical and 
‘secular’ human rights lobby. As a number of those I interviewed 
explained (USCS/26 March 2013/b*, USG/25 April 2013/b, USCS/27 
March 2013/a*, USG/7 May 2013/a, USG/15 May 2013a), under the 
Obama administration, a more ‘inclusive’ approach to religious 
freedom has been adopted and ‘the official mandate for the state 
department’s IRF office is that the US is a nation that protects and 
defends human rights’ (USG/7 May 2013/a). The emphasis on 
religious freedom as a human - and individual - right reflects a 
‘secularised’ -or more specifically a ‘privatised’ - approach to religion 
than that envisaged during the previous era. Quite different than 
machinery for the protection of God’s Children (Hertzke, 2006) 
envisaged by the traditional religious freedom lobby, a human rights 
approach to religious freedom places all religions and none on a level 
playing field. Not only is this approach to religious freedom the one 
which has been adopted by the UK Government in recent months (see 
Chapter Three), it also reflects the tenor of international human rights 
legislation. 
However, the refocusing of IRF away from the protection of 
Christians towards a more ecumenical - we might say ‘marketisation’ 
approach - has not rescued IRF structures from their marginalised 
position in the State Department. Many of those I interviewed 
reflected concerns that human rights is rarely a strategic priority given 
‘generally, policy power is concentrated in regional directorates and 
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thematic issues are fighting to get in’ (USG/7 May 2013/a). The result 
is that religious freedom ‘is often deprioritised where there are other 
strategic interests’ (USCS/27 March 2013/a*). The same conclusion 
has been reached by a number of significant commentators - including 
the 2013 Government Accountability Office120 report on the 
International Religious Freedom Act which assessed the effectiveness 
of the agencies involved in promoting religious freedom. According to 
the report, while all agencies are undertaking the responsibilities 
required of them by the act, interaction between agencies is not 
optimal. Furthermore, it reports that NGO representatives questioned 
argued for ‘greater inclusion of civil society and other non-state actors 
and further empowerment of U.S. government entities’ (GAO, 
2013:2). However, while many of those I interviewed recognised the 
marginalisation of the IRF office and Ambassador as problematic 
(USG/7 May 2013/a, USG/15 May 2013a, USCS/26 March 2013/b*, 
USCS/24 April 2013/a*), two different explanations were given for 
this marginalisation. First, a number of those I spoke to considered the 
background of the Office - and particularly the domination of religious 
freedom advocacy by the religious right - as the primary cause. 
Concerns about the emphasis on protecting Christians overseas (USG/
25 April 2013/a) were frequently identified. On the other hand, an 
alternative explanation was given with reference to the cultural 
secularism of the state department, described as ‘top down and 
pragmatic with a tendency to view religion as private’ (USCS/26 
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120 The full report can be found at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-196 - 
accessed 2 January 2013
March 2013/b*). As such, it seems there is a debate going on between 
two ‘vastly different understandings of religious freedom and the 
congressional mandate’ (USG/7 May 2013/a) such that ‘there is no 
middle ground in RF.... it tends to be advocated by religious groups 
with parochial interests or by non-religious human rights advocates 
who are considered ‘secular’. 
Yet despite these different interpretations of the First Amendment 
(which are constitutive of the sort of cultural renewal I have already 
described), both groups are broadly supportive of a recent shift in the 
conceptualisation of religious freedom which has raised its profile 
considerably. Often drawing on evidence provided by the Pew 
Research Centre,121 a number of those I interviewed narrated a process 
which might be described as the ‘securitisation’ of religious freedom. 
As one former official explained ‘humanitarian rationales for religious 
freedom are not enough - a better approach is to see it as a national 
security issue which has implications for counter-terrorism, stability 
and the promotion of democracy’ (USCS/26 March 2013/b*). Another 
civil society representative shared this view arguing that ‘some are 
increasingly conscious of the link between restrictions of religion 
overseas and terrorism and violence...the more this connection is 
established, the more politicians will become active in the religious 
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121 In September 2012, the Pew Research Center published its report ‘The Rising 
Tide of Restrictions on Religion’ . Not only did this report highlight that the number 
of countries with significant restrictions was on the increased, it also demonstrated 
the link between restrictions on religion and social instability. See http://
www.pewforum.org/2012/09/20/rising-tide-of-restrictions-on-religion-findings/ - 
accessed 19 June 2015.
freedom caucus122’ (USCS/24 April 2013/a*).  Not only, it seems has 
religious freedom undergone an internal process of secularisation, but 
it is increasingly being instrumentalised as a means to an end rather 
than as an end in itself. While some shared concerns about this 
approach (USG/25 April 2013/a, USG/25 April 2013/b), others were 
pragmatic, with one official suggesting ‘in practice, it is also apparent 
that governments that abuse citizens are inherently unstable, can 
become hotbeds of extremism and therefore become strategic 
challenges’ (USG/7 May 2013/a). Another made the direct connection 
between this ‘securitized’ understanding of religious freedom and the 
development of new arrangements in the State Department for 
religious engagement, suggesting that ‘the National Security Council 
now recognises religion as significant in human rights, humanitarian 
assistance and conflict’ (USG/15 May 2013a). 
This reconceptualisation of religion as a means to an end rather than 
an end in itself has enabled both religionists and secularists to unite 
around a shared commitment to religious freedom as a ‘model’ for 
good governance, as one official explained ‘the only US policy 
position on religion is that everyone has the right to believe, worship 
and assemble as they wish’ (USG/15 May 2013a). Religious freedom, 
as a basis for religion-related US foreign policy, it seems guarantees 
the continuation of a unique paradox of American public life: 
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122 A ‘caucus’ is a term used in American politics to describe a collection of 
supporters of a particular political movement.
increasing engagement with religious actors is achieved through 
secularisation.
What we have seen in this examination of religion-related foreign 
policy in the United States is that a process of secularisation - vis the 
First Amendment - goes hand in hand with increased policy attention 
being paid to religion. Not only does this demonstrate that, as in the 
UK context, religion-related foreign policy draws heavily on domestic 
constitutional arrangements, it also directly contradicts the rational 
choice argument that ‘freedom’, ‘choice’ and ‘religion’ are always in a 
relationship of direct proportionality. In the case of the State 
Department, religious freedom and engagement with a plurality of 
religious forms is characterised not by a culture of increasing 
religiosity but instead by a process of secularisation. 
The policy-religion nexus in the US, then, is considerably different 
than that in the UK. Though both draw extensively on their domestic 
church-state settlements in shaping religion-related public policy, the 
outcomes of these influences are dramatically different in ways which 
undermine the presentation of a single ‘western’ identity as is common 
in international relations scholarship. Yet so too have important ‘post-
secular’ narratives from the sociology of religion been challenged by 
this evidence. The moniker ‘religious America, secular 
Europe’ (Berger et al, 2008) has been challenged both on the grounds 
of the structural religiosity of the UK policy context as well as the 
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structural secularism of the US context. More specifically, in light of 
the American evidence, I have suggested that rational choice theories 
of religious vitality are not applicable in this context.  Firstly, evidence 
of an American ‘civil religion’ makes rational choice less a descriptive 
theory or alternative to secularisation and more a normative model 
which is active in the context of secularisation. Secondly, the fact that 
engagement with an increased plurality of religious forms by the State 
Department is characterised by a process of secularisation challenges 
both rational choice theories which posit a stable state of religious 
demand and Casanova’s deprivatisation thesis which describes the re-
emergence of public religion.  In fact, as the appropriation of civil 
religion and secularisation theories would attest, it is impossible to 
identify a single theoretical paradigm through which to understand the 
way American policy makers ‘manage God’ given we must describe 
American policy as at once both highly culturally religious and yet 
highly structurally secular. 
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Chapter 6: Theory and Practice
6.1 Introduction
This thesis has sought to make one small contribution to overcome 
what is a dearth of analysis on religion and foreign policy in the UK. 
In his article ‘What to read on religion and foreign policy’ Chris 
Seiple (2009) names eight texts introducing the subject of religion and 
foreign policy yet none of the volumes identified was written by a 
British scholar or practitioner.123 In this thesis, however, I have sought 
to provide both a practical and theoretical account of the relationship 
between religion and UK foreign policy, using the better developed 
(both in scholarly and policy terms) American context to draw 
comparisons.
In Chapter One, I described the historical absence of reflection on the 
religion-international policy relationship in the UK, first drawing on 
my own experience as a government official and secondly, with 
reference to the relatively well developed conversation going on in the 
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123 While, Thomas’s (2005) text was written from a position at the University of 
Bath, he is nevertheless of American origin and writes of the global and international 
picture rather than the specifics of British foreign policy. So too does Haynes (2007) 
focus on the European rather than British picture in his ‘Introduction to International 
Relations and  Religion’
United States on the subject. In Chapter Two, I provided an overview 
of the scholarly context within which this thesis sits. I described the 
emergence of ‘post-secular’ narratives in two distinct fields - the 
political sciences and the sociology of religion – each of which seeks 
to explain the relationship between religion and society in the 
contemporary era. The combination of the two dominant post-secular 
narratives, I suggested, left us with a picture of Western homogeneity 
in the confrontation with religious change; a picture which I suggested 
the material presented in this thesis would challenge.  Developing this, 
in Chapter Three I explored the usefulness of the label ‘secular’ - 
drawn both from both the social and political sciences and from policy 
makers themselves - to describe the British policy context. I 
concluded that the relationship between religion and state in the UK 
context is more complex than a narrative of ‘secularisation’ can 
account for. Despite this, however, in Chapter Four, I drew attention to 
the limitations of narratives of globalisation and the post-secular, 
drawn from the political sciences, to describe religion-related UK 
foreign policy and argued that it is necessary to recognise the domestic 
sources of foreign policy and to understand the way both structural 
and cultural patterns shape the agency of the nation-state (see Hill, 
2003). Further to this, in Chapter Five I turned to the American 
context, to consider how far the label ‘religious America, secular 
Europe’ could be applied to the foreign policy context and suggested, 
contrary to the assumption that America is ‘more religious’ than 
Europe, that a trajectory of increased engagement with religion in the 
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State Department could be characterised as ‘secularising’ in that it 
remains firmly rooted in the First Amendment separation of Church 
and State. 
In what follows, I bring together the evidence gathered both from my 
UK and US interviews and the analyses in each of the preceding 
chapters to reflect more broadly upon the ways in which religion-
related foreign policy challenges some common assumptions evident 
within the political sciences and the sociology of religion. Specifically, 
I focus on three main areas. First, I consider the way the Treaty of 
Westphalia - the settlement of the Wars of Religion in the seventeenth 
century -  has been treated in International Relations scholarship. 
Second, I return to the literature analysed in Chapter Two. Here, I 
draw on my original research evidence to demonstrate the limitations 
of either purely cultural or purely structural models as able to 
independently explain what is going on in either the UK or the US 
context. Drawing on Archer’s (1988, 2012) model of ‘morphogenesis’, 
I offer a new way to understand the relationship of religion to foreign 
policy which is a more nuanced and comprehensive account than 
narratives of the ‘post-secular’, ‘religious resurgence’ or 
‘secularisation theory’ are able to offer, given it at once describes 
Western heterogeneity and at the same time provides analytical space 
for religious continuity. Third, I turn from the theoretical to the 
practical to describe the ways in which I have sought to make my 
work not only policy-relevant but impactful. Here, I suggest that this 
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thesis, and the outcomes of two workshops I have organised in respect 
of its core concerns, demonstrate that, even where there is apparent 
change, when foreign policy makers start to engage with religion, 
there is a fundamental continuity in the ways they ‘manage God’. 
6.2 Rethinking the legacy of Westphalia
Between 1644 and 1648, the Westphalian towns of Munster and 
Osnabruck hosted negotiations towards a European settlement of the 
so-called ‘Wars of Religion’. Often known by the shorthand the 
‘Treaty of Westphalia’, these agreements established a new world 
order based on the concept of the sovereign nation-state whose 
domestic governance would be protected from the influence of 
external actors. In this section, I consider the legacy of the Treaty of 
Westphalia on the relationship between religion and foreign policy. 
First, I describe the way the Treaty of Westphalia has been treated in 
international relations scholarship, demonstrating that it has been cited 
as initiating an era of secular international relations that needs to be 
abandoned in a new era of religious resurgence. Second, I suggest the 
so-called ‘Westphalian synthesis’ is given as evidence of the likeness 
of Western states, all of whom apparently accord to the same principle 
of ‘secular’ politics in a system of sovereign nation states now under 
threat in a context of globalisation. In light of both these factors, 
international relations scholars seem to describe the current era as a 
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kind of abandonment of the Treaty and its premises, though I shall 
now utilise conclusions drawn from my research to challenge this 
received wisdom about the Treaty of Westphalia in three ways. First, I 
emphasise that the Treaty subjected religion to national authority, 
something which continues to be in evidence today in the religion-
related foreign policy of the US and the UK. Second, as demonstrated 
in Chapters Three, Four and Five, there are constitutive differences 
between Western nations when it comes to religion-related policy, 
which undermine the presentation of the West as a homogenous entity. 
Third, I argue that, far from disappearing, nation states seem to be 
newly relevant in the current era of religious resurgence where 
religion-related foreign policy operates on an ‘inside-out’ rather than 
‘outside-in’ pattern. All of this suggests, then, that far from being 
abandoned, the legacy of the Treaty of Westphalia is very much in 
evidence in contemporary politics and international relations.
The so-called ‘Treaty of Westphalia’ has taken on considerable 
significance in debates about the relationship between religion and 
international relations - and indeed in debates about the relationship 
between religion and state. Indeed, May et al (2014: 332-3) speak of 
the ‘fetishisation’ of Westphalia and describe a common narrative 
associated with it: 
[T]he peace treaty ended decades of religious wars which had 
erupted in Europe over doctrinal differences between 
Protestants, Catholics and Calvinists in the wake of the 
Reformation. The Peace of Westphalia recognised the 
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imperative to divorce the powers of the state from the duty to 
uphold any particular faith. In this narrative, Westphalia is 
viewed as the instigation of the gradual process of functional 
differentiation between state and religion which evolved and 
deepened in the following centuries.
What this description of the ‘common narrative’ suggests is that 
international relations scholarship has come to recognise the Treaty of 
Westphalia as resulting in the secularisation of international affairs. As 
Bellin (2008:318) suggests, it is as though ‘The historical experience 
of Westphalia indelibly associated the removal of religion with the 
establishment of international order...’. Calhoun et al (2011:15) echo 
this account suggesting that ‘the conclusion of these wars with the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia is often cited as the beginning of a secular 
state system in Europe and thus of modern international relations, 
understood as a matter of secular relations among sovereign states’. 
But it is not only a secular vision of international relations which 
seems to have been the legacy of Westphalia. As Wilson (2012:48) 
describes it, ‘religion gradually became a private, individual matter 
and the apparently secular institution of the modern state took the 
place of religion in the social order.’ Conventional wisdom, it seems, 
emphasises the secularising effects of the ‘Westphalian 
synthesis’ (Philpott, 2002) both on international and domestic politics 
often at the expense of three other ‘strands’, i.e. the proscription of 
intervention (states no longer interfere with religion-politics 
relationship in other states); restrictions on religious authorities 
exercising temporal functions nationally and any internationally; and 
the promotion of pluralism (states should less vigorously promote the 
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welfare of particular religions). Bellin (2008: 318) not only suggests 
that the Treaty of Westphalia created a secular world order, but also 
that it ‘planted an enduring suspicion of injecting religion into 
international affairs’. 
It follows, then, that in an era of apparent global religious resurgence, 
this ‘Westphalian synthesis’ is being challenged. Hurd (2009:3), 
epitomising the common narrative, describes the contemporary 
context as one in which we are witnessing ‘the emergence of a series 
of post-Westphalian, post-secular conceptions of religio-political 
authority’. As such, May et al (2014:339) argue that ‘there is a need to 
reassess the long-assumed conception that religion is absent from or 
irrelevant to IR’. Indeed, I shared this perspective in my MA thesis: 
first, I explained that ‘in absenting religion from public life, the Treaty 
of Westphalia not only resulted in the creation of the category 
‘religion’ as a privately and voluntarily held set of beliefs, but also in 
the creation of ‘international relations’ as we know it, based on a 
vision of the world as a network of autonomous and secular nation-
states.’ (Lindsay, 2011: 20). I then went on to describe the range of 
constructivist approaches by which religion was being ‘brought into’ 
international relations in ways that ‘challenged’ the ‘otherness’ of 
religion and the ‘secular polity’ characterised by the Treaty of 
Westphalia. In approaching my PhD research, then, I drew on this 
inheritance, expecting to see in the foreign policy of two such ‘secular 
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polities’ evidence of the abandonment of the premises of Westphalia. 
Yet what I found was something quite different. 
I described in Chapter Three that the UK is demonstrably far from 
being a secular polity. In fact, I argued, its constitutional 
‘religiousness’ has had a notable influence over domestic policy. I 
described the way successive UK governments have engaged with 
religion in ways which have ‘relocated’ rather than ‘marginalised‘ it. 
Next, I demonstrated that, from the expansion of faith schools to so-
called ‘community cohesion’ and counter-terrorism initiatives, religion 
has been on the public policy agenda since the Millennium. Noting 
that UK public policy is not structurally secular, I went on to consider 
the accusation that it is culturally secular, taking an ethnographic 
approach to understanding the ways civil servants approach religion as 
a policy issue. Here I suggested, contrary to the observation that the 
act of policy formation is a ‘secular activity’ (Chapman, 2008:3), civil 
servants act out of a combination of pragmatism and utilitarianism, 
coupled with a commitment to impartiality which culminates in a 
condition of ‘religion blindness’ which manifests itself in a cultural 
resistance to engagement with religious actors and dynamics. 
In Chapter Four, I went on to explain that British foreign policy draws 
on the constitutional church-state settlement, both in the specific case 
of international religious freedom and in underpinning a broader range 
of foreign policy initiatives. While the pursuit of international 
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religious freedom has emerged as policy priority only relatively 
recently, the way in which it is pursued has longer antecedents. 
Notably, the ‘religious freedom toolkit’ uses our own church-state 
settlement as a model of ‘religious freedom’. Furthermore, I was able 
to demonstrate that a range of recent foreign policy engagements with 
religion - including the appointment of a Minister for Faith and 
Communities, the appointment of a Religious Adviser to the Ministry 
of Defence and the publication of ‘Faith Partnership Principles’ by the 
Department for International Development - all follow precedents in 
the domestic policy arena. The implication of this, I suggested, is that 
contrary to accounts of the ‘post-secular’ which emphasise religious 
change, it is important to identify the continuity of our constitutional 
settlement as a determining factor in religion-related policy 
engagements. Furthermore, in Chapter Five, I demonstrated the ways 
in which the American constitutional separation of church and state 
influences its foreign policy in ways that are both secularising and 
‘religionising’. While recent engagements with religion - including but 
not limited to the pursuit of religious freedom - are evidence of 
structural secularisation, the very principle of religious liberty takes on 
civil religious significance in national public policy debates, 
suggesting that it is at once a uniquely secular and religious polity.  
All of this evidence reminds us that the Treaty of Westphalia had an 
important effect, in that it nationalised religion, something which has 
largely been ignored in international relations scholarship. It is the 
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case, as Calhoun et al (2011:15) suggest, that the common narrative of 
Westphalia initiating secular relations among sovereign states is 
‘profoundly misleading’. Instead, they argue, Westphalia established 
in Europe the principle of ‘cuius regio, eius religio’, given that 
European states after Westphalia were largely confessional with 
established churches. So too does Onnekink (2013:2) challenge the 
dominant assumption of a ‘model of an entirely secular post-
Westphalian system’. Like Onnekink, May et al (2014:334) suggest 
that the ‘invented template’ does not adequately capture the ‘historical 
complexities of the seventeenth century’. It may be, then, that rather 
than enacting a process of secularisation, the Treaty of Westphalia 
would be better described as ‘nationalising’ religion, as Thomas 
(2005: 25) suggests. Indeed, Eisenstadt (2000) has suggested that the 
contemporary religion-society picture - characterised as ‘multiple 
modernities’ - is the result of variations in the formulation of the 
nation state model. Given the evidence drawn from my original 
interviews demonstrates that religion-related foreign policy is 
influenced by national constitutional frameworks, it seems to be the 
case that - far from being abandoned in the contemporary context - the 
Westphalian synthesis has renewed relevance. 
Yet this is not the only way in which the legacy of Westphalia has 
been misrepresented in political science literature.  As May et al 
(2014:338) suggest, ‘Many Western theorists of nation-states 
presuppose secularism (as a normative concept) for the nation-state 
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framework, which is based on Western experience, but may not in 
reality be a necessary component to the nation-state model.’ This 
quotation has two implications: as part of the ‘common narrative’ 
about the Treaty of Westphalia, it implies that the Westphalian 
synthesis is contingent upon the Western experience, something which 
is under increasing challenge in contemporary international relations. 
However, there is a secondary implication, which I would suggest is 
equally important: this quotation implies that there is a singular 
‘Western experience’ and that this experience is one of the 
‘secularism’ of the nation-state framework. Again, my own original 
research challenges this perception. 
What Chapters Four and Five have demonstrated is the distinctive 
difference between the religion-related foreign policy of the UK and 
the US influenced by their distinctive religio-political settlements. 
While, in Chapter Five, I acknowledged that both the US context and 
the UK context are evidence against ‘post-secular’ narratives, there are 
important constitutive differences between the two contexts. In 
Chapter Three, I described a vast array of religion-related 
engagements that characterised the UK policy community, 
demonstrating that there is no structural barrier to ‘doing God’. In 
Chapter Four, I extended this to the foreign policy context. By 
contrast, in Chapter Five, I suggested that, despite perceptions from 
UK policy makers that there was ‘too much religion’ in US politics, 
increasing religious engagement in the State Department has been 
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characterised by increasing secularisation. Here, I went on to 
demonstrate, both domestic and international policy is rooted in the 
First Amendment, something which takes on ‘civil religious value’ in 
American cultural life.
The picture, then, is both more complex than a single ‘Western 
experience’ that is associated with narratives about the Treaty of 
Westphalia but so too is it more complex than the picture of ‘religious 
America, secular Europe’ that has been provided by sociologists of 
religion, notably Berger et al (2008).124 It is necessary, as Davie has 
noted, to recognise that ‘even in the modern West, there is surely, not 
only considerable diversity in the religious situations on offer, but 
seriously conflicting trajectories in terms of their likely 
development’ (2002:16)125. Once more, the assumptions I made in 
writing my MA thesis come into question. There, I wrote of the 
commonality among the ‘Western security community’ and described 
the normativity of the Western concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘secularism’, 
something which needed to be abandoned in light of global events 
(Lindsay, 2011: 64, 21). Yet in this thesis, I demonstrate quite the 
opposite: that there are important constitutive differences between 
these two Western nations when it comes to religion-related foreign 
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124 It is important to recognise that there are constitutive differences between the UK 
and other European countries when it comes to constitutional arrangements which 
are likely to be borne out in their foreign policy. In light of my research, detailed 
exploration of different European settlements would merit further study.
125 It is worth noting that Davie (2002:3) puts considerable emphasis on 
constitutional arrangements as being significant in differentiating between European 
and American societies just as I have found these arrangements as being significant 
in differentiating between UK and American polities.  
policy. What these differences suggest is that religious studies 
scholarship, which has long evidenced the distinction between the 
religious complexions of the US and Europe, needs to be brought into 
conversation with political science in order effectively to explain the 
contemporary context. Not only this, it suggests that there is scope for 
further research into other Western nations to determine the influence 
of their constitutional settlements over their foreign policy. One 
notable example would be to determine how far the new Canadian 
Office for Religious Freedom126 is a product of its domestic context. 
Finally, as Gross (1948:29) explains, the Treaty of Westphalia ‘marked 
Man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society 
and his option for a new system characterised by the co-existence of a 
multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one 
another, and free from any external earthly authority.’ In Chapter Four, 
I explored the relationship between globalisation and international 
relations, demonstrating that political science literature 
overwhelmingly recognises globalisation as a challenge to the nation-
state at economic, democratic and territorial levels. This era is one in 
which the very crux of the Westphalian synthesis - a system of 
sovereign nation states - is brought into question. Hence it is possible 
for Hurd (2009:3) to describe the contemporary era as ‘post-
280
126 In his 2011 election campaign, Stephen Harper made a commitment to 
establishing an Office for Religious Freedom and the Office was officially opened in 
February 2013 with a mandate to protect religious minorities; oppose religious 
hatred and intolerance; and promote Canadian values of tolerance and pluralism 
overseas. See http://www.international.gc.ca/religious_freedom-liberte_de_religion/
index.aspx?lang=eng - accessed 19 May 2015.
Westphalian’, while Cerny (2010:25) explains that though 
international relations has hitherto been dominated by the Westphalian 
(realist) paradigm which posits that the world is organised into nation 
states, forces which transcend the nation state are increasingly 
challenging this paradigm. 
As I explained in Chapter Four, the assumed decline of the nation state 
has taken place in parallel to the emergence of the ‘non-state actor’ 
and it is in this role that religion has commonly been ‘brought into’ 
international relations. As Thomas (2005:98) explains ‘It is by 
recognising religious groups or organisations as one of the types of 
non-state actors that religion has frequently been brought back into the 
theory of international relations’. However, I went on to argue that, in 
the UK context, the State itself constitutes a ‘religious actor’ and there 
are important domestic sources of foreign policy both of which 
underline rather than marginalise the nation state as a source of 
political agency. In Chapter Five, though the USA is characterised by 
structural secularisation rather than structural religiosity, I went on to 
describe the ways in which religion-related foreign policy draws on 
the domestic constitutional context and provides further evidence of 
the domestic sources of foreign policy. What this suggests is that 
religion-related foreign policy operates on an ‘inside-out’ rather than 
an ‘outside-in’ trajectory. Drawing on Robertson’s (1989) analysis of 
globalisation, in which he argues that the prevalence of national 
societies is a distinctive feature of globalisation, I demonstrated the 
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determinative influence of the British church-state settlement and 
domestic cultural dynamics over religion-related foreign policy. Once 
more, in re-stating the importance of rather than undermining the 
nation state, my research is evidence that the legacy of the Treaty of 
Westphalia is still highly relevant for understanding contemporary 
politics. 
In summary, the Treaty of Westphalia has been treated as an 
anachronism by many contemporary international relations scholars, 
something whose legacy is of little relevance in a world that has been 
described as ‘furiously religious’ (Berger, 1999:2). For them, 
Westphalia marked the birth of a Western global model of secular 
nation states, a model which has been exposed as wanting by 
contemporary events, both because it absents religion from 
international affairs and fails to respond to the changes wrought by 
globalisation. Yet my research points in the opposite direction, 
suggesting that the Treaty of Westphalia, far from being abandoned, is 
of continued relevance in contemporary politics. Not only, I argue, 
should Westphalia be recognised as a ‘nationalising’ rather than 
‘secularising’ moment, the myth of Western homogeneity needs to be 
challenged as does the apparent demise of the nation state. 
282
6.3 Structure, culture and agency
In critiquing the ‘common narrative’ about the Treaty of Westphalia 
and challenging the presentation of the Westphalian synthesis as 
secularising - as creating a largely homogeneous series of Western 
nations and as being undermined by the forces of globalisation - 
throughout this thesis I have engaged with three different political 
science narratives by bringing them into conversation with ideas about 
religion-state relationships drawn from the sociology of religion. This 
brings the thesis back to the literature discussed in Chapter Two in 
which I demonstrated that ‘post-secular’ discourse traverses two 
different scholarly conversations - one drawing from the political 
sciences and the other from the sociology of religion. These two 
conversations, I explained, have evolved to emphasise different 
factors in explaining the religion-society relationship. While the 
political sciences point to cultural factors as most significant in 
accounting for religion-state relations in the current era; the sociology 
of religion emphasise the structural location of religion as most 
significant.
In this section, I reflect on how the conclusions that can be drawn 
from my research demonstrate the limitations of each of these models 
to explain independently what is going on in either the UK or the US 
context. In the UK, as we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, there 
is structural religiosity combined with cultural ‘religion blindness’. By 
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contrast in the US, we have seen that structural secularisation is 
mirrored by cultural religiosity. It is only by bringing the two 
literatures into conversation, I contend, that we can adequately start to 
explain the religion-foreign policy relationship in these two contexts. 
Drawing on the work of Archer (1988, 2012) to demonstrate that 
culture and structure are analytically separable yet mutually 
constitutive, I introduce ‘morphogenesis’ as a new way for political 
scientists and sociologists of religion to understand the relationship of 
religion to foreign policy. This model is more complicated than 
accounts of the ‘post-secular’, ‘religious resurgence’ or ‘secularisation 
theory’, given it at once describes Western heterogeneity and at the 
same time provides analytical space for religious continuity. 
In Chapter Two, I explained that despite Beckford’s (2000) 
observation that the end of the twentieth century saw the sociology of 
religion ‘playing together’ with the mainstream social and political 
sciences - given both now find religion at the core of their accounts - 
there are significant differences between the sociology of religion’s 
account of the ‘post-secular’ and that emanating from the social and 
political sciences. The latter, I suggested, has sought to ‘bring religion 
in’ to their frameworks through a ‘turn to culture’, manifest in an 
embrace of constructivism as an alternative to the positivism of realist 
political scientific models. As a result, I suggested, religious agency is 
increasingly understood as something symbolic and non-rational 
which orientates political actors in the world. Considering the way 
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religion has been introduced into the fields of development studies, 
international relations theory, security studies and terrorism studies, I 
suggested that there are a number of common elements. First, scholars 
in all of these fields lament the absence of religion from their 
intellectual frameworks, so too do these disciplines seem to have 
inherited elements of classical secularisation theory in that they 
recognise a connection between modernisation, structural 
differentiation, and religious decline.This in turn, I argued, has 
influenced the way religious actors are presented in social scientific 
literature as ‘non-state actors’ who either contribute toward or 
undermine specific policy objectives. Seeking to overcome this 
dichotomy between religion and the state, which is manifest in the 
intellectual frameworks of the social and political sciences, requires 
something more radical than the ‘non-state actor’ model. 
As part of a broader critique of modernity as a culturally contingent 
ideology, Alexander (2003:193) and others have sought to overcome 
the limits of positivism by introducing a ‘post-positivist’ or 
‘interpretative’ approach. The introduction of ‘meaning-related 
content’ (Lapid, 1989: 236) to the social and political sciences has led 
to a better understanding of religious agency which is now able to be 
interpreted in light of the histories, narratives and symbols of different 
cultural contexts. Not only has this moved conversation about 
religious agency forward, it has opened up the category of the 
‘secular’ to political analysis (see e.g. Hurd, 2011). However, just as I 
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pointed in my introduction that the ‘turn to culture’ has, as yet, not 
taken account of the potential differences there might be between 
culture and structure, so the material presented in my thesis has borne 
out these limitations. In Chapters Three, Four and Five, I 
demonstrated that, while it has a role in shaping the religion-state 
relationship on both sides of the Atlantic, cultural factors are only part 
of the equation, making it necessary to acknowledge and to 
understand the interplay of structure and culture in seeking to describe 
the relationship between religion and state and, indeed, to understand 
the way the state might represent a form of religious agency. 
This critique is reminiscent of a debate on-going in mainstream social 
theory about the relationship between culture, structure and agency. In 
her model of ‘cultural morphogenesis’, Archer (1988) points out that 
there are similarities in the way we can understand culture and 
structure. Both, she suggests, can be understood using the 
‘morphogenetic cycle’. According to this sequence, it is possible to 
analytically (if not empirically) distinguish between structure/culture 
and agency to demonstrate that agents are at once subject to structure/
culture and at the same time contribute to shaping that structure/
culture. Furthermore, in her analysis of the culture-agency riddle, 
Archer acknowledges the importance of separating ‘parts’ and 
‘people’ in order to understand sociological change. This position of 
‘analytical dualism’ is an alternative to different forms of ‘conflation’ 
which she argues social theory has tended toward (Archer, 1988: 277). 
286
Failure to recognise emergent relationships between culture and 
agency has, she suggests, resulted in autonomy being denied to one 
side or the other hence ‘downward conflation’ grants causality only to 
culture and not to agents whereas ‘upward conflation’ grants causality 
only to agents and not to culture. I want to suggest that the problem of 
downward conflation is apparent in the ‘turn to culture’ taken by the 
mainstream social and political sciences. In seeking to overcome the 
limitations of their previous intellectual frameworks which, broadly 
speaking, were based on realist127 models, scholars in the political 
sciences have undertaken a ‘cultural turn’ widely analogous to that 
which has taken place in the wider social sciences under the auspices 
of ‘critical theory’. Briefly, while critical theory introduced ‘historical 
and cultural contexts’ (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002: 52) to mainstream 
sociological study, so the cultural turn has prompted non-rational 
methodology, ‘thick’ description and interpretation to the political 
sciences as the best ways in which to understand religious agency. 
The result, as we have seen in Chapter Two, has been the emergence 
of the idea of the ‘post-secular’ supported by the opening up of the 
category of ‘secularism’ to cultural analysis such that it appears to be a 
‘series of political settlements that define, regulate, and manage 
religion in modern politics, including international politics’ (Hurd, 
2011:60). While we have already seen that the portrayal of a single 
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127 Realism is one tradition in international relations theory particularly associated 
with the work of Thomas Hobbes. According to realist theory, the international 
system is characterised as being anarchic and states pursue rational self-interest in 
navigating this system. For an introduction see Donnelly (2008:150).
‘Western’ identity is problematic in light of the evidence found in this 
thesis, there is another element of this cultural reading of secularism 
that is questionable. Theories of ‘cultural secularism’ are guilty of the 
sort of ‘downward conflation’ Archer identifies in that they imply 
agency is shaped and indeed determined by these cultural patterns. Yet 
my analysis of the UK and US context belies this. In the UK, though it 
has been labelled a ‘secular’ culture, I found that negotiation between 
personal agency and cultural patterns (what Archer would call ‘socio-
cultural interaction’) shaped policy makers’ engagement with religion. 
In the US - where there is strong religio-cultural patterning at the 
macro (or cultural system) level formed around the First Amendment - 
this is reversed in the policy context (the socio-cultural level) where a 
process of religious engagement has been characterised by increasing 
secularisation. To properly explain the sort of cultural dynamics by 
which foreign policy cultures are characterised, then, requires more 
than the political sciences - and specifically constructivist readings of 
the ‘post-secular’ - are able to offer.
The post-positivist or ‘cultural’ turn in the political sciences has 
therefore moved conversation about religious agency forward. 
However, it has not always moved it forward in a helpful directions. 
The ‘cultural turn‘ has sought to reverse positivist accounts, which 
contain circumscribed definitions of culture, but has replaced them 
with all-encompassing definitions of culture guilty of engulfing the 
cultural system, denying individuals agency and, in turn, failing to 
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account properly for cultural change. But what of the other ‘post-
secular’ body of literature I dealt with in Chapter Two? Here, I 
suggest, we have the opposite set of problems. As I explained, 
sociologists of religion, like their counterparts in the political sciences, 
have sought to explain the contemporary era by challenging the legacy 
of secularisation theory on their discipline. The first set of challenges, 
I explained, are empirical in that they challenge the premise of 
secularisation theory based on the numerical decline of religious 
behaviour. However, empirical challenges to secularisation theory 
might be guilty of ‘upwards conflation’ in that they draw from patterns 
of religious behaviour (the socio-cultural level) to determine positions 
regarding the place of religion in a particular society (or cultural 
system). But this is not the only problem facing sociologists of 
religion. In his 1988 article, Roland Robertson described the 
‘reawakening’ of contemporary sociology and social theory to culture 
given ‘mature modernity was unfavourable to concern with culture, 
whereas postmodernity - more explicitly post-modernism - encourages 
it’ (1988: 4). However, he argues, the relationship of culture to 
structure is a perennially ‘thorny’ issue (1988:5), something which has 
been dealt with by sociologists from the French tradition but has 
largely been ignored in American sociological analysis (1988: 8). 
Hence, in Chapter Two, I described the way rational choice theories of 
religion have elevated the core subject matter of the sociology of 
religion from the micro to the macro level, but have done so at the 
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expense of understanding the relationship of structure to culture. 
Supply side theories of religious change, associated particularly with 
Rodney Stark and the American school (see e.g. Warner, 1993; Stark, 
1999), have challenged secularisation theory with a deductive 
paradigm which seeks to explain the co-existence of high secularity 
and high religiosity in the US context. Counter to the assumptions of 
secularisation theory, they argue that the American tradition of 
religious liberty has created a competitive market in which religion 
thrives. These models deny religion cultural potency, emphasising as 
they do the human tendency to utility maximisation. Hence we have 
the opposite situation in the sociology of religion to that in the 
mainstream social and political sciences. Where political science is 
increasingly interested in the non-rational elements of human agency 
culminating in an over-bearing ‘culture’ which is guilty of engulfing 
agency, sociologists of religion turn to rational principles as the basis 
of religious choice and appear ‘culture-resistant’ (Robertson, 1988:9). 
Yet, in Chapter Five, I described the way rational choice theories of 
religion themselves might represent a form of cultural patterning, or 
‘sacred economism’, which is characteristic of the American polity 
and might be utilised as part of a neo-secularisation paradigm based 
around the First Amendment.
What remains, then, is to recognise the utility of work by Dobbelaere 
(1981) and Casanova (1994) in challenging the sort of conflation 
between levels and in separating three different premises of 
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secularisation theory. Not only do their neo-secularisation models 
point to important cleavages between Western nations in their 
experience of secularisation, they have brought greater analytical 
clarity to the field by distinguishing between institutional 
differentiation, religious involvement or decline and religious change 
or adaptation (Dobbelaere, 1981:12). Importantly, for Casanova 
(1994), the differentiation thesis represents the analytical core of 
secularisation but it can exist in inverse proportion to meso-level 
secularisation. That is to say, ‘public religion’ (or what we might call 
religious resurgence) is possible even in the context of macro-level 
secularisation. Yet, Casanova’s argument has been challenged in this 
thesis. In the UK context, there has been no macro-level 
differentiation between Church and State as born out in the evidence 
of religious engagement outlined in Chapters Three and Four. Whereas 
in the American context, I have characterised religious engagement by 
foreign policy officials as increasingly secular. Nevertheless his 
analysis remains critically important for accounts of church and state 
because it demonstrates that different dynamics are possible between 
sociological levels (micro, meso, macro). So too, I want to suggest, 
are different dynamics possible between structure and culture. 
The two post-secular narratives, I have suggested, offer us a limited 
understanding of the relationship between structures and cultures. 
While those constructivist accounts drawn from the political sciences 
seem to downwardly conflate making culture determinative of 
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structure; empirical challenges to secularisation theory in the 
sociology of religion are guilty of ‘upwards conflation’ in that they 
draw from patterns of religious behaviour (the socio-cultural level) to 
determine positions regarding the place of religion in a particular 
society. Theoretical challenges to secularisation theory go one step 
further in denying culture any autonomy whatsoever. None of these 
accounts, I have suggested, adequately explains the evidence I have 
found in the course of my research where - on both sides of the 
Atlantic - there have emerged distinct cultural and structural 
phenomena which are related without either seeming to determine the 
other. 
Archer (1988:284) proposes that the same explanatory model of 
analytical dualism works for both structure and culture and suggests 
that it can help us understand relationships between the two. Given 
structure and culture are analytically - rather than empirically - 
separable, such that ‘actors themselves do have positions for both 
domains simultaneously’, it is necessary to theorize about the 
intersection of structural and cultural fields. As she suggests, applying 
the morphogenetic perspective to both structure and culture has the 
effect of ‘discouraging both the inflated importance assigned to 
culture, presented as society’s bandmaster, or its relegation to a 
reflective role as society’s looking glass’ (Archer, 1988:274). Archer’s 
point, then, is to assert that ‘structural and cultural dynamics are 
indeed interrelated in determinative ways, without one of them 
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ultimately determining the other’ (1988:282). Using the phases of the 
morphogenetic cycle, Archer examines the interplay between the 
sequences at structural and cultural levels. 
There are, she suggests, four alternative patterns: shared morphostasis 
where both structure and culture are stable: ‘where there is a 
conjuction between structural and cultural morphostasis, the 
consequences of each domain for the other are symmetrical and 
conducive to maintenance in both fields’ (1988: 292);  a combination 
of cultural morphostasis, structural morphogenesis in which the 
population is subject to ideational control but structural 
morphogenesis takes place in the form of the substantional 
differentiation of material interest groups. Here, ‘culture provides no 
spur to the group differentiation which is the generic motor of 
structural change but acts as a drag upon it’ (p.293). The third pattern 
is the opposite of this, described as a combination of cultural 
morphogenesis and structural morphostasis - where there is structural 
status quo but diversification in culture characterised as pluralism. 
This impacts on the structural system by generating movement among 
material interest groups who seek new advantages and opportunities, 
hence it stimulates social regrouping: ‘what cultural morphogenesis 
does is to change people...from unthinking traditionalists into 
evaluators of alternatives....although this occurs in the cultural 
domain, its effects do not stop there because cultural actors are also 
structural agents’ (1988: 298) The fourth pattern, which Archer (2012) 
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describes as characteristic of the current era, is mutual morphogenesis 
where there is a combination of competing interest and idea groups at 
the same time resulting in complex mutual interaction at the socio-
cultural level. 
I want to suggest that patterns two and three describe the differences I 
have found between the US and UK foreign policy contexts. In the 
US, while there remains a strong degree of cultural homogeneity, 
anchored around the First Amendment, there has been underway a 
considerable amount of structural change characterised both by 
increased religious engagement and - at the same time - increased 
secularisation. This trajectory, epitomised by the emergence and 
development of international religious freedom policy, has been 
marked by the proliferation of interest groups utilising ideas (the 
socio-cultural level) for self-advancement which has, in turn, renewed 
and refreshed the cultural ‘civil religious’ narrative. On the other hand, 
the UK policy context has emerged as one in which there is 
remarkable structural morphostasis, characterised by the continuity of 
religious establishment, which interacts with cultural morphogenesis 
within the governing cadre whose ‘religion blindness’ is increasingly 
challenged by the appearance of varying ‘ideal interest 
groups’ (1988:297) and with calls to engage with religion as a foreign 
policy issue (see e.g. Barnett et al, 2015). The result has been what 
Archer (1988:297) describes, where ‘ideational change stimulates 
social regrouping’, as it has intensified conflict between ‘religious’ 
294
and ‘secular’ positions both within and outside government structures, 
exemplified by the debate over the ‘militant secularism’ of the public 
sector where the substantive content of this thesis began.
In Chapter Two, I suggested that the two different post-secular 
narratives were independently only able to offer a limited insight into 
the relationship between religion and foreign policy in the UK and the 
US. Moreover, I argued, bringing the two literatures into conversation 
exposes critical flaws in both which are not always cited in post-
secular narratives. Where one (the turn to culture) set of accounts 
either overplays religion’s significance in agency or engulfs agency 
entirely with its account of overbearing culture, it underplays the role 
of religion in structure. The other (responses to mainstream 
secularisation theory) overplays the significance of structure at the 
expense of culture. The sum of these two conversations is a narrative 
of homogenous Western secularism in the face of global (and national) 
religious change. Yet, what Archer’s (1988) model of morphogenesis, 
applied both to structure and to culture, has opened up is not only the 
possibility that cultural and structural change can happen 
independently but that one can happen prior to the other. As a result, it 
is possible to develop a narrative quite different than that offered by 
post-secularists. Where those accounts place an emphasis on cultures 
of secularism and therefore Western homogeneity, a cultural and 
structural analysis of religion-related UK and US foreign policy 
reveals more differences than similarities between the two contexts. 
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Furthermore, where post-secular narratives offer a picture of cultural 
religious change, Archer’s (1988) account of morphogenesis enables 
us to account for change in the context of either structural (UK) or 
cultural (US) continuity. 
Morphogenetics, I would suggest, necessarily complicates rather than 
simplifies the picture suggesting as it does that structural and cultural 
change can happen independently of one another. However, I would 
argue that Archer’s assumptions about the ‘Late modern’ condition of 
reflexivity in which there is continuous interplay between 
morphogenetic structure and culture, where ‘discursive struggles are 
socially organized and social struggles are culturally 
conditioned’ (Archer, 1995: 324), has not been supported by the 
evidence in this thesis. Hence, this thesis challenges Archer’s (2012:5) 
proposition that we have moved into an era of ‘rapid social 
transformation deriving from the positive reinforcement of cultural 
morphogenesis by structural morphogenesis and vice versa’. Contrary 
to Archer’s (2012:5) argument, I contend that the UK and US are still 
characteristic of the age ‘coterminous with modernity’ in which 
morphogenesis happens in either the structural or cultural field and is 
matched by morphostasis in the other. Rather than the sort of 
‘reflexivity’ Archer describes (e.g 2012: 7) appearing in either the UK 
or US foreign policy establishment, we have seen that ‘bringing in 
religion’ is structurally (UK) or culturally (US) ‘restorative of the 
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status quo’ (2012:6). And this is borne out by some very recent 
evidence.
6.4 The contemporary picture
In Chapter One, I described the contemporary research context as one 
in which scholars are increasingly called upon to demonstrate research 
impact. In this final section, I outline the ways in which I have sought 
to make my work not only policy-relevant but also impactful. Here I 
discuss two recent workshops that I have organised and facilitated 
bringing together scholars and practitioners on both sides of the 
Atlantic to discuss religion-related foreign policy in furtherance of the 
conclusions of this thesis. These workshops, I argue, contribute to the 
considerable pressure being placed upon foreign policy makers on 
both sides of the Atlantic to bring religion into their decision-making 
processes. Yet, the recommendations for UK foreign policy emerging 
out of these workshops, while they would initiate some ‘progress’ in 
the foreign policy establishment’s religious engagement by 
challenging the cultural problem of ‘religion blindness’ and, while 
they might on the surface resemble the new American arrangements, 
would nevertheless themselves both represent a distinctively British 
response and, in so doing, would be ‘restorative’ of the structural 
status quo. Focussing particularly on three recommendations - to 
develop a religious engagement strategy into which religious freedom 
advocacy would be folded; to learn from best practice elsewhere in 
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Government; and to leverage existing expertise from within the 
diplomatic cadre - I demonstrate that a new ‘religion attentive’ foreign 
policy approach would exhibit all the hallmarks of historic religion-
related domestic and international policy. First, it would derive its 
model of religious freedom from the domestic church-state settlement; 
second, it would derive its approach to religious engagement from the 
considerable wealth of best practice drawn from domestic and 
international development policy and in doing both of these things, it 
would challenge religion blindness but not the structural ‘religiosity’ 
of the British state. 
6.41 Towards Better International Policy Making 
Work emerging from one recent transatlantic initiative has at once 
advocated greater foreign policy attention should be paid to religion 
(Szabo, 2015) and at the same time pointed to the cleavages between 
European and American experience of the religion-foreign policy 
relationship (Jenichen, 2015). By contrast, a series of transatlantic 
dialogues I have been involved in pointed to some areas of 
commonality between the US and the UK when it comes to religion-
related policy objectives. In May 2013, in conjunction with the State 
Department, I organised, facilitated and presented at an inaugural 
State Department-Foreign Office roundtable on religion and foreign 
policy. A second roundtable, in October 2013, continued the 
conversation, focussing on the ways in which institutional resistance 
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to ‘doing religion’ might be overcome.  These roundtables opened up 
dialogue between policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic and, as a 
direct result, consensus emerged on three religion-related foreign 
policy priorities: countering violent extremism; promoting religious 
freedom; and achieving development and international stability. It is 
clear that, whatever the differences in the way they ‘do God’ (as 
described in Chapters 3,4 and 5), it is possible to reach agreement on 
the areas in which policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic 
recognise religion to be a relevant policy variable. 
In order to build on - and interrogate - these areas of consensus, in 
2014 I submitted a bid to the British Council ‘Bridging Voices’ 
programme for funding to organise two transatlantic workshops 
entitled ‘Toward Better International Policy Making: Understanding 
the Role of Religion in Two Priority Regions’. Working with academic 
colleagues and with considerable input from both the State 
Department and the Foreign Office, the proposal was for two scholar-
practitioner workshops which aimed at increasing the understanding 
of religious actors and dynamics in two regions: the Horn of Africa 
and the Middle East and North Africa, regions designated as high 
priority for foreign policy, development and stabilisation efforts on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
In practice, each British Council-funded workshop comprised scholars 
and practitioners and focussed on the ways in which religion is related 
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in the range of issues of concern to policy makers and diplomats in the 
region(s) and sought to identify opportunities for effective religion-
related policy interventions. The workshops focussed around lesson-
learning and sharing of best practice within and across different 
communities (NGOs, Governments, FBOs, academics) and had the 
explicit aim of developing answers to five question sets:
1. In what ways do Governments successfully work with religious 
actors in the region to advance strategic interests?   Which 
approaches or interventions have been successful? What elements 
are replicable? What faith-based communities, institutions and 
organisations have the necessary capacity to be constructive 
partners? Where are the strategic gaps and how can we contribute 
to building capacity?
2. Which country or regional policy objectives would benefit from 
a better understanding of religious dynamics? In particular, what 
might the advancement of religious freedom contribute to regional 
objectives? 
3. What can we learn from historical policy decisions that were 
not sufficiently attentive to the role an influence of religion? 
How might having a more deliberate or nuanced understanding of 
religious perspectives have helped avoid these errors?
4. What are the barriers to effective engagement with religious 
actors and dynamics? How have they been overcome? How can 
conflicts of interest be resolved?
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5. How can we measure the impact of religious engagement? 
Which approaches/interventions have been successful? Which 
elements are replicable? 
Yet, while these workshops originated in consensus between the two 
transatlantic foreign policy establishments, our findings pointed to 
divergence between the two contexts. The most obvious point of 
difference reflected in the Report of the workshops, published under 
the title ‘Toward Religion-Attentive Policy Making’, was in the 
machinery of government. In the time between conceptualising the 
workshops and hosting them, the US State Department took a ‘great 
leap faithward’ (Birdsall, 2013a) and established the Office for Faith 
Based Community Initiatives (subsequently re-named the Office for 
Religion and Global Affairs). As the Report highlights, there remains a 
strategic gap in the UK foreign policy establishment’s ability to 
engage religion effectively. Yet I would argue that the divergence 
between the two contexts goes further. This report makes a number of 
recommendations - many of which are relevant to policy makers on 
both sides of the Atlantic (for example about how to conceptualise 
religion) but at least four of which (about building capacity) are 
specifically intended for the UK foreign policy audience. The latter 
represent an attempt to overcome the sort of religion blindness which 
was identified in Chapter Three of this thesis, as the report explains 
‘‘the FCO, and perhaps the UK Government more broadly, suffers 
from a condition of ‘religion blindness’. The FCO can improve the 
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quality of its work by analysing religious dynamics and engaging 
religious actors (Birdsall, Lindsay and Tomalin, 2015b:8). 
Specifically, the report calls on the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office to do more on religion by appointing a Director of Religion and 
Global Affairs (Birdsall, Lindsay and Tomalin, 2015b:8). To an 
untrained eye, the appointment of a senior official and creation of 
bureaucratic space for the strategic consideration of religion within the 
Foreign Office might look a bit like the sort of initiative taken by the 
State Department and its Office for Religion and Global Affairs. But 
would this move to developing ‘religion attentive’ UK foreign policy 
really just be a case of conforming the British foreign policy 
establishment to the American model? 
On the contrary, while the report represents just the latest example of 
pressure to ‘do more on religion’ facing foreign policy makers, I want 
to demonstrate that its recommendations are as much about continuity 
as they are change and therefore that they represent the evolution of a 
uniquely British way to ‘manage God’. First and most obviously, the 
report calls on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to develop a 
religious engagement strategy into which religious freedom advocacy 
should be folded. This does not suggest a radical re-tooling of existing 
international religious freedom policy which, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
draws significantly on the domestic church-state settlement and 
Equalities legislation for its model. Furthermore, while the idea of a 
religious engagement strategy does echo the US Strategy for Religious 
302
Leader Engagement which is being delivered by the State 
Department’s Office, the Report makes clear that the Foreign Office 
should ‘emulate best practice’ (Birdsall, Lindsay and Tomalin 2015b:
9) from within the UK Government. But what might best practice look 
like?
6.42 Doing religious engagement: a typology
One of my interviewees, when asked about the government’s religious 
engagement suggested: ‘there is no collective database of religious 
groups and ways they are engaged with..I expect it happens differently 
in different areas’ (HMG 5 July 2012/c). In fact, what I have found is a 
remarkable degree of consistency in the way government ‘does God’ 
even across departmental boundaries. I have mapped an extensive 
range of public policy engagements with religion and, through this 
mapping, I have developed a five fold ‘typology’ of religion-related 
public policy which illustrates that there are five ‘modes’ in which 
policy makers engage religious actors: formal advice, commissioning, 
consulting or engaging; enabling; and research. In what follows, I 
provide a brief overview of each of these modes with illustrative 
examples provided to me during the course of my interviews.
First, my interviews revealed that there are a range of mechanisms 
through which policy makers obtain religious ‘advice’. Perhaps the 
most obvious is through the appointment of designated faith advisers 
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like the Islamic Religious Adviser to the Ministry of Defence whose 
role is to ‘represent some of these (religious) perspectives to policy 
makers’ (HMG/4 October 2013a). In a similar model, a number of 
faith advisers were appointed to the Department of Communities and 
Local Government between 2003 and 2010 under the Prevent counter-
radicalisation strategy (HMG/5 July 2012/b). These faith advisers, one 
official explained, introduced a different perspective to the policy 
making process, suggesting that religion could specifically affect 
outcomes like poverty and were keen for religion to be included in the 
list of protected characteristics under equalities legislation (HMG/5 
July  2012/b). 
As well as the appointment of religious or ‘faith’ advisers to central 
government departments, advice is also obtained from religious 
representatives sitting on formal advisory boards including the 
Foreign Secretary’s advisory group on human rights (HMG/23 August 
2012/b); the Faith Partnership advisory board established after the 
publication of DFID’s Faith Partnership Principles (HMG/14 June 
2013/a); and the Ministry of Justice’s Equality and Diversity Forum 
(HMG 27 July 2012/a)128. Taking the perspectives of religious 
representatives, then, seems to be a relatively routine part of the policy  
making process. 
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The second model through which policy makers in the UK engage 
religious actors, ‘commissioning’, involves policy makers contracting 
out the delivery of public services to faith based organisations. This 
model began under the Blair government (HMG 27 July 2012/a) with 
the establishment of the Department of Communities and Local 
Government and was extended in the 2008 paper ‘Face to Face and 
Side by Side: a framework for partnership in our interfaith society’. In 
my interviews, officials identified a range of recent policy initiatives 
which involved the commissioning of faith sector organisations 
including everything from faith schools, whose religious credentials 
could be protected by a move to academy status129 to neighbourhoods 
policy under which the Church Urban Fund has been funded to 
improve inter-faith relations, a new type of partnership which is 
‘taking advantage of the role they (the Church of England) already 
play in communities’ (HMG 27 July 2012/a)130. The range and scope 
of this type of ‘commissioning’ is broad: for example, the Ministry of 
Justice has contracted the Salvation Army to provide services to adult 
victims of human trafficking (HMG/27 July 2012/a)131 while domestic 
integration policy involves the direct funding of faith related projects 
seeking to improve community relations (HMG 27 July 2012/a)132. 
Furthermore, under the Localism Act, the Department for 
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129 See The Guardian ‘Gove defends Faith Schools’, 17 February 2011 - http://
www.theguardian.com/education/2011/feb/17/gove-faith-schools - accessed 7 May 
2015
130 In correspondence 30 October 2013.
131 In correspondence 30 October 2013
132 In correspondence 30 October 2013.
Communities and Local Government encourages local authorities to 
commission services from faith-based organisations. There is, then, an 
established pattern of ‘commissioning’ religious organisations to 
deliver specific public services. 
The third mode of religious engagement I have identified falls under 
the banner ‘consulting or engaging’, by this I mean the consultation or 
engagement of religious actors or representatives as stakeholders in 
the policy development or implementation process. Based on my 
evidence, it seems that this is by far the most extensively utilised 
mode of religious engagement.  Consulting or engaging is less about 
the utilisation of religious groups and their resources and more about 
the representation of religious groups and their perspectives in the 
policy making process. This type of engagement, one official 
explained, dated back to consultation with a range of religious groups 
over the Millennium Celebrations, which ‘set a precedent for all faiths 
feeling they had a right to be consulted’ (HMG 27 July 2012/a). Those 
I interviewed identified a range of consultation with religious groups 
including with black churches on planning laws (HMG/ 5 July 2012/
c); with Churches over changes to accession rules (HMG/5 July 2012/
a); with religious groups over the swine flu epidemic and flood review 
(HMG 24 July 2012/a); with Churches and other faith bodies on 
education policy; and in Northern Ireland, the government has often 
been ‘in listening mode’ with Church leaders (HMG, 5 July 2012/a). 
On religious freedom, officials explained to me, the consultation 
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process with religious groups is ‘wide’ with ‘many advocacy groups in 
regular contact’ (HMG 23 August 2012/a). In July 2011, there was a 
conference on religious freedom at Wilton Park which brought 
together government representatives, civil society representatives and 
faith leaders (HMG 23 August 2012/a). Importantly, officials were 
keen to point out, consultation of religious groups is wide-ranging - 
though the government traditionally works with the nine historic faiths 
it will ‘talk to anyone who wants to talk’ (HMG, 27 July 2012/a). 
What this suggests is that equalities legislation, though critiqued for a 
functional conception of religion, (see e.g. Trigg, 2013) has in fact 
provided opportunities for religious groups to contribute to the policy 
making process.
The fourth mode of religious engagement is subtly different from the 
third. I have labelled this mode ‘enabling’ though it might also be 
described as partnership working. This category describes the ways in 
which HMG works to assist religious organisations and groups to 
achieve their own ends. The most high profile recent example of this 
sort of ‘enabling’ is the so-called Big Society.  Recognising that ‘there 
is already a big role for religious organisations in civil society’ (HMG 
5 July 2012/c), through initiatives like community asset transfer, the 
government is enabling religious organisations to take over libraries, 
community centres and other community assets. Similarly, the ‘Year 
of Service’ initiative was an ‘opportunity for the Government to 
highlight work that faith communities already do’ (HMG, 27 July 
307
2012/a). The Department for International Development has worked 
with churches on development projects through the Basic Services 
Fund (HMG 27 July 2012/a)133.  One of the most significant examples 
of ‘enabling’, or working in partnership, in recent years has been 
through the Prevent counter-radicalisation strategy as one official 
explained ‘In the Prevent Strand, religious groups are critical players, 
in the early days we looked for friendly commentators’ (HMG 3 July 
2012/a). In a way ‘enabling’ represents the counter-point to 
accusations that the government ‘instrumentalises’ religious 
organisations in their pursuit of policy goals. By enabling faith groups 
and communities, the government allows itself to be instrumentalised 
given these groups’ engagement with government stakeholders is 
‘either advancing their agenda or protecting something, like any other 
organisation that has interests’ (HMG 5 July 2012/c)
The fifth and final mode of religious engagement described to me by 
officials was research. This covers quite a range of activity - from 
large-scale external research projects like the five year Religions and 
Development Programme to internal information gathering done by 
the Research, Information and Communications Unit. Significantly, 
the scope for research into religion has decreased under the Coalition 
Government. One official explained ‘there was more research done on 
religion under Prevent, now we look at ethnicity, place of birth and 
rare populations’ (HMG 5 July 2012/d), another suggested ‘we rarely 
308
133 In correspondence 30 October 2013
go looking for expertise on religion...our interest is in people’ (HMG 5 
July 2012/c). That said, officials I spoke to identified a range of 
research initiatives which concerned religion. Perhaps most significant 
was the cadre of research analysts in the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office who ‘support policy objectives but have additional other 
objectives about enhancing knowledge and expertise’ (HMG 28 
August 2012/b). While organised geographically, these analysts 
recognised that ‘for an individual or group inspired or motivated by 
religion, I would expect it to be the most important factor’ (HMG 28 
August 2012/b) and were able to identify a range of recent research 
into religion from one piece on the role of specific religious 
organisations in global and local events to another which tracked 
trends in the Government’s work with certain types of groups. 
Elsewhere, RICU continues to support counter-terrorism objectives 
with its work and is ‘now able to put information it has gathered to 
front line staff..this is much more advanced than in other policy 
areas’ (HMG 7 December 2012/a). 
While policy makers were quick to point out that these modes of 
engagement were not unusual and that religious groups are treated ‘as 
just another civil society stakeholder’ (HMG/28 August 2012/a) or as 
‘any other constituency’ (HMG/5 July 2012/c), nevertheless this 
typology provides a useful focus for practitioners in that it illustrates a 
range of entry points into the policy making process, helping to build 
the sort of ‘policy literacy’ I described as essential in Chapter One. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the array of religion-related policy 
engagements would represent a good starting point for foreign policy 
makers keen to learn from the successes or failures of past 
interventions that have been undertaken elsewhere in Government. 
There is scope for a similar review of religion-related interventions to 
be undertaken across the diplomatic cadre (Birdsall, Lindsay and 
Tomalin, 2015b: 9) who will have their own experiences of religious 
engagement in post. 
6.43 Toward religion-attentive UK foreign policy
In the United States, building strategic capacity for religious 
engagement in the State Department - via the establishment of an 
Office for Religion and Global Affairs - was met with suspicion (e.g. 
Olmstead, 2013) over the extent to which this initiative would 
contravene the First Amendment. Unlike that context, the UK foreign 
policy community would face no such structural barrier in making 
new arrangements for ‘doing God’ more strategically. Indeed, taking 
religion seriously as a foreign policy issue and initiating new efforts to 
engage and understand religion would be part of a long history of 
religion-related engagements in the domestic arena and would build 
on the sort of international initiatives outlined in Chapter Four. Not 
only is the UK in a unique position to achieve real impact in the 
pursuit of international religious freedom given its combination of 
religious establishment and tremendous religious pluralism (see 
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Chapter Four), it can learn from its past mistakes in doing religious 
engagement (see Chapter Three) and from the American precedent 
(see Chapter Five) to develop a religion-attentive foreign policy 
process which is fit for the contemporary era in which ‘Understanding 
religion, and religions, needs to be an integral part of our diplomatic 
armoury.’134 Doing so, I suggest, would represent a cultural but not a 
structural shift for the UK foreign policy establishment rather than the 
sort of mutual morphogenesis Archer (2012) describes as 
characteristic of late modernity. 
Furthermore, what I am describing is far from a ‘post-secular’ foreign 
policy.  I contend that building institutional capacity for religious 
engagement - be it in the US State Department or the UK Foreign 
Office - does not represent the sort of fundamental change posited by 
post-secular narratives. Instead, the adoption of a strategic 
international approach to religion in both contexts represents 
continuity rather than change.  Any UK approach to religious 
engagement would inevitably be shaped by the domestic constitutional 
settlement which - as domestic policy has shown - makes it 
comparatively easy for the UK government to engage religious actors 
given it is demonstrably neither ‘secular’ nor ‘post-secular’. On the 
other hand, the American Office for Religion and Global Affairs has 
been shaped by the First Amendment and therefore remains in a 
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134 Nigel Baker, Her Majesty’s Ambassador to the  Holy See, Blog January 14th 
2014 http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/nigelbaker/2013/01/24/training-diplomats-to-
understand-religion/) - accessed May 5 2015
‘secular’ rather than ‘post-secular’ mode. I explained earlier that the 
core purpose of this project was to explain and examine markedly 
different transatlantic foreign policy approaches to religion. In the 
course of writing this thesis, things have changed considerably on 
both sides of the Atlantic, demonstrating that the religion-foreign 
policy relationship is not only something policy makers are 
increasingly concerned about but something scholars should recognise 
as an opportunity for exploration. Yet what this thesis demonstrates is 
that the differences between the US and the UK are more fundamental 
than mere policy positions. This means that no matter how far the 
UK’s religion-related policy priorities seem to echo those in the US 
and however the UK Government moves forward to develop a 
religion-attentive foreign policy approach - be it appointing an 
Ambassador for religious freedom or developing a religious 
engagement strategy - it will always ‘manage God’ differently. 
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Appendix A
8.1 Sample Interview Questions
These questions provide an overview of the sort of subjects 
discussed with participants.  They acted as a guide during the 
interview process which was semi-structured. Questions were 
tailored to the individual, bearing in mind their connection to the 
material and context. 
The purposes of the interviews will be to determine:
1) if, how and whether religion currently motivates, helps to deliver or 
contributes to the objectives of foreign policy
2) if, how and whether religion has in the past motivated, helped to 
deliver or contributed to the objectives of foreign policy
3) if, how and whether religion currently (or has in the past) motivates, 
helps to deliver or contributes to the objectives of domestic policy
4) why any differences between engagement with/treatment of/
attentiveness to religion in domestic and foreign policy may emerge 
(including the extent of personal interest, bias on the part of 
decision makers)
5) how the religious heritage of individuals, groups and generations 
(including but not limited to personal religious faith and practice, 
national heritage, educational background) may have influenced 
specific foreign policy decisions or the general direction of foreign 
policy
Introductory
1. How long have you worked in this department/organisation?
2. What is your particular area of interest/expertise?
3. Having read the project information, please describe your current 
role and any other experience that you consider relevant to the 
project.
4. What was your initial reaction to the information provided about the 
project? 
5. How do you react to the suggestion that current UK (foreign) policy 
is ‘religion blind’?
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Use of research
6. How often do you refer to external research in your work?
7. Can you give examples of the sort of external research you have 
used in order to develop policy?
8. Is there a part of your department/organisation where research takes 
place in order to inform policy making?
9. Do you regularly commission/consult research?
10.Does your department/unit/you subscribe to or consult relevant 
journals e.g. foreign affairs?
11.Have you/your department/unit ever consulted external experts in 
developing policy?
Foreign Policy
12. What is foreign (national security, development, communities) 
policy?
13. How are foreign (national security, development, communities) 
policy decisions made?
14. What factors are considered in developing foreign (national 
security, development, communities) policy?
15. How significant is the national interest in foreign (national 
security, development, communities) policy?
16. What, in your experience, is the relationship between religion and 
foreign (national security, development, communities) policy?
17. Are there any ways in which religion motivates foreign (national 
security, development, communities) policy?
18. Is religion a foreign (national security, development, communities) 
policy issue? 
19. Do you consider religion to influence policy in any other 
countries? If so which? why/why not?
20. Are there other areas of government policy in which you consider 
religion to be an important factor?
21. What is involved in the practice of foreign (national security, 
development, communities) policy?
22. How is success in foreign policy (national security, development, 
communities) measured?
US/UK relations
23. Is the relationship between the US and UK significant in your area 
of work?
24. How would you describe/do you understand the relationship 
between the UK and US?
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25. How closely do you work with US counterparts on specific areas 
of policy?
26. What factors are considered when developing policy with relation 
to the US?
27. How do you respond to the growing attention being paid to 
religion in relation to foreign policy in the US?/How do you 
respond to the fact that little attention is paid to religion in relation 
to foreign policy in the UK?
Capability-related
28. Are there any formal qualifications required for your position/
related positions in your organisation?
29. What experience would you expect someone working in your 
position/organisation to have?
30. How far is foreign policy influenced by research? Do you 
regularly engage with think tanks/research organisations? 
31. Do you consider there to be a departmental/organisational culture? 
32. What is the cultural make-up of your department/organisation?
33. Are there any religion specialists in your department?
34. Has your work ever required you/colleagues to study religion(s) or 
religious communities?
35. Where would you seek information on religion in the event that it 
was needed?
International Religious Freedom (for USA only)
36. Where did the IRF act come from?
37. What is the connection between IRF policy and the first 
amendment?
38. What does IRF look like?
39. Is there a relationship between Christianity and democracy?
40. Is IRF only about the protection of minority religions?
41. What has been/is being done to encourage other countries to 
pursue an IRF policy agenda?
42. Why do you think Obama was slow to appoint an IRF 
Ambassador?
IRF (for UK only)
43. What do you know about US IRF policy?
44. How significant is religious freedom as part of the European and 
UK human rights agenda?
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Education/religious background
[I sought information about the educational and religious 
background of interview subjects to ascertain whether there is a 
connection between individual experiences of religion and 
attitudes towards its role in foreign policy.]
43. What is your understanding of religion?
44. Do you consider yourself to be religious?
45. What is your experience of religion/religious organisations?
46. In what ways do you consider your experience of religion to have 
assisted you in obtaining/performing your role? previous/future 
roles? To what level are you formally educated? In particular, do 
you have undergraduate or postgraduate qualifications? In what 
subjects? 
47. In what ways do you consider your formal education assisted you 
in obtaining/performing your role? previous/future roles?
General/Closing
48. Is there anything you would like to discuss/mention that we have 
not covered?
49. Are there any interviewees that you would suggest I contact about 
this research?
50. How significant do you consider to be the findings of this 
research? 
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Appendix B
8.2 Interview Coding
UK Interviews
Anyone in the employment of Her Majesty’s Government (includes 
members of the permanent civil service, the diplomatic service 
(including locally engaged officers) temporary appointees or special 
advisers but excluding Ministers) will be referred to as HMG/date/
a,b,c etc. Attributions will be recorded as ‘HMG official’. [note: any 
reference to ‘policy makers’ or ‘policy officials’ in the thesis refer to 
this group of government employees and NOT to the Ministerial cadre 
of elected politicians.]
In addition to specific interviews, I have drawn on a number of 
interactions with HMG officials (including the range referred to 
above) in the form of roundtable discussions, personal correspondence 
etc on religion and policy. In order to demonstrate where references 
are to a single individual, I have used the classification code of his/her 
first interview in the text and have used an additional footnote to 
indicate where this information came from an interaction other than a 
formal interview.
Interview Code Interview Date Attribution
HMG/ 8 June/2011 8 June 2011 HMG official
HMG/10 May 2012/a 10 May 2012 HMG official
HMG/10 May 2012/b 10 May 2012 HMG official
HMG/3 July 2012/a 3rd July 2012 HMG official
HMG/4 July 2012/a 4th July 2012 HMG official
HMG/4 July 2012/b 4th July 2012 HMG official
HMG/4 July 2012/c 4 July 2012 HMG official
HMG/5 July 2012/a 5 July 2012 HMG official
HMG/5 July 2012/b 5 July 2012 HMG official
HMG/5 July 2012/c 5 July 2012 HMG official
HMG/5 July 2012/d 5 July 2012 HMG official
HMG/ 24 July 2012/a 24 July 2012 HMG official
HMG/27 July 2012/a 27th July 2012 HMG official
HMG/ 23 August 
2012/a
23 August 2012 HMG official
HMG/23 August 
2012/b
23 August 2012 HMG official
HMG/28 August 
2012/a
28 August 2012 HMG official
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Interview Code Interview Date Attribution
HMG/28 August 
2012/c
28 August 2012 HMG official
HMG/28 August 
2012/c
28 August 2012 HMG official
HMG/28 August 
2012/b
28 August 2012 HMG official
HMG/ 21 September 
2012/a
21 September 2012 HMG official
HMG/7 December 
2012/a
7 December 2012 HMG official
HMG/7 December 
2012/b
7 December 2012 HMG official
HMG/ 13 December 
2012/a
13 December 2012 HMG official
HMG/19 March 2013/
a
19 March 2013 HMG official
HMG/ 21 March 
2013/a
21 March 2013 HMG official
HMG/21 March 2013/
b
21 March 2013 HMG official
HMG/14 June 2013/a 14 June 2013 HMG official
HMG/4 October 2013/
a
4 October 2013 HMG official
US Interviews
Anyone in the employment of the US Federal Government will be 
referred to as USG/date/a,b,c. Attributions will be to a ‘federal 
government official’. 
Given the division between government employees and civil society 
representatives is less marked in the US, although I will refer to civil 
society representatives as ‘USCS/date/a,b,c’, it should be noted that a 
number of those interviewed were former employees of the federal 
government - these are marked with an *.
Interview Code Interview Date Attribution
USCS/26 March 2013/
a*
26 March 2013 former USG/civil 
society representative
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Interview Code Interview Date Attribution
USCS/26 March 2013/
b*
26 March 2013 former USG/public 
intellectual
USCS/27 March 2013/
a*
27 March 2013 former USG/civil 
society representative
USCS/2 April 2013/a 2 April 2013 civil society 
representative
USCS/2 April 2013/b 2 April 2013 civil society 
representative
USCS/24 April 2013/
a*
24 April 2013 former USG/civil 
society representative
USG/25 April 2013/a 25 April 2013 US Government 
employee
USG/25 April 2013/b 25 April 2013 US Government 
employee
USCS/30 April 2013/a 30 April 2013 civil society 
representative/public 
intellectual
USCS/7 May 2013/a* 7 May 2013 former USG/civil 
society representative
USG/7 May 2013/a 7 May 2013 US government 
employee
USG/15 May 2013a 15 May 2013 US Government 
employee
USCS/25 July 2013/a* 25 July 2013 former USG/public 
intellectual
USG/4 October 2013/
a
4 October 2013 US government 
employee
USCS/29 March 2015 29 March 2015 former USG/public 
intellectual
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